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Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Mot. 
For Summary Dismissal Of Petition 
Hearing Scheduled - (04/09/2003) Ron Schilling 







lnterim Hearing Held 
Order Granting Limited Appearance And Waiver 
Court Minutes 
Briefing Order . 
Order For Attorney Fees 
Amended Order To Appoint Special Prosecutor 
Re:motion To Recall Remittitur And Remand Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
For Resentencing Procedures 
Certificate Of Mailing 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion For Extension 
Of Time 






Reply Brief In Support Of States Motion 
For Summary Dismissal 
Order For Attorney's Fees 
Hearing Scheduled - (0310312004) Ron Schilling 









Interim Hearing held 
Court Minutes 
Stay Pending Supreme Court Decision 
Order Staying Proceedings pending dispositon in 
the ldaho Supreme Court 
HRSC SUE Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status 










Prosecutor assigned Lori Gilmore PROS 
MOTN 
HRHD 
Motion to lift stay 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference 





Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling 
Conference 03/30/2006 10:OO AM) 




111 812008 Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County User SUE 
$ii& @z%;v 02 kz** M ROA Report .9$i L$*9 
8 of 10 Case CR-1981-0008495 Current Judge Ron Schilling 
Defendant: Stuart, Gene Francis 
State of Idaho vs. Gene Francis Stuart 
Date Code 
211 012006 BRIE 






















SUE Petitioner's supplemental briefing in opposition to Ron Schilling 
1) motion for summary dismissal of petition for 
postconviction relief andlor writ of habeas corpus 
and 2) Rule 35 petition 
SHARON Supplemental Brief in Support of Respondent's Ron Schilling 
Motion for Summary Dismissal 
SUE Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling Ron Schilling 
Conference held on 0313012006 10:OO AM: 
Hearing Held 
SUE Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
SUE Hearing Scheduled (Motion 05/22/2006 10:OO Ron Schilling 
AM) TO BE HELD AT THE MAXIMUM 
SECURITY PRISON IN BOISE 
SUE Notice Of Hearing Ron Schqling 
SUE Affidavit of Susan Kathleen Stuart Ron Schilling 
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SUE Affidavit of Donna Marquette Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
SUE Affidavit of Delores Mary Nichols Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
SUE Affidavit of Claudia J. Petrie Ron Schilling 
SUE Affidavit of Doug Seeger Ron Schilling 
SUE Affidavit of Coby L. Smith Ron Schilling 
SUE Affidavit of Thomas H. Thorn Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
SUE Affidavit of Sheri Wald Ron Schilling 
SUE Affidavit of Esther Ziemann Ron Schilling 
AFF D SUE Affidavit of Virginia Lee Presler Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
AFF D SUE Affidavit of Michael A. Lowe Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Debra K. Johnson Ron Schilling 
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BE HELD AT THE MAXIMUM SECURITY 
PRISON IN BOISE 
CMlN SUE Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
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Affidavit of Michael A. Lowe 
Affidavit of Debra K. Johnson 
Affidavit pf Rose Mary Connelly 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Daniel Heagy 
Affidavit of Rose Mary Connelly 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Malry Jane Bigley 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Gene Lee Dally 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Sharie Lee Kuhl 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Virginia Lee Presler 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Thomas H. Thorn 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Jim Bigley 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Malvin W. Kraft 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Delores Mary Nichols 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Donna Marquette 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Susan Kathleen Stuart 
Document sealed 
Scanned 4/26/07 
Judgment dismissing case with prejudice 
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Appealed To The Supreme Court Ron Schilling 
Motion that costs of appeal be at county expense Ron Schilling 
Order Ron Schilling 
Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
Stipulation Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
Order Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
Notice of lodging reporters transcript and clerk's Ron Schilling 
record 
Affidavit in support of motion Ron Schilling 
Motion for extension of time in which to file Ron Schilling 
objections to clerk's record and reporters's 
transcripts 
Order Ron Schilling 
Notice of an objection to clerk's record Ron Schilling 
Notice of hearing In RE: Settlement of Clerk's Ron Schilling 
Record 
Hearing Scheduled (Objection 10/09/2007 10:OO Ron Schilling 
AM) 
Stipulation regard~ng correction of clerk's record Ron Schilling 
Order regarding correction of clerk's record Ron Schilling 
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New Case Filed Ron Schilling 
Petition For Post-conviction Relief And/or Ron Schilling 
Writ Of Habeas Corpus Ron Schilling 
Affidavit In Support Of Petition 
Certificate Of Delivery 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion Ron Schilling 
Motion For Summary Dismissal Ron Schilling 
Brief In Sup. Of Motion For Summary Dismissal Ron Schilling 
Certificate Of Mailing Ron Schilling 
Notice Of Intent To File Opposition And Ron Schilling 
Supporting Memorandum & Req. Hearing Ron Schilling 
Motion For Limited Admission Ron Schilling 
Petitioner's Response In Opp. To Mot. For Ron Schilling 
Summary Dismissal Of Petition Ron Schilling 
Hearing Scheduled - (04/09/2003) Ron Schilling Ron Schilling 
Interim Hearing Held Ron Schilling 
Order Granting Limited Appearance And Waiver Ron Schilling 
Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
Supplemental Authority Supporting Petition Ron Schilling 
For Post-conviction Relief And/or Writ H.c. Ron Schilling 
Briefing Order Ron Schilling 
Petition For Appt. Of Special Prosecutor Ron Schilling 
Amended Petition For Appt. Of Special Pros. Ron Schilling 
Order To Appoint Special Prosecutor In Re Ron Schilling 
Post Conviction Relief And/or Habeas Corpus Ron Schilling 
Certificate Of Mailing Ron Schilling 
Affidavit In Support Of Mot~on For Extension Ron Schilling 
Of Time Ron Schilling 
Motion For Extension Of Time Ron Schilling 
Reply Brief In Support Of State's Motion For Ron Schilling 
Summary Dismissal Ron Schilling 
Hearing Scheduled - (03/03/2004) Ron Schilling Ron Schilling 
Affd. In Support Of Mot. To Stay Proceedings Ron Schilling 
Pending Dispo. In The Idaho Supreme Ct. Ron Schilling 
Mot. To Stay Proceedings Pending Disposition Ron Schilling 
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Stay Pending Supreme Court Decision Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling Order Staying Proceedings Pending Dispositon in 
the Idaho Supreme Court 
WRSC SUE Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Status 













Prosecutor assigned Lori Gilmore 
Motion to lift stay 
Hearing result for Telephonic Status Conference 





Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling Hearing Scheduled (Telephonic Scheduling 
Conference 03/30/2006 10:00 AM) 
SUE 
SUE 
Notice Of Hearing Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling BRIE Petitioner's supplemental briefing in opposition to 
1) motion for summaty dismissal of petition for 
postconviction relief and/or writ of habeas corpus 
& 2) Rule 35 petition 
BREF 
HRHD 
SHARON Supplemental Brief in Support of Responden's 
Motion For Summary Dismissal 
Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling SUE Hearing result for Telephonic Scheduling 






Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling Hearing Scheduled (Hearing Scheduled 
05/22/2006 10:OO AM) To be held at the . 
maximum security prison in Boise 
Affidavit of Susan Kathleen Stuart Ron Schilling AFFD SUE 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Jim Big ley 
* 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Mary Jane Bigley 
AFFD SUE Ron Schilling 
Ron Schilling AFFD SUE 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Gene Lee Dally Ron Schilling AFFD SUE 
Document sealed 





Ron Schilling Affidavit of Malvin W. Kraft 
Document sealed 
Affidavit of Sharie Lee Kuhl SUE Ron Schilling AFFD 
Document sealed 





SUE Affidavit of Donna Marguette 
Document sealed 
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AFFD SUE Affidavit of Delores Mary Nichols Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Claudia J. Petrie Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Doug Seeger Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Coby L. Smith Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Thomas H. Thorn Ron Schilling 
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AFFD SUE Affidavit of Sheri Ward Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Esther Ziemann Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Virginia Lee Presler Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Michael A. Lowe Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Debra K. Johnson Ron Schilling 
AFFD SUE Affidavit of Rose Mary Connelly Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
ADVS SUE Hearing result for Hearing Scheduled held on Ron Schilling 
05/22/2006 10:00 AM: Case Taken Under 
Advisement To be held at the maximum security 
prison in Boise 
CMIN SUE Court Minutes Ron Schilling 
CDlS SUE Civil Disposition entered for: Gilmore, Lori, Other Ron Schilling 
Party; State Of Idaho, Other Party; Stuart, Gene 
Francis, Subject. 
order date: 3/12/2007 
MEMO SUE Memorandum Opinion on Petition for Post Ron Schilling 
Conviction Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus & 
Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to vacate 
sentence of death and for new sentencing trial. 
SCAN SUE Scanned 03/29/07 Ron Schilling 
JDMT SUE Judgment Dismissing Case with Prejudice Ron Schilling 
SCAN SUE Scanned 04/26/2007 Ron Schilling 
APSC SUE Appealed To The Supreme Court Ron Schilling 
NOTA SUE NOTICE OF APPEAL Ron Schilling 
MOTN SUE Motion that costs of appeal be at county expense Ron Schilling 
ORDR SUE Order Ron Schilling 
MlSC SUE Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
MlSC SUE Second Amended Notice of Appeal Ron Schilling 
STIP SUE Stipulation Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
ORDR SUE Order Ron Schilling 
Document sealed 
NOTC SUE Notice of lodging reporters transcript and clerk's Ron Schilling 
record 
Date: 1 11 812008 
Time O r p $ P M  -+SA&S 
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Second Judicial District Court - Clearwater County 
ROA Report 
Case: CV-2002-0000443 Current Judge: Ron Schilling 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
User: SUE 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff vs State Of Idaho, Defendant 
Date Code User Judge 
8/22/2007 AFFD SUE Affidavit in support of motion for extension Ron Schilling 
MOTN SUE Motion for extension of time in which to file Ron Schilling 
objections to cferk's record and reporter's 
transcript 
ORDR SUE Order Ron Schilling 
9/25/2007 NOTC SUE Notice of hearing In RE: Settlement of Clerk's Ron Schilling 
Record 
NOTC SUE Notice of and objection to clerk's record Ron Schilling 
1 0/412007 HRSC BARBIE Hearing Scheduled (Objection 10/09/2007 10:OO Ron Schilling 
AM) 
12/21/2007 STIP SUE Stipulation regarding correction of clerk's record Ron Schilling 
1/2/2008 ORDR SUE Order regarindg correction of clerk's record Ron Schilling 
3. Porter's Motion to CUR-& Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sattmce of Death 
and for Mew Sentmeng Trial (Lcwis Comty Case No. 6053) is denied 
without prejudice as moot: 
4. The Verdict, filed January 26,1990, finding Porter guilty of first-degree 
murder shatI stand; 
5. The disbricf court's order and judgment that Porter is "guilty of the 
CRIME OF m E R  INTHE F B T  DEGREE as charged in said 
idomahon as found by the jury in their unanimous verdict" contained in 
the Judmmt and Sentace, filed September 7,1990 shall stand; 
6. The district courfs order, judgment and decree that Porter is 
"sentenced to suffer the punishment of death in accordance with the 
provisions of Idaho Code Section 184004 and in the manner prescribed by 
Chapter 27 of Title 19, Idaho Code, at the Idaho State Penitentiary in Boise, 
Ada County, Idaho" contained in the Judgment and Sentence, filed 
September 7,1990 is hereby vacated; 
7. A new date will be set to sentence Porter for first-degree murder, the 
only crime of which he now stands convicted by a jury of his peers. 
IT IS SO ORDERED this& day of April. 2003. 
Although 1 h e  serious reservations about h s  court's jurisdiction to impose: 
the death penalty in this case, Hays v. State, I13 Idaho 736,739,747 P.2d 758 
(Ct.App. 1987) ("A jurisdictional defect exists when the alleged facts are not 
made mimind by statute, or where there is a failure tn state facts essential to 
establish the offense charged"), because I conclude I.C. 9 19-2719 does not bar 
Porter's petition for relief, I do not reach those issues raised-by his Rule 35 
motion. 
WOE?A.NDUM DECISION, PORTER V. STAE,  SP-02-041 21 
CAm OF SERVICE 
I hmeby c d E y  that a h e  and mmct copy of the above Memorandum Dedsion 
to the following persons by the manner indicated. 
L. Labfont Andemn 
Office of the Att:om.ey General 
Capital Lit.iga.tion Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 8372GCX)IO 
Kimron R. Torgemon 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Lews County Courthouse 
Nezperce, Idaho 83543 
Andrew Parnes 
P.O. Box 5988 
K e t c h n ,  n]) 83340 
U.S. Mail 
( ] Overnight Mail 
I I Fax 
[ ] Hand Delivery 
[ ] U.S. Mail 
f 1 Overnight Mail 
11 f Fax 
Hand Delivery 
&J U.S. Mail 
[ ] Overnight Mail 
C I Fax 
[ Hand Delivery 
Joan Fisher US. Mail 
Bmce G-bn [ Overnight Mail 
Capital Habeus Unit &j Fax ~ o S E K ~ - L ~ ~ %  
Federal Defenders of Eastam WashuySton & Idaho [ f Hand Delivery 
201 N. Main Street 
Moscow, ldaho 83843 
h4EMORANDUM DECISION, PORTER V. STATE, SP-M-041 
IN THE DISTRICT COUT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO. IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER,pd2 




) CASE NO. 
1 VS . 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
1 
) BRIEFING ORDER 
Defendant. j 
1 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 





STATE OF IDAHO, 1 BRIEFING ORDER 
Respondent. 1 
1 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 





STATE OF IDAHO, 1 BRIEFING ORDER 
Respondent. 1 
Following a conference call on April 9, 2003, at the hour of 10:15 a.m., the 
Court hereby sets the following cut-off dates: 
DefendantlPetitioner shall file it's responsive brief to the Motion for Summary 
Dismissal in SP02-151 by July 1 1,2003; 
PlaintifflRespondent shall file all responsive briefs to Defendantlpetitioner's 
pending briefs on or before October 10, 2003; 
DefendantlPetitioner shall file response to PlaintifflRespondent's briefs by 
November 14,2003. 
BRIEFING ORDER- Page 1 of 2 
Upon completion of briefing a hearing will be scheduled at the Maximum 
Security Facility courtroom in Boise, Idaho. DefendantlPetitioner, Gene Francis 
Stuart, will be personally present at said hearing. 
Any preliminary matters not needing court minutes may be set up as a 
conference call. Any preliminary matters requiring court minutes will be scheduled 
for hearing at the Clearwater County Courthouse, Orofino, Idaho. 
DATED this 1~ ' day o&72003. 
CERTIFICATE OF DELIVERY 
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the foregoing BRIEFING 
ORDER was hand delivered or mailed, postage pre-paid, on the /2?/;h"day of 
April, 2003 to the following: 
John A. Swayne 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Clearwater County Courthoitse 
//hand delivered 
Joan M. Fisher 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
201 North Main Street 
Moscow, ID 83843 
/mailed 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN 
Clerk of the District Court 
3 
, < . ; ~ c f . ~ ~ ~  6- ' 
. b  
i" , 
BRIEFING ORDER- Page 2 of 2 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of ldaho 
MICHAEL A. HENDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687 
KIMBERLY J. BAILEY, ISB #5159 
WLPH R. BLOUNT, ISB #5966 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P. 0 .  Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 
.. -. 




'201 AUG 13 A 11: 34 
CASE PC0 
JOHN A. SWAYNE, ISB #I985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
PO Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-561 1 
Facsimile: (208) 476-971 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
Plaintiff-Appellant, CASE NO. SP02-00109 
VS. PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST 
GENE FRANCIS STEWART, 1 CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Petitioner-Respondent. 1 
FETlT70N FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST CONVICT70N REUEF 
AND/OR WRlT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 1 
COMES NOW, John A. Swayne, Prosecuting Attorney, in and for Cleawater 
County, State of Idaho, and hereby petitions the above-entitled court for the 
appointment of a Special Prosecutor in the interest of GENE FRANCIS STEWART and 
upon being duly sworn, hereby deposes and says: 
1. That your affiant is the duly elected Prosecuting Attorney of Clearwater 
County; 
2. That your affiant has the duty to respond to the Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief andfor Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on behalf of GENE FRANCIS STEWART 
pursuant to ldaho Code 99 19-271 9 and 19-4902; 
3. That the Petition For Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus 
filed on behalf of GENE FFWNCIS STEWART in the above entitled cases involves both 
complex and technical legal issues involving the sentencing of GENE FRANCIS STEWART 
to the death penalty for the crime of Murder in the First Degree,; 
4. That ldaho Attorney General Lawrence G. Wasden, or his designee, is the 
attorney presently assigned in the Petitioner's criminal Case No. SP02-00151 and has 
represented Clearwater County as a Special Prosecutor in other Post Conviction petitions 
regarding this same defendant and accordingly is familiar with the ongoing issues and court 
proceedings involving this case at both the state and federal appellate levels; that this case 
number should have been included in the Petition for Appointment of Special Counsel filed 
earlier this year, which petition the Court has granted. 
5. That your affiant believes that because the above-named Petitioner has 
previously exhausted his ldaho appellate remedies and has had his Petition for Writ of 
PETlTlON FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 2 
Certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court and has had his Third Petition For 
Post Conviction Relief dismissed, the response to the pending Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus requires the continuing assistance of the Capital 
Litigation Unit and the ldaho Attorney General's Office in order to provide for the necessary 
continuity and expertise in the above-captioned case; 
6. That your affiant petitions this Court to appoint ldaho Attorney General Lawrence G. 
Wasden, or his designee, a member of the ldaho State Bar Association and experienced 
attorney in criminal prosecution, as the Special Prosecutor pursuant to ldaho Code §31- 
2603(b), in that he is a suitable person to perform the duties required of your affiant and to 
assist the Clearwater County Prosecutor in responding to the Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on behalf of GENE FRANCIS STEWART. 
DATED this 0 day of h d  ,2003. 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN To before me this 13 ' day of ,2003. 
<< NOTARY PUBLIC FOR IDAHO 
Residing at Orofino, therein 
Commission expires 6 +-/6-06 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 3 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of ldaho 
MICHAEL A. HENDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief. Criminal Law Division 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687 
KIMBERLY J. BAILEY, ISB #5159 
RALPH R. BLOUNT, ISB #5966 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 





JOHN A. SWAYNE, ISB #I985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
County of Clearwater 
PO Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-561 1 
Facsimile: (208) 476-971 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) CASE NO. SP02-00109 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) 
) AMENDED 
vs . ) PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF 
) SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
) WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Petitioner-Respondent. ) 
) 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
AND/OR WRlT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 1 
COMES NOW, John A. Swayne, Prosecuting Attorney, in and for Clearwater 
County, State of Idaho, and hereby petitions the above-entitled court for the appointment 
of a Special Prosecutor in the interest of GENE FRANCIS STUART and upon being duly 
sworn, hereby deposes and says: 
1. That your affiant is the duly elected Prosecuting Attorney of Clearwater 
County; 
2. That your affiant has the duty to respond to the Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on behalf of GENE FRANCIS STUART pursuant 
to ldaho Code (5s 19-271 9 and 19-4902; 
3. That the Petition For Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus 
filed on behalf of GENE FRANCIS STUART in the above entitled cases involves both 
complex and technical legal issues involving the sentencing of GENE FRANCIS STUART 
to the death penalty for the crime of Murder in the First Degree,; 
4. That ldaho Attorney General Lawrence G. Wasden, or his designee, is the 
attorney presently assigned in the Petitioner's criminal Case No. SP02-00151 and has 
represented Clearwater County as a Special Prosecutor in other Post Conviction petitions 
regarding this same defendant and accordingly is familiar with the ongoing issues and court 
proceedings involving this case at both the state and federal appellate levels; that this case 
number should have been included in the Petition for Appointment of Special Counsel filed 
earlier this year, which petition the Court has granted. 
5. That your affiant believes that because the above-named Petitioner has 
previously exhausted his ldaho appellate remedies and has had his Petition for Writ of 
Certiorari denied by the United States Supreme Court and has had his Third Petition For 
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 2 
Post Conviction Relief dismissed, the response to the pending Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief and/or Writ of Habeas Corpus requires the continuing assistance of the Capital 
Litigation Unit and the ldaho Attorney General's Office in order to provide for the necessary 
continuity and expertise in the above-captioned case; 
6. That your affiant petitions this Court to appoint ldaho Attorney General Lawrence G. 
Wasden, or his designee, a member of the ldaho State Bar Association and experienced 
attorney in criminal prosecution, as the Special Prosecutor pursuant to ldaho Code (531- 
2603(b), in that he is a suitable person to perform the duties required of your affiant and to 
assist the Clearwater County Prosecutor in responding to the Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief andlor Writ of Habeas Corpus filed on behalf of GENE FRANCIS STUART. 
DATED this H. day of T, , ,2003. 
Prosecuting Attorney 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWORN before me this f l  day of 4fiy.i ,2003. 
Residing at Orofino, therei 
Commission expires k?Zo h i  
PETITION FOR APPOINTMENT OF SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST CONVICTION RELIEF 
AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
1 Case No.: 8495 
Petitioner-Appellant, 1 
1 ORDER FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
vs. 1 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Defendant-Respondent. 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the fees in this matter in the amount of $650.00 at 
the rate of $100.00 per hour be and the same hereby are approved and payable to Randall, 
Blake & Cox, P.A. 
4 
DATED THIS 7 day of September, 2003. 
 DISTRICT JUDGE 
ORDER FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES - 1 -  
0 0 3 3 0 2 1  1 
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of ldaho 
MICHAEL A. HENDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
, , "  ~ , .  . - &&+ 
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CLER;-DI s 'TR~CT COURT .#a*, 
CLEARWATER COU+bTY gpr:-!.'q ,, . , ., lOki10 
2003 SEP 20 P 1: 05 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687 
KIMBERLY J. BAILEY, ISB #5159 
RALPH R. BLOUNT, ISB #5966 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ldaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 
JOHN A. SWAYNE, ISB #I985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Clearwater County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-56 1 1 
Facsimile: (208) 476-971 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellee, ) CASE NO. 8495 
) 
VS. ) AMENDED ORDER TO APPOINT 
) SPECIAL PROSECUTOR RE:MOTION 
) TO RECALL REMlTTlTUR 
) AND REMAND FOR RESENTENCING 




IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that ldaho Attorney 
ORDER TO APPOINT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - I 
General Lawrence G. Wasden, or his designee, State of Idaho, be appointed as 
Special Prosecutor to assist the Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney in Clearwater 
County Case No. 8495, STATE of IDAHO vs. GENE FRANCIS STUART, Idaho 
Attorney General Lawrence G. Wasden, or his designee, would be a suitable person to 
perform the duties required in this matter and that good cause exists to appoint the 
Attorney General or his designee, as Special Prosecutor to assist in the response to 
the Motion to Recall the Remititur and Remand for Resentencing Procedures filed on 
behalf of GENE FRANCIS STUART in the above entitled case. 
Dated this 2~~ day of .%.DIQ.~~* ,2003 
ORDER TO APPOINT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND/ 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 2 8 % 0 0 0 2 1 3  
LAWRENCE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of ldaho 
MICHAEL A. HENDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687 
KIMBERLY J. BAILEY, ISB #5159 
RALPH R. BLOUNT, ISB #5966 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-00i 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
Facsimile: (208) 334-2942 
\/ 
2003 SEP 20 P 1: 05 
C\ p p-j. I"? \ rh" CASE - \ - 
JOHN A. SWAYNE, ISB #A985 
Prosecuting Attorney 
Clearwater County Courthouse 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Telephone: (208) 476-561 1 
Facsimile: (208) 476-971 0 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Plaintiff-Appellant, ) CASE NO. SP02-00109 
) 
VS. ) ORDER TO APPOINT SPECIAL 
) PROSECUTOR IN RE POST 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
) WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS 
Petitioner-Respondent. ) 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, AND THIS DOES ORDER, that ldaho Attorney 
ORDER TO APPOINT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
WRlT OF HABEAS CORPUS - ? 
General Lawrence G. Wasden, or his designee, State of Idaho, be appointed 
as special prosecutor in the matter of the PETITION FOR POST-CONVICTION RELIEF 
AND/OR WRlT OF HABEAS CORPUS, GENE FRANCIS STUART vs. State of Idaho, 
to assist the Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney, in that Idaho Attorney General 
Lawrence G. Wasden, or his designee, is a suitable person to perform the duties 
required in this matter and that good cause exists to appoint a special prosecutor to 
assist in the response to the Petition for Post-Conviction Relief andlor Writ of Habeas 
Corpus, filed on behalf of GENE FRANCIS STUART. 
Dated this Z Z ~  day of s n k m b  ,2003. 
ORDER TO APPOINT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
WRlT OF HABEAS CORPUS - 2 
&cgg2? 
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BY - ., 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) CASENO.SP02-00109 
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I, Sue K. Summerton, Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, hereby certify that a 
true and correct copy of the ORDER TO APPOINT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR IN RE 
POST CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS was mailed, 
postage prepaid, this 24th day of September, 2003, to the following: 
John A. Swayne, Clearwater County Prosecutor, Courthouse Mail, Orofino, ID 83544 
L. LaMont Anderson, Office of Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720 
Joan Fisher and Oliver W. Loewy, Capital Habeas Unit, 201 North Main Street, Moscow, 
ID 83843 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk 
- 
/ c* \ . f 7 y;\s{ ;\,<, \ -?:y) BY. ., 
Deputy 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
SEP 24 P I: 2b 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TtjE,STATE - 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEAR%%% * 41 \ fe\ 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
PlaintifflAppellee, 
VS. 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
Appellant. 
/ - ,  
) CASE NO. C R 8 S W  - oEPUiy 
) 




I, Sue K. Summerton, Deputy Clerk of the above entitled Court, hereby certify that a 
true and correct copy of the AMENDED ORDER TO APPOINT SPECIAL PROSECUTOR 
RE: MOTION TO RECALL REMITTITUR AND REMAND FOR RESENTINCING 
PROCEDURES was mailed, postage prepaid, this 24th day of September. 2003, to the 
following: 
John A. Swayne, Clearwater County Prosecutor, Courthouse Mail, Orofino, ID 83544 
L. LaMont Anderson, Office of Attorney General, P.O. Box 83720, Boise, ID 83720 
Joan Fisher and Oliver W. Loewy, Capital Habeas Unit, 201 North Main Street, Moscow, 
ID 83843 
i ,  
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
LA-CIE G. WASDEN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
MCHAEL A. HENDERSON 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Criminal L,aw Division 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687 
RALPIlf R. BLOUNT, ISB #5966 
KRISTINA M. SCHTNDELE, ISB #6090 
Deputy Attorneys General 
Criminal Law Division, Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 
Telephone: (208) 334-2400 
JOHN SWAYNE, ISB #I985 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney 
Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
TeIephone: (208) 476-56 1 1 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE C O W  OF CLEARWAIXR 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
Petitioner, 
VS . 
STATE OF IDAHO, 




1 REPLY BRIEF IN SUPPORT OF STATE'S 








STATE OF IDAHO, 
1 





GENE FRANCIS STUART, 
Defendant. 
) 
1 REPLY BRIEF ncd SUPPORT OF STATE'S 
1 MOTION FOR SlJMNfARY DISMISSAL 
1 
0 ~ ~ ~ 0 2  8 
REPLY BRlEFRVSUPPORT OF STATE'S MOllON FOR SUMMARY DISMISSRC - 1 
11/14/2003 16:10  FAX 208 334 2942 _ _ _ -  -____- - - - -  A . G .  Ob'FIClr: CRIMINAL D I V  
COME NOW, L. W o n t  Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Capital 
Litigation Unit and Special Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, State of Idaho, 
and John A. Swayrre, Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, State of Idaho, and do 
hereby submit this reply brief in support of the state's Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
A. Because Stuart Was Convicted Of First-Demee Murder M a h n  Him Eligible For 
The Death Penalty, His Successive Petition For Post-Conviction Relief Is 
Governed B y  I.C. 5 19-271 9 
Stuart's contention that he was never convicted of capital first-degree murder is 
without merit. (Resp. in Opp., pp.5-6.) Stuart was clearly convicted of first-degree 
murder. (#14863, R., p.70.) Based upon his first-degree murder conviction, Stuart was 
eligible for the death penalty, see I.C. Cj 18-4004, which was properly imposed by the 
district court and af3rrned by the Idaho Supreme Court. See State v. Stuart, 110 Idaho 
163,715 P.2d 833 (1986) (Stuart I). 
Further, Stuart's contention has been expressly rejected by at least one of Idaho's 
sister states. In State v. Mata, 668 N.W.2d 448, 480 (Neb. 2003), the defendant 
contended that under Sattazahn v. Pennsvlvania, 537 U.S. 101, 1 11 (2003) (Scalia, J.,), he 
had only been convicted of the 'lesser offense" of kt-degree murder and could not be 
resentenced to the "greater offense" of capital murder. Rejecting the defendant's 
argument, the Nebraska Supreme Court first noted that only three Justices agreed with the 
relevant portion of Sa t tazh .  Addressing the merits of the defendant's argument, the 
court explained: 
Mata stands convicted of capital murder as defined by the Sattazahn 
plurality, but error in the sentencing proceeding resulted in reversible error 
of the sentencing portion of Mata's final judgment. However, Mata can be 
11/14/2003 16:10 PAX 208 334 2942 ---- A . 6 .  UbPlLb LKlllNAL O I V  
rweintend bccause he has not been " a q i a d '  of capital mmder as 
dehed by the Sattazahn plurality. There is no support in Ring or the 
Sattmahn plurality discmsion for the pruposition that a separate capital 
resentencing proceeding following a successEul appeal violates the Sixth 
Amendmat or the Double Jeopardy Clause. 
Mata, 668 N.W.2d at 480. 
Likewise, the Idaho Supreme Court has implicitly concluded that Sattazah does 
not preclude the state &om seeking motha death sentence when a prior death sentence 
has been reversed as a result of the dictates of Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002). In 
State v. Lovelace, 2003 WL, 21697869, *lo-1 1 (Idaho 2003), pegs. for reh gpending, the 
Idaho Supreme Court concluded a capital defendant required resentencing because of the 
dictates of Rin> The court specifically addressed Sattazahn in addressing the question 
of whether resentencing Lovelace to death would violate the Double Jeopardy Clause: 
The fact finder in Lovelace's case made those findings necessary to 
impose a death sentence, which was the sentence he received at his 
original trial. In no sense has a fact finder concluded that the State failed 
to prove aggravating circumstances beyond a reasonable doubt. On 
resentencing, then, Lovelace wrll not face sentencing on a charge of which 
he had been previously "acquitted" for double jeopardy purposes. 
Jeopardy did not attach and double jeopardy [would] not bar [a] 
subsequent death sentence. 
A capital defendant whose original sentence is vacated on appeal can be 
resentenced to death so long as the defendant has not been "quitted" of 
the death sentence. 
Id. at 12-13. 
Clearly, Stuart has never been "acquitted" of a death sentence. The Idaho 
Supreme Court aEnned the district court's findmg of two statutory aggravating factors, 
including: (1) 'The murder was especially heinous, atrocious or axel, manifesting 
exceptional depravity;" and (2) 'The defendant by prior conduct or conduct in the 
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mmission of the mwder at hand has efibited a propemity to commit murder which 
will probably constime a continuhg threat to society." SStuast I, 110 Idaho at 174-75. 
Unless this court decides that no rational trier of fact could have fomd the essential 
elemmts of at I w t  one sbatory a w a v a h g  factor beyond a reasonable doubt, State v. 
Fields, 1 1 5 Idaho 1 101, 1 103, 772 P.2d 739 (1989), S has not been acquitted of the 
death penalty. Obviously, if Stuart can be resentenced to death under the dictates of 
Lovelace, he was first c o n ~ c t d  of "'capital murder" and his successive petition is 
governed by I.C. r;) 19-27 19 
B. Because I.C. 6 19-2719 Does Not Provide For The Retroactive Ap~lication Of 
New Rdes Of Law In A Successive Post-Conviction Petition, Stuart Has Failed 
To Meet The Requisite Prima Facie Showing For Relief 
Spendkg a significant portion of his Response in Opposition to Motion for 
S m a r y  Dismissal addressing the applicability of J.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c), Stuart has 
apparently concluded that the state's argument regarding the retroactive application of 
Ritiis based exclusively upon I.C. 5 19-2719(5)(c). (Resp. in Opp., pp.9-37.) However, 
Stuart is mistaken as to the state's position regarding retroactivity. As detailed in the 
state's Brief in Support of Motion for S v  Dismissal, I.C. 8 19-271 9(5)(c) certainly 
provides additional authority to dismiss Stuart's post-conviction claims. (Brief in 
Support, pp.9-10.) However, as also explained in the state's Brief in Support of Motion 
for Summary Dismissal, the Idaho Supreme Court's holding in Fetterlv v. State, 121 
Idaho 417, 418, 825 P.2d 1073 (1991), and Stuart v. State, 128 Idaho 436, 437-38, 914 
P.2d 933 (1996) (Stuart V), independently supports the state's position. (Brief in 
Support, pp.8-9.) Clearly, the underlying premise of Fetterly and Stuart V, is that I.C. § 
19-271 9 does not contain a provision permitting the filing of a successive post-conviction 
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claim based upon the retroactive application of new rules of law. Ratha, the only 
exception is provided in I.C. 4 19-2719(5), which p d t s  a successive petition "in those 
m w d  w e s  where it can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not known and 
reasonably could not have been known within the time frame allowed by the statute." 
Creech v, State, 137 Idaho 573,575, 52 P.3d 387 (2002). 
C. Havin~ Been Implicitly Reiected By The Idaho Supreme Court's Analvsis Of I.C. 
4 19-2719 And BY Other Courts, Stuart's Challennes R e ~ a r d i n ~  I.C. 6 19- 
2719(5)(c) A .  Without Merit 
1. Because Ring Is A New Rule Of h w .  It Cannot Be Amlied Retroactively 
To Stuart's Case 
Stuart contends I.C. i j  19-2719(S)(c) has no application to his case because "Ring 
did not announce a new rule of law." (Resp. in Opp., p.10.) Stuart's attempt to claim 
that the United States Supreme Court's decision in is not a new rule of law is akin 
to saying white paper is black. Stuart's successive petition itself underscores the obvious 
fact that established a new rule of law by stating, "The decision in Ring is thus a 
truly extraordinary legal development which compels this Court's reconsideration of the 
constitutionality of Petitioner's death sentence." petition, p.4.) The obvious 
"extraordinary legal development" is the announcement of a new rule of law that had 
been expressly rejected by the United States Supreme Court just twelve years earlier in 
Walton v. Arizona, 497 U.S. 639 (1 990). 
Even the Ninth Circuit has recognized that is a new rule of law, not merely 
an application of long settled law, because "'there can be no dispute that a decision 
announces a new rule of law if it expressly overrules a prior decision."' Sumrnerlin v. 
Stewart, 341 F.3d 1 082, 1 1 09 (gfh Cir. 2003), pet. for cert. pending, (quoting Oraham v. 
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Collins, 506 U.S. 461,467 (1993)). Because bAexprmsly m o r n &  it was o v m b g  
Wdton, there is no question it m o m c e s  a new rule of law. 
2. Stuart Has Failed To Establish I.C. 6 19-2719(5)(c) Violates 
Constitutional Or State Laws 
a. Idaho Code Ej  19-2719(5)fc) Does Not Violate Idaho's 
Separation Of Powers Doctrine 
Stuart contends I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c) violates Idaho's separation of powers 
doctrine under the Idaho Constitution, art. II, $ 1. @ ~ p .  in Opp., pp.21-23.) W l e  
Idaho's appellate courts have not directly addressed this issue, it has been addressed in 
the context of habeas corpus. In MahafTey v. State, 87 Idaho 228, 280, 392 P.2d 279 
(1964), the Idaho Supreme Court explained that, because the w i t  of habeas corpus is 
expressly recognized in Idaho's constitution, "the writ is not a statutory remedy." The 
court concluded, "Mule the legislature (absent certain contingencies) is without power to 
abridge this remedy se~ured by the Constitution, it may add to the efficacy of the writ. 
Statutes are usually enacted for this purpose and should be construed so as to promote the 
effectiveness of the proceeding." Id. Addressing the enactment of the UPCPA, the 
supreme court concluded the UPCPA is "an expansion of the Writ of Habeas Corpus." 
Diome v. State, 93 Idaho 235,237,459 P.2d 101 7 (I 969). 
Because the UPCPA is an expansion of the writ of habeas corpus and the 
legislature is not barred Erom adding to the efficacy of the writ, it naturally follows that 
I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c) does not unduly restrict the district court's jurisdiction in violation 
of the separation of powers doctrine. Rather, LC. $ 19-2719(5)(c) merely establishes the 
parameters in which relief may be granted when a successive post-conviction petition has 
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been filed. As explaind in Kirkland v. Blaine Corn& Medical Ctr., 134 Idaho 464,471, 
Because it is properly within the power of the legislature to establish 
statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, create new causes of action, and 
otherwise modify the common law without violating separation of powers 
principles, it necessarily follows that the legislature also has the power to 
limit remedies available to plaintiEs without violating the separation of 
powers doctrine. 
Because the legislature has the power to limit the remedies available to plaintiffs, 
it necessarily has the power to limit the remedies of capital petitioners in seeking post- 
conviction relief Stuart has failed to establish I.C. § 19-2719(5)(c) results in a 
constitutional violation under the separation of powers doctrine. 
b. Because I.C. 6 19-2'719(15)(c) Merely Codifies Fetterlv And Sfuart 
V, Idaho Law Does Not Prohibit Its Retroactive Application 
' 
As explained above and in the state's Brief in Support of Motion for S m a r y  
Dismissal, prior to the enactment of I.C. $ 19-271 9(5)(c), the Idaho Supreme Court had 
already reasoned that I.C. $ 1 9-271 9 does not contain a provision permitting the filing of 
a successive post-conviction claim based upon the retroactive application of new rules of 
law. Fetterlv, 121 Idaho at 418; Stuart V, 128 Idaho at 437-38. Therefore, Idaho law that 
generally prohibits the retroactive application of new statutory enactments is inapplicable 
in Stuart's case. 
Further, because Stuart's instant successive post-conviction petition was filed 
after the enactment of I.C. 8 19-2719(5)(c), the doctrine regarding the retroactive 
application of new statutory enactments is inapplicable. 
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 4  
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Stuart conten& 1.C. 4 19-2719(5)(c) violates his equal proteceon and due process 
rights b m m e  it aUegedly oEkrs capital pet-it-ionm less pmtedon than non-capital 
petitioners under the UPCPA. (Brief in Opg., pp.33-35.) Stuart" s n t a t i o n  is based 
upon the claim that there is "no raeonal basis for the disparate treatment of non-capital 
pnlsoaas." (Brief in Opp., p.34.) 
While the Idaho S u p r a e  Court has not directly addressed this issue in regards to 
I.G. 5 19-2719(5)(c), the issue has been rqeatedly addressed in the general context of 
I.C. 4 19-2719 and rejected. In State v. Beam, 115 Idaho 208, 21 1-13, 766 P.2d 678 
(1 988), the court expressly held LC. $ 19-2'719 does not violate equal protection. In State 
v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795,806, 820 P.2d 665 (1991), the court expressly concluded I.C. 
$ 19-2719 does not violate due process. The Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly 
a k e d  both of these cases. See 127 Idaho 100, 102, 897 P.2d 991 
(1995); State v. Hoffman, 123 Idaho 638, 647, 851 P.2d 934 (1 993); State v. Card, 121 
Idaho 425,430-31, 825 P.2d 1081 (1991); State v. Rhoades, 121 Idaho 63, 72, 822 P.2d 
960 (1991); Paz v. State, 118 Idaho 542, 559, 798 P.2d 1 (1990); State v. Fetterlv, 115 
Idaho 23 1,235-36,766 P.2d 701 (1 988). 
Because Stuart has failed to even cite these cases, he obviously has failed to 
provide any argument as to why they are not controlling as to I.C. 4 19-271 9(5)(c). 
Because there is no logical distinction between the Idaho Supreme Court's general 
analysis of I.C. $ 19-271 9 and I.C. $ 19-2719(5)(c), Stuart's contention fails. 
0 0 0 0 0 2 2 5  
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The United States Constiation, article I, Ej 10, and the Idaho Constitu-tion, article 
I, $ 16, prohibit the enaclment of ex post fa to  laws. As explained in State v. Byers, the 
United States Suprme Court has defined what constitutes an. ex post facto law: 
I", every law that makes an action done before the passing of the law, and 
which was h o m t  when done, criminal; and punishes such action. 2d. 
Every law that aggravates a crime, or makes it greater than it was, when 
committed. 3d. Every law that changes the punishment, and inflicts a 
greater punishent, than the law annexed to the crime, when mmmitted. 
4th. Every law that alters the legal rules of evidence, and receives less, or 
diRerent testimony, than the law required at the time of the commission of 
the ofYense, in order to convict the offknder. 
Byers, 102 Idaho 159, 166,627 P.2d 788 (1981) (quoting Calder v. Bull, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
The Supreme Court's ex post facto jurisprudence has focused upon the third 
category because such laws "implicate the central concerns of the Ex Post Faeto Clause: 
the lack of fair notice and governmental restraint when the legislature increases 
punishment beyond what was prescribed when the crime was consummated." Lvnce v. 
Mathis, 519 U.S. 433,441 (1997)(intemal quotes and citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
As explained in Dobbert v. Florida, 432 U.S. 282, 293 (1977), the Ex Post Facto 
Clause generally does not apply to procedural matters: 
It is equally well settled, however, that the inhibition upon the 
passage of ex post facto laws does not give a criminal a right to be tried, in 
all respects, by the law in force when the crime charged was committed. 
The constitutional provision was intended to secure substantial personal 
rights against arbitrary and oppressive legislation, and not to limit the 
legislative mntrol of remedies and modes of procedure which do not 
affect matters of substance. 
Even though it may work to the disadvantage of a defendant, a 
procedural change is not ex post facto. 
~ ~ 0 0 0 2 ~ 6  
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(btemal quotes and CiMons o ~ B e d )  (mphasis added). 
The Supreme Court bas identified '%o critical elements [that] must be present for 
a criminal or penal law to be ex post facto: It must be retrospective, that is, it must apply 
to events occurring before its enactment, and it must disadvantage the offender affected 
by it." Weaver v. &&m, 450 U.S. 24, 29 (1 980)(footnote omitted). However, ''no ex 
post facto violation occurs if the change effected is merely procedural, and does not 
increase the punishment nor change the ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts 
necessary to establish guilt." Id. at 29 n. 12. "Critical to relief under the Ex Post Facto 
Clause is not an individual's right to less punishment, but the lack of fair notice and 
govemental restraint when the legislature increases punishment beyond what was 
prescribed when the crime was consummated." Id. at 29 (emphasis added). 
The Supreme Court, in Collins v. Youngblood, 497 U.S. 37 (1990), narrowed 
what constitutes an ex post facto violation by overruling several prior cases. After the 
defendant was sentenced, the Texas legslatuse amended the remedy that was available 
when an unauthorized fine was imposed at sentencing. Under the law at the time the 
defendant was sentenced, if the law did not authorize the fine, the judgment and sentence 
were void and the defendant was entitled to a new trial. Id 497 U.S. at 39. Mer 
Youngblood was sentenced, new legislation was enacted permitting the appellate court to 
merely refonn an improper verdict, thereby eliminating the new trial remedy. Id. at 40. 
The Supreme Court reiterated that procedural changes do not violate the Ex Post Facto 
Clause. 14 at 45. The Court reasoned, 'While these cases do not explicitly define what 
they mean by the word 'procedural,' it is logical to &ink that the term refers to changes in 
the procedures by which a criminal case is djudicated, as opposed to changes in the 
0 0 0 a 0 ~ ~ ~  
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sulrstmtive law of crimes." Id. at 45. The Court cmncluded the new statute "is a 
procedural change &at allows reformation of bproper verdicts. It does not alter the 
definition of the crime of aggravated sexual abuse, . . . nor does it increase the 
punishment for whch be is eligible."IId. at 44 (emphasis added). The Court explained 
that I m p g e  from other cases discussing whether a procedural change may violate the 
Ex Post Facto Clause if it deprived a defendant of "substantial protections" or infikged 
upon "substantid personal rights," had "imported confusion into the interpretation of the 
Ex Post Facto Clause." 14. at 45. 
Idaho's appellate courts have followed the Supreme Court cases detailed above. 
See Lovelace, 2003 WL 2 1697869 at *13-14. In Mellinrrer v. State, 1 13 Idaho 3 1, 34, 
740 P.2d 73 (Ct. App. 1987), the Idaho Court of Appeals quoted Dobbert and Miller in 
concluding that a change in the statute of limitations in Idaho's Uniform Post-Conviction 
Procedures Act ('WCPA") was procedural in nature and did not materially affect the 
petitioner's substantial rights. See also LaFon v. State, 119 Idaho 387, 389-90, 807 P.2d 
66 (Ct. App. 1991); Escluivel v. State, 128 Idaho 390, 913 P.2d 1160 (Ct. App. 1996). 
The Idaho Supreme Court. expressly adopted Mellinger in State v. O'Neill, 118 Idaho 
244, 247, 796 P.2d 12 1 (1990). In Paradis v. State, 128 Idaho 223, 227, 91 2 P.2d 110 
(1996), the Idaho Supreme Court applied the rationale of O'Neill in a capital case. 
This same analysis has also been applied to the Anti-Terrorism and Effective 
Death Penalty Act ("AEDPA"), whch was enacted by Congress in 1996 and significantly 
changed the manner in which federal habeas cases are litigated and limited the cases in 
whch the federal courts can grant habeas relief. The federal courts have u n i f o d y  held 
that, because the changes made by the m D P A  are procedural in nature, they do not 
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violate the Ex Post Facto Clause, 177 F.3d 43, 46-47 (1'' Cir. 
1 999); 224 F.3d 542, 560 (6' Cir. 2000); Neellev v. Nade, 138 F.3d 
917, 921 (1 l& Gir. 1998) (overruled on other grounds by Williams v. Tavlor, 529 U.S. 
362 (2000)); United States v. Orkz, 136 F.3d 161,168-69 P .C .  Cir. 1998). 
Similar malysis was used in Mitchell v. State, 934 P.2d 346, 349 (Okla, Crim. 
App- 19971, when the petitioner challenged m e n b e n t s  to Oklahoma's capital post- 
conviction statutes. The court explained that, because such changes were "procedural in 
nature," they did not violate the Ex Post Faeto Clause. Id, 
Likewise, the enactment of I.C. 5 19-271 9(5)(c) was procedural in nature. The 
statute "neither made criminal a theretofore innocent act, nor aggravated a crime 
previously committed, nor provided a greater punishment, nor changed the proof 
necessary to convict." Semour, 224 F.3d at 560 (quoting Dobbert, 432 U.S. at 293). 
Rather, "ese provisions simply limit the cirmstances under which [Stuart] may 
collaterally attack h ~ s  conviction." Libby, 177 F,3d at 46, 
3. The Idaho Su~reme Court Has Implicitly Re-jected Stuart's Argument 
Re~ardinp Teape v. Lane 
Stuart contends that undei the Supremacy Clause of the United States 
Constitution, LC. 5 19-2719(5)(c) is supplanted by the dictates of Teame v. Lane, 489 
U.S. 288 (1989). (Resp. in Opp., pp.26-33.) However, the Idaho Supreme Court has 
implicitly rejected Stuart's argument. 
Idaho Code 19-2719 "provides a defendant with one opportunity to raise ail 
chalIenges to the conviction and sentence in a petition for post-conviction relief?." Porter 
v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 259,32 P.3d 15 1 (2001) (emphasis added). The only exception 
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is provided in I.C. $ 19-2719(5), which p e d t s  a suc~essive petition "in those m d  
cases where it can be demonstrated that the issues raised were not lcnom and reasonably 
eould not have been known w i t h  the time fiame allowed by the statute." Creech, 137 
Idaho at 575. 
Idaho Code § 19-2719 does not perrnit the filing of a successive post-conviction 
petition based upon s u b s m ~ v e  changes in the law, Teame or its two exceptions. In 
Fetterly, the Idaho Supreme Court implicitly rejected Teame. In dissent, Justice Bistline 
opined that Teague should be applied to Fetterly's case. Fetterl~, 121 Idaho at 420 
(Bistline, J., dissenting). However, because Fetterly's case was already final when he 
filed his successive post-conviction petition, the majority ignored Teague and concluded, 
based upon M a t h  v. Kentuckv, 479 U.S. 314 (1987), that the holding in State v. 
Charboneau, 1 16 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 2999 (1 989), should not be applied retroactively. 
FetterIv, 1 2 1 Idaho at 4 1 8- 1 9. 
Admittedly, in GaAFord v. State, 127 Idaho 472, 476, 903 P.2d 61 (1995), the 
Idaho Supreme Court applied Tcame, in the context of a state petition for writ of habeas 
corpus. After being acquitted of criminal charges by reason of insanity, Gaf5ord was 
confined at State Hospital South. During his commitment, Gafford's situation changed 
such that he no longer suffered from the mental condition that lead to his acquittal. Id. 
127 Idaho at 474. The United States Supreme Court subsequently struck d o m  a 
Louisiana statute that allowed an insanity acquittee to be committed to a mental 
institution until he could demonstrate he was not dangerous, even though he was no 
longer mentally ill. Id. (citing Foucha v. Louisiana, 504 U.S. 71 (1992)). Relying upon 
Foucha, Gafford filed a state petition for writ of habeas corpus seeking his release on the 
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ground he was not mentdlly ill. I& 127 Idaho at 474. The Idaho Supreme Court 
concluded: 
Gafford does not seek to have the holding in Foucha applied retroactively; 
he seeks the prospective application of that new rule to his present and 
continned conhernent. Accordingly, the retroactivity rules cited by the 
State and relied upon by the district court have no application in this case. 
I& 127 Idaho at 476. 
In dicta, the court M e r  opined even if Foucha presented a retroactivity problem, 
because it "require[d] the observance of procedures 'implicit in the concept of ordered 
liberty,"' it would apply to Gafford's case. Id. 12'7 Idaho at 476 (quoting Penry v. 
Lynau&, 492 U.S. 302 (1989)). Relying upon State v. Chlton, 112 Idaho 823, 828, 736 
P.2d (1987), the supreme court concluded, "Foucha announced a rule grounded in due 
process and formulated to protect a fimdamental liberty interest." GaEord, 128 Odajp at 
476. 
However, GaRord, a civil cornrnitmcmt case, has never been applied in the context 
of a criminal case, let alone a successive post-conviction case collaterally attacking a 
capital case. In fact, the Idaho Supreme Court refised to apply Gafford in a post- 
conviction case, Buffington v. State, 130 Idaho 507, 943 P.2d 933 (199'7) (refking to 
adopt the dissent's position that Gafford's "new rule" doctrine should be applied). 
Because I.C. 8 19-2719 does not contain a Teame exception, the question of the 
retroactivity of Rin> is governed exclusively by the dictates of I.C. rij 19-2719 and its 
interpretation by the Idaho Supreme Court. 
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Despite contending supplmmts I.C. 5 19-27 1 9(5)(c), Stuart contradicts 
himself by contmding that Teague does not apply to fus case, because the rule announced 
in E X  is substantive and not procedural in nature. (Resp. in Opp., pp.27-29.) Contrary 
to Stuart's contention, Riainvolves a procedural rule and is not substantive in nature. 
While Stuart relies upon general principles discussed in Bouslev v. United States, 523 
U.S. 614 (1998), he fails to cite a single case in wkch the courts have found that R i a  or 
A ~ ~ r m d i  V. New Jersey, 530 U.S. 466 (2000), whch formed the basis of the Supreme 
Court's decision in a involves a substantive rule.' (Pet's brief, pp.27-28.) 
W l e  the Idaho appellate courts have yet to address this issue, the Idaho Supreme 
Court has addressed it in the context of ex post facto law. In hvelace, 2003 WL 
21 697869 at *13-14, the defendant claimed that, because recent changes in Idaho's 
capital sentencing law allegedly created a new o B m e  of capital murder, his resentencing 
would create an ex post facto violation. The supreme court concluded the changes were 
not substantive, explaining: 
Idaho Code 5 18-4004 describes first-degree murder and prescribes a 
punishment of life imprisonment or death pursuant to the guidelines 
outlined in LC. Ij 19-2515. Clearly, Lovelace had fair warning that death 
was a possible punishment for first-degree murder, and we cannot 
conclude that the subsequent statute authorized a more onerous 
punishment than that authorized by the unconstitutional statute. A new 
law that did not alter the definition of the crime . . . of which bvelace was 
convicted, nor increase the punishment for wkch he was eligible as k 
result of that conviction was a procedural change. 
The state acknowledges that in S m e r l i n ,  the Ninth Circuit found, contrary to every 
other jurisdiction addressing the issue, that RiA involves a substantive rule of law and 
not merely a procedural rule. However, as described below, the Ninth Circuit's opinion 
is not well taken and should be rejected by this court. 
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T!ae f ib i t jon  a g ~ m  the passage of ex pod fact0 laws does not 
extend to limit the legistative control of rmedies and modes of procedme, 
which do not a e c t  matters of substance. Under the new sentencing 
skwtes, the state must prove the same a w a v a h g  circmstances required 
by the former statute and must prove them to a jury beyond a reasonhle 
doubt. 
Id. at *14 (internal quotations and citations omitted). 
Several federal circuits have used this same analysis to conclude that Apprendi 
involved a new rule of law that is procedural in name. In McCoy v. United States, 266 
F.3d 1245, 1257 11.16 (1 lm Cir. 2001), the court wnc~uded Amrendi involved 
procedural rules: 
In Apprendi, the Supreme Court specifically noted that '"tlhe substantive 
basis for New Jersey's dmment . . . is not at issue; the adequacy of 
New Jersey's procedure is." 530 U.S. at 475, 120 S.Ct. 2348 (2000). The 
application of Apprendi merely changes the method or procedure for 
detemining drug quantity and his sentence; it does not make McCoy's 
conduct not criminal, thereby raising the spectre of aetual innocence as the 
concurring opinion implies. Thus, as other circuits have, we conclude 
Appredi announced a new rule of criminal procedure. 
See a130 United States v. Sanders, 247 F.3d 139, 145-46 (4& Gir. 2001); United States v. 
Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 308-09 (5& Cir. 2002); Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 842- 
43 (7" Cir. 2002); United States. ex rel. Perm v. Warden, FMC Rochester, 286 F.3d 
1059, 1063 (8& Cir. 2002) (citing United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 997-98 (8' Cir. 
In Cannon v. Mullin, 297 F.3d 989, 994 (10" Cir. 2002), the court explained that 
R& also involves a procedural rule, because the same analysis regarding the question 
of whether Apprendi involves a procedural mle applies to R*. Likewise, in Turner v. 
Crosbv, 339 F.3d 1247, 1284 (1 1" Cir. 2003) (internal quotes and citations omitted), the 
court explained: 
Just as Apprendi constitutes a procedural rule bemuse it dictates what fact- 
finding procedure must be employed, Ring constitutes a procedural rule 
because it dictates what fst-&ding procedure must be employed in a 
capital sentacing h e h g .  Ring c h m g d  neither the underlying conduct 
the state must prove to establish a defendant's crime warrants death nor 
the state's burden of proof. Ring affected neither the facts necessary to 
establish [Idaho's] aggravahg fmtors nor the State's burden to establish 
those factors beyond a reasonable doubt. hstead, Ring altered only who 
decides whether any ating c i rcmsbces  exist and, thus, altered 
only the fact-finding procedure. 
Additionally, Idaho's sister states have concluded Ri& is a procedural rule. As 
explained in State v. T o m ,  64 P.3d 828, 832-33 (Ariz. 2003) (internal quotations and 
citations omitted), "Substantive rules determine the meaning of a criminal statute. 
Decisions announcing substantive rules often address the criminal significance of certain 
facts or the underlying prohibited conduct. In contrast, procedural decisions set forth 
fact-finding procedures to ensure a fair trial." The Arizona Supreme Court concluded, 
because RiLiis nothmg more than an extension of A ~ ~ r e n d i  to capital cases, that it is not 
substantive, but procedural in nature. I@ 64 P.3d at 833. See also Colwell v. State, 59 
P.3d 463, 472-73 (Nev. 2002) ("our first inquiry is whether the constitutional rule of 
criminal procedure established in Ring is new"); State v. Lotter, 664 N.W.2d 892, 904-05 
(Neb. 2003) ("the new constitutional rule announced in Ring was procedural, not 
substantive"); Head v. Hill, 2003 WL 22282293, " (Ga. 2003) ('the new rule announced 
in Ring, which overruled Waiton, . . . , was a new rule of criminal law"). 
Based upon the analysis in Lovelace and other courts extending the non- 
retroactivity rule of Avvrendi to h> there is no doubt that h>is a rule of procedure. 
hth changed only to whom the requisite elements of capital murder must be proven, not 
the actual elements required for imposition of the death penalty or the burden of proof. 
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5. 
Failed To Establish Ring Is Remactive 
In T a ~ c ,  the United States Supreme Court discussed the problems associated 
with applying new constitutional rules not in existence at the time a criminal conviction 
becomes h a l :  
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the b e  a conviction 
became final seriously undernines the principle of fioality which is 
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, 
the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. The fact that 
life and liberty are at stake in criminal prosecutions shows only that 
conventional notions of finahty should not have as much place in criminal 
as in civil litigation, not that they should have none. If a criminal 
judgment is ever to be k a l ,  the notion of legality must at some point 
include the assignment of final competence to determine legality. 
The costs imposed upon the States by retroactive application of 
new d e s  of constitutional law on habeas corpus generally far outweigh 
the benefits of t h~s  application. In many ways the application of new rules 
to cases on c o l l a t d  review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of 
criminal prosecutions, for it continually forces the States to marshal 
resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals 
confbrmed to then-existing constitutional standards. . . . [Sltate courts are 
understandably frustrated when they faithEuUy apply existing 
constitutional law only to have a federal court discover, during a habeas 
proceeding, new constitutional demands. 
Id. 489 U.S. at 309-10 (internal citations and emphasis omitted). 
As explained in Lambrix v. Sindetarv, 520 U.S. 518, 527 (1997), a three-step 
process is required to complete the Teague analysis: 
First, [the court] determines the date upon which the defendant's 
conviction became final. See Cuspari v. BohZen, 510 U.S. 383, 390, 1 14 
S.Ct. 948, 953-54, 127 L.Ed.2d 236 (1994). Second, [the court] must 
'"[s]urve[y] the legal landscape as it then existed,' Graham v. Collins, 
[506 U.S. 461, 468, 113 S.Ct. 892, 898, 122 L.Ed2d 260 (1993)], and 
'determine whether a state court considering [the defendant's] claims at 
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the time his conviction became final would have felt compelled by 
existing precedent to conclude that the rule [he] seeks was required by the 
Comtitutioa' v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484, 488 Ell0 S.Ct 1257, 1260, 
108 L.Ed.2d 4151 (1990)." Cmpari, supra, at 390, 114 S.Ct. at 953. 
Finally, if the court determines that the habeas petitioner seeks the benefit 
of a new rule, the court must consider whether the relief sought falls 
within one of the two narrow exceptions to nonretroactivity. See Gilrnore 
v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345, 113 S.Ct. 2112, 2119, 124 L.Bi.2d 306 
(1 993). 
i. Determining; Finality 
Finality has been defined as "a case in which a judgment of conviction has been 
rendered, the availability of appeal exhausted, and the time for a petition for certiorari 
elapsed or a petition for c e r t i o ~  finally denied." Griffith, 479 U.S. at 321 n.6. 
. . 
11. Detemininp; The b ~ a l  Landsca~e As It Then Existed 
In Teame, the Court discussed what constitutes a new rule: 
[A] case announces a new rule when it breaks new ground or imposes a 
new obligation on the States or the Federd G o v a e n t .  [Citations 
omitted]. To put it diffwently, a case announces a new rule if the result 
was not dictated by precedent existing at the time the defendant's 
conviction became final. 
Id. 489 U.S. at 301 (emphasis in original). 
Ln determining if the result is "dictated," decisions must be based upon Supreme 
Court precedent and be more than reasonable interpretations of prior law: 
[ q h e  Teague inquiry - which is applied to Supreme Court decisions that 
are, one must hope, usually the most reasonable interpretation of prior law 
- requires more than [a reasonable interpretation of prior law - perhaps 
even the most reasonable one]. It asks whether the [decision] was dictated 
by precedent - i.e., whether no other interpretation was reasonable. 
Lmbrix, 520 U.S. at 538. 
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While the Ninth Circuit has expressed ""sous doubt as to the wisdom" of the 
view that state courts are free to ignore decisions of the lower f e d 4  courts on questions 
of federal law, Yniauez v. Arizona, 939 F.2d 727, 736 (9& Cir. 1991)' there is no 
authority requiring the states' adoption of lower federal courts' decisions. In vacating the 
Ninth Circuit's daision in Yniauez, the Supreme Court characterized the dicta regarding 
the question of a state's inability to ignore lower federal court decisions on questions of 
federal law as "remarkable." Arizonans for Official Endish v. Arizona, 520 U.S. 43, 58, 
n.11 (1997). The Court recognized "state courts . . . possess the authority, absent a 
provision for exclusive federal jurisdiction, to render binding decisions that rest on their 
own interpretations of federal law." Id. (quoting A s m  Inc. v. Kadish, 490 U.S. 605, 
617 (1989)). The Court fbrther cited Lockbart v. Fretwell, 506 U.S. 364, 375-76 (1993) 
(Thomas, J., concurring), in which Justice Thomas explained state trial courts are not 
obligated to follow the federal circuits' interpretation of federal law. Id. Justice Thomas 
explained: 
The Supremacy Clause demands that state law yield to federal law, but 
neither federal supremacy nor any other principle of federal law requires 
that a state court's interpretation of federal law give way to a (lower) 
federal court's interpretation. In our federal system, a state trial court's 
interpretation of federal law is no less authoritative than that of the federal 
court of appeals in whose circuit the trial court is located. [Citations 
omitted]. An Arkmas trial court is bound by tfus Court's (and by the 
Arkansas Supreme Court's and Arkansas Court of Appeals') interpretation 
of federal law, but if it follows the Ei&hth Circuit's intapretation of 
federal law, it does so only because it chooses to and not because it must. 
bckhart, 506 U.S. at 375-76. 
Because state trial courts are not obligated to follow a federal circuit court's 
interpretation of federal law (and any rule requiring such would itself be a "new rule"), it 
is inconsistent to conclude that existing precedent established by a federal circuit court 
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would result in states feeling compelled to conclude the rule established by that precedent 
is required by the Constitution, particularly when other circuits have contrary precedent. 
This fimdamental principle was foliowed by the Idaho Supreme Court in Charboneau, 
1 16 Idaho at 146-47, when the Idaho Supreme Court expressly rejected the Ninth 
Circuit's conclusion in Adamson v. Ricketts, 865 F.2d 101 1 (9& Cir. 1988), that the 
federal Constitution required jury sentencing in capital cases. This principle has also 
been followed by the Arizona Supreme Court in rejecting the Ninth Circuit's 
pronouncement in Summerlin, that Rislg is retroactive. State v. Sansing, - P.3d - 
--..-J 2003 WL 222041 13, * 1 n.2 (Ariz. 2003) ('We are not bound by the Ninth Circuit's 
interpretation of what the Constitution requires"). 
. . . 
in. The Two Teague Exceptions 
In Lambrix, the Court discussed the two Teame exceptions. Specifically 
addressing the first exception, the Court explained: 
"The first exception pennits the retroactive application of a new rule if the 
rule places a class of private conduct beyond the power of the State to 
proscribe, see Teugue, 489 U.S., at 31 1 [I09 S.Ct. at 1075-10763, or 
addresses a 'substantive categorical guarante[e] accorded by the 
Constitution,' such as a rule 'prohibiting a certain category of punishment 
for a class of defendants because of their status or offkme. "' 
Id. 520 U.S. at 539 (quoting Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,494 (1990)). 
The second exception applies to '"watershed rules of criminal procedure' 
implicating the hdamental fairness and accuracy of the cnininal proceeding." Larnbrix, 
520 U.S. at 539-40 (quoting Parks, 494 U.S. at 495). As explained in Teame, this 
exception has very limited application: 
Typically, it should be the case that any conviction free from federal 
constitutional error at the time it became final, will be found, upon 
REPLY BRIEF SUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR S-Y DISMISS % 0 ) b ~ ~ ~ ~ ~  
reflection, to have been hdamentdlly fair and conducted under those 
procdures essential to the substance of a full hearing. However, in some 
situations it might be that time and growth in social capacity, as weli as 
judicial perceptions of what we can rightly demand of the adjudicatory 
process, will properly alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural 
elements that must be found to vitiate the fairness of a particular 
conviction. For example, such, in my view, is the case with the right to 
counsel at trial now held a necessary condition precedent to any 
conviction for a serious crime. 
Teawe, 489 U.S. at 3 12 (quoting Mackey v. United States, 401 U.S. 667, 693-94 
En applying the second exception, the rule "must not only improve accuracy [of 
trial], but also 'alter our understanding of the bedrock procedural elements ' essential to 
the fairness of a proceeding." Sawver v. Smith, 497 U.S. 227, 242 (1990) (quoting 
Teame, 489 U.S. at 31 1); see also Tvler v. Cain, 533 U.S. 656, 665 (2001). In Grav v. 
Netherland, 518 U.S. 152, 170 (1996), the Court further discussed what constitutes a 
"watershed rule" of criminal procedure: 
We observed in SaDe v. Parks that the paradigmatic exainple of a 
watershed rule of criminal procedure is the mpirement that counsel be 
provided in all criminal trials for serious offenses. 494 U.S., at 495, 1 10 
S.Ct at 1264 (citing Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335, 83 S.Ct 792, 9 
L.Eki.2d 799 (1963). "Whatever one may think of the importance of 
Epetitioner's] proposed rule, it has none of the primacy and centrality of 
the rule adopted in Gideon or other rules which may be thought to be 
within the exception." Parks, supra, at 495, 1 10 S.Ct. at 1264. 
As further explained in Teame, 489 U.S. at 313, it will be "unlikely that many 
such components of basic due process have yet to emerge." The exceptions must be read 
consistently with other constitutional rules and policies. "Application of comtitutional 
rules not in existence at the time a conviction became final seriously undermines the 
principle of finality which is essential to the operation of our criminal justice system." 
Id. 489 U.S. at 309. 'The 'costs imposed upon the Staters] by retroactive application of 
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new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus thus generally far outweigh the benefits 
of this application."' Sawyer, 497 U.S. at 242 (quoting Solem v. Stumes, 465 U.S. 638, 
654 (1984)). 
Since Teame was issued in 1989, the Supreme Court has examined numerous 
new mles under the second exception and found none fit within its narrow confines. 
Teawe, 489 U.S. at 3 1 1-1 6 (unconstitutiond use of peremptory challenges to remove 
venire members); Butler v. McKellar, 494 U.S. 407, 416 (1990) (FiRh Amendment 
proscription barring police-initiated interrogation following suspect's request for counsel 
in separate investigation); Saffle v. Parks, 494 U.S. 484,495 (1990) (Eighth Amendment 
requirement that jury be allowed to base sentencing decision upon sympathy); Sawyer, 
497 U.S. at 241-45 (Eighth Amendment proscription against diminishing jury's sense of 
responsibility for capital sentencing decision); Graham v. Collins, 506 U.S. 461, 478 
(1993) Cjury was prevented from adequately considering certain mitigation evidence); 
Gilmore v. Taylor, 508 U.S. 333, 345 (1993) (due process violation based upon 
instructions preventing the jury from considering evidence of defendant's affirmative 
defense); Caspari v. Bohlen, 510 U.S. 383, 396 (1994) (application of the double 
jeopardy clause to successive non-capital sentencing); Goerke v. Branch, 5 14 U.S. 115, 
120 (1995) (substantive due process rights prohibit dismissal of appeal of recaptured 
fbgitive); Grav, 5 18 U.S. at 170 (due process violation where defendant was not given 
adequate notice of evidence commonwealth intended to use against him at capital 
sentencing hearing); Larnbrix, 520 U.S. at 539-40 Cjury's consideration of a 
constitutionally vague aggravator tainted the trial court's sentence); O'Dell v. Netherland, 
521 U.S. 151, 167 (1997) (rule requiring capital defendant be permitted to inform jury he 
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is parole-eligible); Tyler, 533 U.S. at 665-66 (reasonable doubt jury instruction that 
reduced state's burden of proof). 
b. Because the Supreme Court's Holding in Ring Constitutes A N w  
Rule In Violation of Teame, Tbis Court May Not Apply Rinp 
Retroactively To Stuart's S u c ~ s i v e  Post-Conviction Case 
Even if this court concludes it must analyze Stuart's case pursuant to the dictates 
of Teame, because h>is a new rule, his successive claims must be dismissed. 
i. Stuart's Appeal Was Final In 1986 
Finality has been defined "for purposes of retroactivity analysis when the 
availability of direct appeal to the state courts has been exhausted and the time for filing a 
petition for a writ of certiorari has elapsed or a timely filed petition has been finally 
denied." Caspari, 5 10 U.S. at 390. Stuart's conviction was final in 1986, when the time 
for filing a petition for catiorari expired from the Idaho Supreme Court's opinion in 
Stuart I. 
. . 
11. The New Rule From Rinn Was Not Dictated By Prior 
Supreme Court Precedent 
Beginning in 1983, the Idaho Supreme Court, examining cases from the United 
States Supreme Court, rejected claims that jury involvement in capital sentencings was 
mandated by the Constitution. See State v. Sivak, 105 Idaho 900, 904, 674 P.2d 396 
(1983); State v. Creech, 105 Idaho 362, 372-73, 670 P.2d 463 (1983). In 1989, the Idaho 
Supreme Court exhaustively detailed the line of United States Supreme Court decisions 
dating back to 1976 and establishing that judicial sentencing in capital cases did not 
violate the Constitution. Charboneau, 116 Idaho at 146-47. In 1990, the Supreme Court 
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reaEmed those prior cases and expressly reasoned that a trial judge, sitting alone, was 
tted to deternine tbe cxistenm or absence of skatory aggravabg fa&ors. 
497 U.S. at 647-49. Ten years later, the Supreme Court concluded, the Sixth h m h e n t  
does not permit a defendant to be "cxpose[dJ . . . to a penalty exceeding the maximm he 
would receive if pudshed rding to the facts reflected in the jury verdict alone." 
Amrendi, 530 U.S. at 483 . Two years later in Ring, 536 U.S. at 585, the Supreme Court 
concluded A~prendi was inmncilable with Walton, and overruled Walton, 'Yo the 
extent that it allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to b d  an aggravating 
circmstance necessary for the imposition of the death penalty." 
As explained above, Atlgrendi and b> constitute a new rule in violation of 
Teaflue. In 1986 when Stuart's conviction became final and the state courts surveyed the 
legal landscape to address the question of whether juries were constitutionally mandated 
to find statutory ajgravating factors, the unequivocal answer was no. As explained in 
Graham, 506 U.S. at 467, '"there can be no dispute that a decision announces a new rule if 
it expressly overrides a prior decision." 
iii. Ring Does Not Fall Within Either Of The Two Narrow 
Teague Exceptions 
Because h'g announced a new rule of law, this court must determine if it falls 
withm one of the two exceptions to the nonretroactivity doctrine. As in Parks, 494 U.S. 
at 494, "[tlhe rule sought by [Stuart] would neither decrrmrnalx . .  . ze a class of conduct nor 
prohibit the imposition o f .  . . punishment on a particulat class of pasons." Therefore, 
Rinfr, does not fall within the first Teague exception. See Summerlin, 341 F.3d at 1109; 
Turner, 330 F.3d at 1295; Lotter, 664 N.W.2d at 905; Towry, 64 P.3d at 833. 
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Several federal circuits have concluded does not fall w i t h  second 
exception. In Trueblood v. Davis, 301 F.3d 784, 788 (7& Cir. 2002), the Seventh Circuit 
implicitly concluded the second exception does not apply "ecause the Supreme Court 
has not yet held it to be retroactive." In Moore v. h e y ,  320 F.3d 767, 771 n.3 (8& Cir. 
2003), the Eighth Circuit explained, "Absent an express pronouncement on rebroactivity 
from the Supreme Court, the rule &om Ring is not retroactive." In Camon, 297 F.3d at 
993-94, the Tenth Circuit rejected the petitioner's claim that &in> falls within Teague's 
second exception. See also Workman v. Mullin, - F.3d - , 2003 WL 22024965, 
* 13 (loa Cir. 2003) ('&Ring may not be applied retroactively to cases on collateral 
review"). Finally, in Turner, 339 F.3d at 1283-86, the Eleventh Circuit recognized the 
narrowness of the second exception, compared R i t i  with Amrendi, and expressly 
concluded, "Ring simply does not f a  within the ambit of the second Teague exception.'' 
The court explained: 
PreRing sentencing procedure does not diminish the likelihood of a fair 
sentencing hearing; instead, Ring$ new rule, at most, would shiR the fact- 
finding duties during Turner's penalty phase from (a) an impartial judge 
after an advisory verdict by a jury to (b) an impartial jury alone. Ring is 
based on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial and not on a perceived, 
much less documented, need to enhance accuracy or fairness of the fact- 
finding in a capital sentencing context. 
Id. 339 F.3d at 1286 (footnote omitted). 
A number of Idaho's sister states have concluded does not fit within 
Teame's second exception. In Towerv, 64 P.3d at 833, Arizona's Supreme Court 
expressly concluded RU3.3 does not fit within the second exception, because it ''merely 
shifts the fact-finding duty from an impartial judge to an impartial jury." The court 
explained: 
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Requiring a jury to d e t e n e  tbe existence of aggravating circumstances 
does not "increase[] the reliability of the guilty-innocence d e t d a t i o n  at 
all because" Ring L7 does not affect a jury's determination of guilt or 
hocence. See United States v. Moss, 252 F.3d 993, 999 (8' Cir. 
2001)(concluding that Apprendi does not qualify under the second Teague 
exception). Rather, Ring II prohibits a validly convicted defendant fiom 
being exposed to the death penalty d e s s  a jury finds tbe existence of 
certain aggravating factors. See id. 
Id. Further, discussing whether WAedmces the likelihood of a fair sentencing hearing, 
the court reasoned, "Ring 11 merely shfts the fact-fmding duty from an impartial judge to 
an impartial jury. [Citations omitted]. We have no reason to believe that impartial juries 
will reach more accurate conclusions regarding the presence of aggravating 
circumstances than did an impartial judge." Id. at 833-34. 
Discussing whether Rtn> alters the understanding of the '%bedrock procedural 
elements essential to the fairness of a proceeding," the court explained, "one can easily 
envision a system of 'ordered liberty' in which certain elements of a crime can or must be 
proved to a judge, not to the jury." Id. at 834 (quoting United States v. S h d ,  113 F.3d 
3 1, 37 (5" Cir. 1997)). The court also examined several Supreme Court cases, including 
DeStefano v. Woods, 392 U.S. 63 1, 633 (1968), in which the Supreme Court declined to 
make Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145 (1968), retroactive. Towery, 64 P.3d at 834. 
Duncan held that the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial applies to the states through 
the Fourteenth Amendment. The Supreme Court, declining to make Duncan retroactive, 
concluded, 'We would not assert, however, that every criminal trial - or any particular 
trial - held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may never be as fairly 
treated by a judge as he would be by a jury." DeStefano, 392 U.S. at 158. W e  
DeStefano was a pre-Teawe case, it is difficult to imagine that a case merely requiring a 
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jury to find statutory aggavating factors is retromtive when the right to a jury trial on the 
elernents of the underlying %st-degree murder was not applied retroactively. 
"I'he Arizona court also recognized that in Neder v. United Sbtes, 527 U.S. 1, 9 
(1999), the Supreme Corn concluded a judge's failure to instruct and submit an element 
of the offense to a jury was subject to h m l a s  error analysis. Towery, 64 P.3d at 834- 
35. Because the failure to have a j q  find a statutory aggravating circurnstanw is similar 
to failing to submit an underlying element to the jury, "it would be inconsistent with 
Neder to now find that Ring 11 is a watershed rule that 'implicate[s] the fundamental 
fairness of the trial."' Id (quoting Teawe, 489 U.S. at 312). 
In Colwell, 59 P.3d at 373, the Nevada Supreme Court concluded Rinpl is not 
retroactive, because it "is based simply on the Sixth Amendment right to a jury trial, not 
on a perceived need to enhance accuracy in capital sentencings." 
Relying upon several of the cases cited above, in h t te r ,  664 N.W.2d at 905-08, 
Nebraska's Supreme Court recodzed that Teague's second exception is inapplicable to 
R a .  The court explained A ~ ~ r e n d i  is the "jurisprudential source of the Sixth 
Amendment principle established by Ring." Id. 664 N.W.2d at 907. Therefore, the wurt 
relied upon the plethora of jurisdictions, including the Ninth Circuit in United States v. 
Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d 664 (9fh Cir. 2002), which concluded Teague's second 
exception does not apply to Amendi. Id. 664 N. W.2d at 907 .~  
Unquestionably, the right to a jury trial is an important constitutional right. 
However, as explained in Duncan, 'We would not assert, however, that every aimha1 
As noted in Harris v. United States, 536 U.S. 545, 581, 122 S.Ct. 2406, 2407 (2002) 
(Thomas, J., dissenting), "No Court of Appeals, let alone this Court has held that 
Apprendi has retroactive effect." See also Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841,842 (7" 
Cir. 2002) (listing cases). 
o o g c j o z s s  
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trial - or any particular trial - held before a judge alone is unfair or that a defendant may 
never be as f i l y  treated by a judge as he would be by a jury." Id. 391 U.S. at 158. In 
fact, because the right to a jury trial is not as '"fundamental" as Stuart wodd like this 
court to believe, Ihmm was given only prospective application. DeStafano, 392 U.S. at 
633-34. In light of the other United States Supreme Court decisions rejecting the second 
exception, the state submits R a  does not rise to the level of requiring that counsel be 
provided in all criminal trials for serious offenses, which is the stmdard for determining 
whether the second exception has been met. Parks, 494 U.S. at 495. 
The state is aware of only one jurisdiction, the Ninth Circuit, which has concluded 
is retroactive to cases on collateral r e ~ i e w . ~  See Summerlin, supra. The Ninth 
Circuit's rationale is primarily based upon the conclusion that "death is different." Id. 
341 F.3d at 1109-10. While the Supreme Court has concluded, in limited areas, that 
capital cases require heightened scrutiny, the Supreme Court in the context of Teame 
analysis has rejected the concept. In Sawer, 497 U.S. at 242, the petitioner claimed the 
second Teague exception "should be read to include new Wes of capital sentencing that 
'preserve the accuracy and fairness of capital sentencing judgments."' Wmphasis added). 
The Supreme Court rejected the implied claim that diEerent Teawe rules apply in capital 
cases and concluded, "The scope of the I'eague exceptions must be consistent with the 
recognition that '[alpplication of constitutional rules not in existence at the .time a 
conviction becomes final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is essential 
In State v. Whitfield, 107 S.W.2d 253 (Mo. 2003), the Missouri Supreme Court applied 
R i l i  retroactively. However, the court's decision was not based upon Teague, but state 
law. Id. 107 S.W.2d at 264-69. 
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to the operation of our aiminal justice system."' Sawer, 497 U.S. at 242 (quoting 
The Ninth Circuit also concluded that Arizona's capital sentencing procedure 
allowed "extra-judicial factors to enter into the ultimate judgment." S m e r l i n ,  341 F.3d 
at 11 15. However, the court failed to explain how those same factors do not enter into 
nun-capital cases under Amrendi. Additionally, the court failed to recognize that juries, 
like judges, may receive an "inordinate amount of inadmissible evidence." S m e r h ,  
341 F.3d at 11 17. However, unlike ''trial judges [who] are presumed to know the law and 
to apply it in making their decisions," Lambrix, 520 U.S. at 532 n.4, juries only ignore 
inadmissible evidence if the trial judge gives an appropriate instruction, which is 
generally based upon an objection f?om counsel. The Ninth Circuit's concern about 
hearsay statements f?om presentence reports is also unavailing. In Idaho, the court may 
consider hearsay evidence in a presentence report only if Vie defendant is afforded an 
opportunity to present favorable evidence and to explain or rebut the adverse 
information." State v. M a w ,  121 Idaho 178, 183, 824 P.2d 109 (1991). 
The court's concern regarding a jury's role in making important moral decisions 
inherent in rendering a capital verdict is also overstated. S m e r l i n ,  341 F.3d at 11 13. 
In fact, because judges stand for election, they often understand and recognize the "link 
between contemporary community values and the penal system." Id. Yet, the Ninth 
Circuit criticized the fact that judges stand for election and allegedly are more "apt to be 
influenced by external considerations when making their decisions." Id. 341 F.3d at 
1 1 15. The accuracy of a death sentence may actually be diminished by jury participation, 
particularly in light of the complexity of defking statutory aggravating factors, mitigation 
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and the other pitfalls associated with capital seatm&g. See United States v. Moss, 252 
F.3d 993, 999 (8& Cir. 2001) ('Termitling a judge-found fact to age& the sentence 
imposed after a valid conviction, even if it is found under a more lenient stan@ cannot 
be said to have resulted in a funWmMly  unfair criminal proceeding"). 
Further, a number of the concerns raised by the Ninth Circuit were premised upon 
Justice Breyer's concurrence in Ilk>. However, Justice Breyer believes the Eighth 
Amendment mandates jury sentencing. RinR, 536 U.S. at 613-19. The majority's 
opinion in Rk> was based upon the Sixth Amendment and a holding that juries are 
required only to find statutory aggravating factors. Id. 536 U.S. at 609. Clearly, the 
concerns raised in Sumnerlin are not necessarily shared by a majority of the United 
States Supreme Court. 
The Ninth Circuit also overlooked several key factors in reaching its decision. 
First, the opening paragraph in h> explicitly linked capital and non-capital cases when 
it stated, "Capital defendants, no less than noncapital defendants . . . are entitled to a jury 
determination of any fact on which the legislature conditions an increase in their 
maximum punishment." I?&? 536 U.S. at 589. In United States v Brown, 305 F.3d 304, 
308 (sth Cir. 2002), the court recognized that in Apprendi, 530 U.S. at 475, the Supreme 
Court explained, "The substantive basis for New Jersey's enhancement is thus not at 
issue; the adequacy of New Jersey's procedure is." (Emphasis in original). Based upon 
the link established in Rin> the Ninth Circuit's attempt to distinguish b> from 
A ~ ~ r e n d i  is unavailing. Apprendi is the basis for &A. Therefore, "the substantive basis 
for [Idaho's statutory aggravating factors] is thus not at issue; the adequacy of [Idaho's] 
procedure is." 
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Second, the Ninth Circuit ignored the language from h> regarding harmless 
error. See 536 U.S. at 609 n.7 ("this Court ordinarily leaves it to lower courts to pass on 
the harmlessness of the error in the first instance''). If harmless error cannot be applied to 
Ri& as stated by the Ninth Circuit, the Supreme Court would have so stated and not 
remanded to Arizona for a determination of whether it exists. 
Third, the Ninth Circuit failed to recognize that in Sanchez-Cervantes, 282 F.3d at 
670, the court concluded that discussion subjecting b ~ r e n d i  to harmless or plain error 
analysis, "lend[s] additional support to [the] determination that [Ring] is not a bedrock 
procedural rule." In H o h a n  v. Arave, 236 F.3d 523, 548 (grn Cir. 2001) (Pregerson, J., 
dissenting), the dissent expressly found that any error as a result of the jury not finding 
statutory aggravating factors beyond a reasonable doubt was harmless because the 
defendant failed to challenge one of the statutory factors found by the trial judge. 
Certainly, if Apprendi/Rinpc error is subject to plain error analysis, it cannot rise to the 
level of Teame's second exception. 
Fourth, the question of whether the rights identified in Ap~rendi are so 
"fundamental that any system of ordered liberty is obliged to include them," was 
examined in Curtis v. United States, 294 F.3d 841, 843 (7* Cir. 2002). The court 
analyzed United States v. Cotton, 535 U.S. 625 (2002), concluding, "a decision about 
drug quantity made by a judge (on a preponderance standard) rather than a jury (on a 
reasonable-doubt standard) is not the sort of error that necessarily undermines the 
fairness, integrity, or public reputation of judicial proceedings." Curtis, 294 F.3d at 843. 
Finally, contrary to the Ninth Circuit's opinion, b> did not redefine Arizona's 
capital murder law, but merely changed the entity that must make the finding regarding 
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statutory aggravating factors. Addressing this underlying theme Erom Summerlin, the 
Idaho Supreme Court has already rejected such a claim, albeit in a somewhat diEerent 
context. In Lovelace, 2003 WL 21697869, at *13-14, the supreme court addressed the 
question of whether the Ex Post Facto Clause permits a capital defmdant to be 
resentenced to death under Idaho's new capital sentencing statutes. The court recognized 
that "[ufnder the new sentencing statutes, the state must prove the same aggravating 
kcmstances required by the former statute and must prove them to a jury beyond a 
reasonable doubt." Id. at "14. Therefore, the nature of the new changes, which wen= 
mandated by R i Z i  are procedural in nature, not substantive. 
The state submits that the analysis in Summerlin is not well taken and should be 
rejected. If the rationale of Apprendi is strong enough to overrule a case decided a mere 
twelve years ago, that same rationale must be applied in the context of Teame. Neither 
Ap~rend~  nor &ti implicates fundamental fairness and the accuracy of the criminal 
proceeding in the manner envisioned by the Supreme Court to qualie as a "watershed 
rule" under Teame's second exception. 
D. Because The Claims Raised in Stuart's Successive Petition For Post-Conviction 
Relief Fail To Meet The Dictates Of I.C. 6 19-2719C5). This Court Must Dismiss 
His Instant Successive Petition 
1. Introduction 
Stuart contends I.C. fj 19-2719(5) has no application to his case because the 
claims raised in his instant successive post-conviction petition were allegedly raised on 
direct appeal. (Resp. in Opp., pp.38-43.) Stuart also makes several statutory and 
constitutional challenges to I.C. 19-271 9(5). (Resp. in Opp., pp.44-46.) 
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However, Sbmrt has not only misconstrued the state's argument, but he has 
misinterpreted I.G. 5 19-2719 and ignores the fact that the factua) and legal basis for his 
challenge regarding jury sentencing in Stuart I, were significantly different than the basis 
for his present claims. Further, the Xdaho Supreme Court has already rejected the vast 
majority of Stuart's statutory and constitutional challenges. 
2. Because I.C. 4 19-2719 Does Not Provide For the Retroactive Awwlication 
Of New Rules Of Law In A Successive Post-Conviction Petition, Stuart's 
Successive Claims Must Be Dismissed 
As detailed above, I.C. Cj 19-2719 does not p d t  the granting of post-conviction 
relief based upon the retroactive applicaticrn of new rules of law. Therefore, Sfuart's 
contention regarding the relitigation of claims raised on direct appeal is unavailing. 
Start's contention that his present claims were previously raised in his direct 
appeal is also erroneous. As recognized by the Idaho Supreme Court in Stuart I, Stuart's 
claim in 1986, was based upon the Eighth Amendment and the argument that the jury 
should have participated in his sentencing. However, Stuart's present successive claims 
far exceed the 1986 claim. For example, Stuart challenges the lack of jury participation 
under the Sixth and Fourteenth Amendments. (Petition, p.8.) He also contends his 
constitutional rights were violated because he allegedly was not given notice in the 
charging document of the statutory aggravating factors and bad no preliminary hearing 
regarding the statutory aggravating factors. (Petition, pp.8-9.) Stuart fixher contends the 
' jury did not determine mens rea allegedly required under Emund v. Florida, 458 U.S. 
477 (1981). (Petition, p.9.) Stuart also contends the jury failed to find mitigating 
circumstances or conduct the weighmg process. (Petition, pp.9- 1 0.) Clearly, these were 
all claims that were known or reasonably could have been known when Stuart filed his 
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first post-conviction petition. His failure to timely raise the claims in his sumssive 
petition, including the new legal basis for the claims, constitutes waiver of the claims 
under I.C. (j 19-2719(5). 
Stuart's contention regarding the filing of an allegedly frivolous claim in his &st 
post-conviction relief case is extraordinarily disingenuous. As Stuart's counsel is well 
aware, there is apparently no such thing as a "frivolous" claim in the context of capital 
litigation. Despite the United States Supreme Court's and Idaho Supreme Court's 
pronowcernents regarding various legal aspects of capital litigation, capital defendants 
continually raise claims that have been repeatedly rejected by the courts. For example, in 
1993, the United States Supreme Court concluded the statutory aggravating factor, "By 
the murder, or circumstances surrounding its commission, the defendant exhibited utter 
disregard for human life," is constitutional. Arave v. Creech, 507 U.S. 463, 479 (1993). 
Despite the Supreme Court's pronouncement in Creech, several capital defendants 
continue to make constitutional challenges to this aggravating factor, including Creech. 
See e.g. State v. Creech, 132 Idaho 1, 11-12, 966 P.2d 1 (1998). Other statutory 
aggravating factors continue to be challenged despite the Idaho Supreme Court's 
pronouncement that they are constitutional. See e.g. State v. Sivak, 127 Idaho 387,391- 
92,901 P.2d 494 (1995). Despite the United States Supreme Court's and Idaho Supreme 
Court's prior holdings regarding jury sentencing, nearly every capital defendant asks the 
courts to reconsider their respective decisions. See e.g. State v. Porter, 130 Idaho 772, 
795-96, 948 P.2d 127 (1997). In fact, the filing of 'ltkivolous" claims has become so 
much a part of the normal course of procedure in capital cases, that the state is not 
permitted costs or attorney fees in post-conviction cases even if the claims are 
REPLY BRIEF INSUPPORT OF STATE'S MOTION FOR S W M Y  DISMISSAL - 35 
0 0 0 0 0 2 5 2  
11/14/2003 1 6 : 2 4  PAX 208 334 2942 A . G .  U P P l G b  L K i m L N A L  ULV 
"hvolous ." 132 Idaho at 23. Clearly, S 's contention is without merit and 
must be rejected. 
3. A ~ u l i ~ t i o n  Of I.C. 4 19-2719 To Stuart's Case Does Not Constitute 
Retroactive Application In Violation Of State Law 
Stuart correctly notes that Idaho law '"prohibits the retroactive application of 
newly passed legislation." Matthews v. State, 122 Idaho 801, 804, 839 P.2d 1215 (1992) 
(citing I.C. 5 73-101). However, 1.C. 73-101 provides an exception, if the legislature 
expressly declares its intent to make a new rule of law retroactive. Id. At the t h e  I.C. 8 
19-27 19 was passed, the legislature expressly stated: 
This act shall apply to all cases in which capital sentences were 
imposed on or prior to the effective date of t h ~ s  act but which have not 
been carried out, and to all capital cases arising after the effective date of 
this act. 
1984 Idaho Sess. Laws 390. 
Obviously, this language clearly states the legislature's intent to make I.C. 5 19- 
2719 retroactive to all capital cases. Because of this language, Stuart's argument 
regarding retroactivity is without merit. 
4. 1.G. 6 19-2719{5) Does Not Violate The Idaho Constitution's Separation 
Of Powers Doctrine 
Stuart's contention regarding I.C. 5 19-2719(5) allegedly violating Idaho's 
separation of powers doctrine is the same as his contention regarding I.C. 5 19- 
2719(5)(c). Because there is no logical distinction between the separation of powers 
doctrine analysis for I.C. 5 19-2719(5) and 1.C 5 19-2719(5)(c), the state adopts its 
argument above. 
0 0 0 8 i j 2 5 3  
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5 .  Stuart: Has Failed To Establish LC. 6 19-2719(5) Violates Ex Post Facto 
Laws 
For the s m e  reasons that I.G. 5 19-2719(5)(c) does not violate ex post facto laws, 
the state submits I.C. 5 19-2719(5) does not violate ex post facto laws. 
6. 1.C. 6 19-2719(5) Does Not Violate Stuart's Due Process Or Eaud 
Protection RiEhts 
As detailed above, the Idaho Supreme Court has repeatedly rejected Stuart's claim 
that 1.C. 8 19-271 9 violates equal protection or due process! Therefore, Stuart's claim 
must be rejected. 
E. Because Stuart Has Failed To Establish That State Non-Capital Retroactive 
Princi~les Apply To His Case, His A r w e n t  For Greater Retroactivitv Principles 
Under Idaho Law Fails 
Stuart contends that "[flederal retroactivity doctrine is the floor, not the ceiling" 
and that "states may provide greater retroactive efFect than fed& retroactivity doctrine." 
(Resp. in Opp., p.46.) However, because the Idaho Supreme Court has rejected applying 
greater retroactive effect than federal retroactivity doctrine in the context of capital cases, 
Stuart's argument fails. 
In State v. Whitman, 96 Idaho 489,491,531 P.2d 579 (1975), the court explained: 
The prospective or retrospective application of a decision is a 
discretionary determination of judicial policy made by the Court after 
balancing certain criteria. The Court must weight: 
(1) The purpose of the new rule; 
(2) Reliance on the prior decisions of this Court; and 
In fact, if Stuart's case was not or is not a capital case, the state would submit, based 
upon the Idaho Supreme Court's repeated rejection of this claim, that it is frivolous aod 
ask for appropriate sanctions. 
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(3) The effect of the new rule on the administration of 
justice. 
Stuart contends these three criteria should be evaluated in determining whether 
Rdshou ld  be given retroactive effect. However, since at least the passage of I.C. 5 19- 
2719, tfte Whitxnan criteria have neva been applied in the context of a capital case and 
were implicitly rejected by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Card, 121 Idaho 425,825 
P .2d 108 1 (1 99 I), and Fettaly. 
In C& the majority applied Pame v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1 99 I), which 
overruled in part, Booth v. Marvland, 482 U.S. 496 (1987). C& 121 Idaho at 431-34. 
Justice Bistline, in dissent, contended that under Whitman, Payne should not be appLied 
retroactively. Card, 12 1 Idaho at 46 1-63. 
As described above, Fetterly sought retroactive application of the new rule of law 
fiom Charboaem. Relying upon I.C. 5 19-2719, the Idaho Supreme Court rejected 
Fetterly's argument. Fetterly, 121 Idaho at 419. However, in dissent, Justice Bistline 
opined the majority improperly rejected the Whitman criteria for determining 
retroactivity. Id. 121 Idaho at 421 -24. 
By rejecting Justice Bistline's analysis in C d  and Fetterly, and applying the 
dictates of I.C. 5 19-2719, the Idaho Supreme Court has already rejected Stuart's 
argument regarding the application of Whitman. 
F. LC. 4 19-27 19 Does Not Unlawfully Susuend The Writ Of Habeas Corpus 
Stuart attempts to salvage his successive post-conviction petition by alternatively 
characterizing it as a "Writ of Habeas Corpus." Because the UPCPA is the exclusive 
means for challenging the validity of a conviction or sentence, Stuart is precluded h m  
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raising his R i a  claims in the context of a writ of habeas corpus. Gomez v. State, 120 
Idaho 632,634,818 P.2d 336 (Ct. App. 1991). 
Stuart implicitly contends I.C. 8 19-271 9 unlawfully suspends the writ of habeas 
corpus by precluding petitioner fkom raising valid claims under b&p. that invalidate his 
sentence. (Resp. in Opp., pp.50-52.) However, Stuart's counsel again fails to cite 
controlling cases expressly rejecting this claim. In McKmnev v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 
703, 992 P.2d 144 (1 999), a capital petitioner raised the identical issue. Rejecting the 
claim, the Idaho Supreme Court explained: 
We reject this argument, a W g  the Court of Appeals' analysis of this 
issue in Eubank v. State, 130 Idaho 861, 863-64, 949 P.2d 1068, 1070-71 
(Ct. App. 1997). All remedies in capital cases available by writ of habeas 
corpus or by post-conviction procedure must be pursued according to the 
procedures and the time limitations of 1.C. (i 19-271 9. I.C. (i 19-2719(4). 
The legislature may pass statutes regulating the use of the writ of habeas 
corpus. Mahafley v. Stizte, 87 Idaho 228, 231, 392 P.2d 279, 280 (1964). 
Post-conviction procedure acts have replaced the writ of habeas corpus for 
the purpose of challenging the validity of a conviction. See Dionne v. 
Stute, 93 Idaho 235, 237, 459 P.2d 101 7, 1019 (1 969). The proper use of 
a petition for post-conviction relief "avoids repetitious and successive 
applications; eliminates confusion and yet protects the applicant's 
constitutional rights." id. Like the UPCPA, LC. (i 19-2719 does not deny 
the writ of habeas corpus. See id.; see also Eubank, 130 Idaho at 863-64, 
949 P.2d at 1070-71. 
Id., 133 Idaho at 703-04; McECinney v. Paskett, 753 F.Supp. 861, 864-65 (D. Id. 1990). 
Further, as detailed in the state's Brief in Support of Motion to Dismiss Appeal, 
even if Stuart's successive petition could be raised in a petition for writ of habeas corpus, 
because the writ was filed in the wrong jurisdiction, his claims fail. (Brief in Support, 
p.12.) Stuart's claim is without merit and must be summarily rejected by this court. 
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Stuiut mntends, "J3quitable principles alone d m m d  t b t  [his] death sentenee be 
vacated." (Resp. in Opp., p.37.) Con- to Stuart's contention, it is the retroactive 
application of RhXhthat would result in an inequitable result and miscarriage of justice. 
In Criffith, a case involving the retroactive application of Batson v. K a M c k ,  
479 U.S. 79 (1986), the Supreme Court discussed the history and equities associated with 
the question of retroactivity. The Court explained, "'the Constitution neither prohibits 
nor requires retrospective eEfect,' of a new constitutional rule, and that a determination of 
rekoactivity must depend on 'weigh[ing] the merits and demerits in each case."' Griffith, 
479 U.S. at 320 (quoting Linkletter v. Walker, 381 U.S. 618, 629 (1965)). The Court 
M e r  noted the three-prong analysis adopted in Linkletter and StovaU v. Denno, 388 
U.S. 293 (1967): "(a) the purpose to be served by the new standards, (b) the extent of the 
reliance by law dorcernent authorities on the old standards, and (c) the effect on the 
adminiskation of justice of a retroactive application of the new standards." Grifith, 479 
U.S. at 321 (quoting Stovall, 388 U.S. at 297). The Court explained that historically the 
three-prong analysis did not include cases ''where a new rule is a 'clear break' with past 
precedent;" even if the case was on direct review. Griffi'ch, 479 U.S. at 324 (quoting 
United States v. Johnson, 457 U.S. 537, 549-50 (1982)). As explained in United States v. 
Johnson, 457 U.S. 537,549-50 (1982) (intemal quotes aad citations omitted): 
[where the Court has expressly declared a rule of criminal procedure to 
be a clear break with the past, it almost invariably has gone on to find such 
a newly minted principle nometroactive. In this second type of case, the 
traits of the particular constitutional rule have been less critical than the 
Court's express threshold determination that the new constitutional 
interpretation so changes the law that prospectivity is arguably the proper 
course. Once the Court has found that the new rule was unanticipated, the 
second and third Stovall factors - reliance by law enforcement authorities 
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on the old standads and effect on the sQation of justice of a 
reeoactive applimtion of the new rule - have virtually compelled a 
finding of nomeb.oactivity. 
Reassessing the '"clear break" exception, the Court concluded it should not be 
applied to eases on direct review. Griffith, 479 U.S. at 326-28. 
In Team,  the Suprae Court again addressed the question of retroactivity, but in 
the context of collateral review.' Based upon the 'interests of comity and finality, a 
plurality of the Court concluded new constitutional rules of Miminal procedure cannot be 
applicable in those cases which have become final before the new rules are announced. 
Id. 489 U.S. at 308-10. Specifically addressing the issue of fmality, the Court explained: 
Application of constitutional rules not in existence at the time a conviction 
became final seriously undermines the principle of finality which is 
essential to the operation of our criminal justice system. Without finality, 
the criminal law is deprived of much of its deterrent effect. The fact that 
life and liberty are at stake in cmminal prosemtions shows only that 
conventional notions of finality should not have as much place in criminal 
as in civil litigation, not that they should have none. If a criminal 
judgment is ever to be fmal, the notion of legality must at some point 
include the assignment of final competence to determine legality. 
The costs imposed upon the States by retroactive application of 
new rules of constitutional law on habeas corpus generally far outweigh 
the benefits of this application. In many ways the application of new rules 
to cases on collateral review may be more intrusive than the enjoining of 
criminal prosecutions, for it continually forces the States to marshal 
resources in order to keep in prison defendants whose trials and appeals 
conformed to then-existing constitutional standards. . . . [Sltate courts are 
understandably fnrstrated when they f~thfully apply existing 
constitutional law only to have a f e d 4  court discover, during a habeas 
proceeding, new constitutional demands. 
Id. at 309-10 (internal quotes, citations and emphasis omitted). 
Interestingly, the question before the Court, again, involved the retroactive application 
of Batson v. Kentucky. 
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Despite S-3 protestations to the co RiEtkg is a netv constitutional rule 
whose impact on the statas is exactly as described in T a p e ,  if it is applied retroactively 
to collateral cases. For nearly twenty yem, Idaho's courts have relied upon an 
abundance of Suprme Court precedent clearly holding that a jury finding of statutory 
aggravating factors is not mandated by the Constibtion. See Sivak, 105 Idaho at 904; 
Greech, 105 Idaho at 372-73; Chasboneau, 116 Idaho at 145-48. To now require the 
application of b> to those cases and potentially force the resentencing of every capital 
defendant in Idaho would seriously undermine any deterrent effect associated with the 
death penalty. More importantly, as explained in Teame, the entire operation of the 
criminal justice system would be seriously undermined because of the destruction of the 
principle of finality. Certainly, the costs associated with such a holding would be 
enormous and seriously outweigh any benefits associated with the new rule. 
Based upon the principles of comity and finality, Stuart's argument regarding 
equity rings hollow. 
CONCLUSION 
The state respectfully requests this court grant the state's Motion for Summary 
Dismissal and dismiss Stuart's successive Petition for Post-Conviction Relief 
DATED this 1 4t? day of November, 2003. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
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STATE OF IDAHO } 
) ss: 
County of Ada 1 
L. LaMont Anderson, being first ddy sworn on oath, deposes and says: 
1. The state's responsive brief to Defendmtfpetitioner's pending briefs is due 
October 10,2003. 
2. An extension of time is necessary inasmuch as your B a n t  has had 
insufficient time in which to complete the necessary research and draft an appmpriate 
responsive brief 
3. Your aEant is primarily responsible for drafting the state's responsive 
brief. However, your affiant did not receive the court's ordering zppointing the Idaho 
Attorney General's Office until September 29, 2003. 'While your affiant had every 
reason to believe the order would be signed, your affiant hesitated to expend a significant 
amount of time preparing to dr& the responsive brief in the event the court declined to 
grant the petition for appointment. 
4. Additionally, even if the order had been signed and received earlier, 
because of a significant and unexpected increase in your affiant's case load, it has been 
impossible to complete the necessary review of Stuart's pauling briefs and research and 
draft an appropriate response. Further, the Ninth Circuit, on Septanba 2, 2003, issued 
an opinion in S m c r l i n  v. Stewart, - F.3d -* 2003 WL 22038399 (9' Cir. 2003) 
(en banc), that may have a direct impact on the issues raised in Stuart's successive post- 
conviction petition. 
5. Your affiant requests an extension of fhirty-five (35) days, whereupon his 
brief would become due November 14,2003. 
AFFLC,AyrTI11'SUPPORT OF MODON FOR lZXXENSION OF T W  - 2 
6. No previous extmiom of time have been rquested by yow afiant in 
which to file his brief. 
7. Your aEant contacted Stuart's ~4cciunse1, Oliver W. Loewy, who informed 
your aEant that in light of Surunerlin. he had no objection to the state's request. 
8. This request is made in good fitith and not with the intention of causing. 
undue delay or tactical advantage. 
Further your affiant sayetb naught. 
DATED &is 10& day of October, 2003. 
Deputy Attorney ~ k a f  
Chief, Capital IiitiMon Unit 
SUBSCRIBED AND SWOW TO before me this 1 oth day of October, 2003. 
~ e s i & ~  at: Boise, Idaho 
My Coinmission Expires: 10!22/04 
AFFUI>AUTIh.' SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR ,3XYi%i?SION OF ZME - 3 
CmTmCATE OF SERVICE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 10' day af October, 2003,I caused to 
be smiced a true and ~ u m c t  copy of tbe foregohg document by the method indicated 
below, posbge prepaid where qplicablq and addressed to the following: 
Joan M. Fisher X. U.S.A?ail 
Federal Defenders of Rmd Delivery 
Eastem Washington & Idaho Overnight h4&l 
201 N. Main Facsimile 
Moscow, ID 83543 
Honorable Ron Schilling 
P.O. Box 1251 
Mexidian, ED 83680-1251 




CE G. WASDEN 
Attorney Gar& 
Skte of Idaho 
mal Law Division 
NT MRERSON, ISB if-t 3687 
~ I S T R \ ; A  M, se 
D ~ a y  Atlomeys C e n d  - 
CrirninaI Law Division, Capitat Litigarion Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-00 10 
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CASE Ed0 
JOHN SWAYNE, 1SB #1985 
Clearwater Cowiy Prosecuting Attorney 
Box 2627 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Telqhone: (208) 476-561 1 
1N THE ISISTRICrT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICU DISTRICT 
OF W E  S T A E  OF IDAHO, ICN AND FOR THEi COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE! F W C I S  STUART, 
Petitioner, - 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 






1 MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF TntiE 
1 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff, 
1 > CASE NO. 8495 
vs . 1 MOTION FOR EXTENSION OF I M E  







MOTIOOY FOR EXTEh'SSlON OF 2lrME - I 
COME!, NOW, L. LaMont hdason,  Deputy A t k m y  General, Cbief, Capital 
Litigation Unit and Special Proswuhg Attorney for C l m a t a  County, State of Idaho, 
and John A. Swayne, Prosecuting Aaomq for Clewate? County, Statc of Id&, and do 
hereby move this Court for an order extending the tme in which the state's '"tesponsive 
bnef to Defendantrpetitiona's pending briefs" will be due until November 14, 2003. 
This motion is based on the &&vit of the undersigned attorney. Said affidavit is 
attached hereto and incorporated by reference herein 
DATED this 10" day of October, 2003. 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chef, Capital Litigation Unit 
I H E E B Y  CmRW That on or about tfie I day of October, 2003, I caused to 
be serviced a true and coned copy of tfie forqoing d o m a t  by the me&& indicated 
below, postage prepaid when: applicable, and d h s e d  to the f o U o ~ g :  
Joan M. Fisha X U.S. Mail 
Federal Defaders of Hmci Delivery 
Eastm W&won & Idaho &cSrnight Mail 
201 N. Main Facsimile 
Mosww, aD 83W3 
Honohle Ron Schjlling 
P.O. Box 1251 




IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF 
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
1 Case No.: 8495 
Petitioner-Appellant, 1 
1 ORDER FOR ATTORNEY'S FEES 
vs. 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Defendant-Respondent. 1 
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the fees in this matter in the amount of $270.00 at 
the rate of $100.00 per hour be and the same hereby are approved and payable to Randall, 
Blake & Cox, P-A, 
,.t" 
DATED THIS 3 day of December, 2003. 
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1 J,., ! 30aN M. F1[SmR * ,  1 
Capital Errbeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of &stern Wmfigton & Idaho 
20 1 No* Street i ~ : 1 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-0 1 80 
FacshiIe: 208-882-1 492 
IN DLSTNCT COURT OF THE SECONI, J'UDIW DISiTUCT OF 
FEE STATE OF IDAHO, LN AND FOR TEE COlINTY OF CLEARWATER 
Gene Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF IDAHO, and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Department of Correction, and 
GREG FISHER, Warden, Idaho 
Max;imum Seeunity Institution, 
Respondent. 
CAPITAL CASE 
CASE NOS. SP02-109, 
8495, & 
SP02-151 
AFSIDAVIT LIY SUIPPCJRT OF 
MOTION TO STAY PI;:OClEEDINGS 
PErnrnG DISPOSITION IN m 
DM0 S U P W r n  COURT OF 
H O F W  v. STATE AND ICN THE 
=D STATES S U P I ~ M E  COURT 
OF S C m O  v. S U n t l M E W  
I, Joan M. Fisher, declare the following undex penalty of perjury: 
1. Because resentenchg proceedings would be expensive, lengthy, and complex, sentencing 
relief in this case would likeIy lead the parties to w i d e r  resolving Petitioner's entire 
case short of additional litigation. Thus, moving forward on these mattx-s before 
dispositions in Schriro v. Summerlin, 124 S.Ct. 833 (2003) (certiorari rzview granted), 
and Ho@m v. State, Case Nos. 29354/29355 (Idaho S.Ct. 2003) (appeals firom denials 
Affidavit In Support Of Motion To Stay -1 
03/02/2004 1$:49 FAX. 208 883 14' 
of Ring relief in 19 LC. $2719 petition and I.C.R. 35 motion), m y  be wastefirl, 
Additionally, it would be consistent with Idaho Supreme Court and f c d d  court orders in 
&e Ring context. 
2. Petitioner, who stands convicted of Erst degree murder (Idaho Code S edion 1 8-400 1 & 
4003 (1 977)) and is under sentence of death for that oseme, has three matters penwg 
before this Court. Ia two of these matters, Petitioner seeks sentencing relief through the 
application of Ring v. Arizona, 122 S. Ct. 2428,2432 f2002), to his case.' In the third, he 
seeks, among other things, sentencing relief on factually complex m..Ring grounds.2 
3. In Ring, the United States Supreme Court held as a matter of federal constitution law that 
a jury must determine the existence of each fact necessary to render a defendant eligible 
for a sentence of death. The Idaho Supreme Court has acknowledged drat Ring invalidates 
the statutory scheme under which Mr. Stuart was sentenced to death. State v, Fe~erly ,  
137 Idaho 729,52 P.3d 874,875 (2002) (holding that Ring "appears to invalidate the 
death penalty scheme in Idaho which to this time has allowed the sentencing judge to 
make factual findings of the aggravating factors necessary to the imposition of a death 
\ 
sentence."). 
4. Thus, iERing is found retroactively applicable in Summerlin or Ho&r, Petitioner will 
be legally entitkd to vacation of his death sentence. Respondent has acknowledged this 
-- . 
'Petition For Post-Conviction Relief And/@ Writ Of Habeas Coqus, Case Number SP- 
02-00109, and Motion To Correct Illegal Sentence, To Vacate Sentence Of Death And For New 
Sentencing Trial, Case Number 8495. 
'Petition For PostConviction Relief And Petition For Writ Of  Habeas C o p ,  Case 
Number SP02-15 1. See id. at 7-8 (Claim A: prosecutorid misconduct mandates new sentencing 
proceedings) and 18- 19 (Claim C: Brady violations require new sentencing proceedings). 
Affidavit Xn Support Of Motion To Stay -2 
03 /02 /2004  1 7 : 4 8  FAX 208 883  14' - FEDERAL DEmNDERS 
entidement in the case of a s ~ a r t y  simated dm& wtenced prison% Specifidy, in 
oral argument before the Idabo Supreme Court in Nof im ,  Respondeat stated that if Ring 
is found ~&oac*dvely applicable the State will ""hve no other ehoim ...in the interest of 
ess" tbsm $0 concede b t  resentencing p r o c e a g s  are rna~daed .~  
5 .  The United S&*s Supreme Coctrt has &ranted certiorari review to decide whether fedml 
law requires the rekoaclive wpGcat.ion of R i ~ g  to cases where the direct appeal was fmd 
before Ring was mounted. Schriro v. Summerlin, No. 03-526. 
6. Even if fd-1 law does not require retroactive qpfication of Ring, Idiho state law m y  
do so. Of the: several cases raising before ehe Idaho Supreme Court the: question of Ring's 
retroactivity, the only case: MXy briefed and argued is Hofiun and the Supreme Court 
has stayed that m e e r  pen* disposition in Swnmerlirt. H a w n  v. Litate, Order 
Suspending Appeal, Case Nos. 29354/29355 (Idaho 2/12/2004). Wit: the Supreme 
3The following exchange took place during oral argument before the Ida6 Supreme 
Cowt on February 9,2004: 
Justice Trout: . . . W.,.the U.S. Supreme Court did decid: 
[Ring] was retroactive, why I[ mess at &at 
point in time.. .the Sate would concede &en 
as I understand it that [Appe&.int Hof'fman] 
should be resentenced at that point? 
Asst. A.G, Anderson: Your Honor, I don't believe that we'd have 
Î - any other choice ... But in the interest of f&m%a$-$quite fb&Iy can't envision 
the scenario where the State would not say 
you have to be resentenced 
This quofation is taken horn the Idaho Supreme Court audio tapes of the oral atgsument, not from 
a0 official transcript. 
Affidavit J& Support Of Motion To Stay -3 
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Court h not stayed aI1 cases raising the issue of Ring's retroactivity, it has stayed some4 
aud, in any event no case other than Hof@kun which raises the question has been Nly 
briefed mdlor argued before that court, 
7. The Federal District Court for the District of Idaho has stayed proceeciings in many 
habeas corpus cases filed on behalf'of death sentenced prisoners pendxg the Idaho 
Supreme Court's decision as to whether it will apply Ring retroacitvely on colIaWd 
review, where the cases were not already stayed on other grounds. See, Rhoades v. Arave, 
Case No, CV 93- 156-S-EJL (6/30/03); Rhoades v. Aruve, Case No. C7? 93-1 55-S-EJL 
(6130103); Creech v. Pasktt, Case No. CV 99-0224-S-BLW (5/20/03): Fields v. Klauser, 
Case No. CV 95-422-S-EL (6130/03); McKiqney v. Pmketf, Case No. CV 96-177-S-EJL; 
Row V. Miller, CV 98-240-S-BLW (6/9103); and Sivak v. KEauser, CV-96-0056-S-BLW 
(6/9/03). 
8. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals, too, has stayed proceedings in an :Idaho case pending 
finat disposition by the United States Supreme Court of Sunzmerlin anl. the Idaho state 
courts' frnal disposition of state postconviction proceedings based up or^ Ring in Hornan. 
,' 
Ho- V. Arave, Orders (Nos. 02-99004, 10/10/2002 & 02-G9005, 10/17/2003). 
Likewise, the Nina Circuit has stayed proceedings in the: case of an Xdsho death 
sentellced prisoner pending "final disposition of SummerIin by the United States Supreme 
*See, e.g., Rhoades v. St~te, Case Nos. 29 1801292 12 (Idaho 12/18/03); iKcKinney v. State, 
Order Granting Motion To Suspend Appeal, Case Nos. 26269/2942 1 (Idaho 1. / :  6/04); State v, 
Sivak, Order Granting Motion To Suspend Appeal, Case Nos. 29662/29663 Gd&o 1/20104); 
State v. Creech, Order Granting Motion To Suspend Appeal, Case Nos. 29681129632 (Idaho 
1/20/04); IIairston v. State, Order Granting Motion To Suspend Proceedings In Appeal, Case 
Nos. 28528/29653/29680 (Idaho 2/24/04). 
AfGdavit Ia Support Of Motion To Stay -4 
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Court." Pizzuta v. Arme, 345 F.3d 11 19 (Yffi Cir. 2003). 
9. Thus, staying these proceedings pending disposition in SummerZin and the ELiomn cases 
may preserve judicial resources and would be consistent with Idaho Supreme Court and 
federal corn orders, 
Dated this a thy of March, 2004. 
- 
Attorney for Petitioner Gene I?. Stuar t  
mdavit In Support Of Motion To Stay -5 
nd I hereby certify that on the& --- day of March, 2004, I caused to bl: sewed a true and 
c o m t  copy of the foregoing doclrment by the method inQcated below, postzge prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
1;. M a n t  Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chief; Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise ZP) 83720-0010 
( f )  208-334-2942 
Clearwater county Prosecutor's Office 
P.O. Box 2627 
brofino, Idaho 83544 
(f) 208-476-97 10 
PUS Mail - 
- Hand Delivev 
&?;tcsirde 
- Federal Express 
r u s  Md - 
da~Sdimil~d'"ry 
- Federal Express 
ABldavff In Sapport Of Motion To Stay -6 
PC \ 3 ;3+, ( \;c;ws$k Y\!X , ) 
LC.3 ~ie&- BY 
Qejjtity 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER. 
GENE FRANCIS STUART ) CASE NO. CR81-8495, SP02-00109, 
) SPO2-00151 
Plaintiff, ) 
1 COURT MINUTES 
vs . i 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ET. AL. ) 
) 
Defendant. ) 
District Judge Presiding: Ron Schilling 
Joan Fisher and Oliver Lowery: Attorneys for Plaintiff 
John A. Swayne and Lamont Anderson: Attorneys for Defendant 
Deputy Clerk: Sue K. Summerton 




81 8 Parties present telephonically: Honorable Ron Schilling; Oliver Lowey and Lamont 
Anderson. John Swayne present in court. Joan Fisher not present. Court advises 
now is the time for a scheduling conference. Court advises receipt of Plaintiffs 
Motion and Affidavit to stay. 
908 Mr. Lowey argues ths !Motion to Stay 
932 Court questions Mr. Anderson and Mr. Swayne regarding their position. 
941 Mr. Anderson argues in opposition to Motion to Stay. 
1036 Mr. Lowey continues argument to Motion to Stay 
11 62 Mr. Anderson continues argument. 
Deputy Clerk - Sue K. Summerton 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
Approved: & 




1220 Mr. Lowery continues argument. 
124-7 Court remarks to attorneys. Court advises that after review of the motion and 
argument from the attorneys that the motion to stay is granted. Court stays these 
cases until either party, for good cause, notifies the court of another consideration. 
Court orders Mr. Lowey to prepare an order rendering this opinion. 
1404 Court in recess. 
Deputy Clerk - Sue K. Summerton 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
Approved: 
03/02/2004 1 7 : 4 8  FAX 208 8 8 3  14%- FEDERAL DEFENDERS a 0 0 3  
JOAN M msmR 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defedem of Eastern Wmh@on & Idaho 
20 1 North Main Street 
Moscow, XcMm 83 843 
Telephone: 208-883-0 180 
FacsWe: 208-882- 1492 
TEE I ) I S W a  COURT OF THE SECOND JUD31W DLS'.WCT OF 
THE STATE OF ZDAICXO, IN AXVD FOR TEE COUNTY OF CLEUZWATER 
Gene Francis Stuart, 
Petitioner, 
STATE OF D M O ,  and 
TOM BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho 
Departmeat o f  Correction, and 
GREG FTSHER, Warden, Idaho 
M d u m  Security Institution. 
Respondent. 
CAPITAL CASE 
CASE NOS. SP02-109, 
8495, & 
SP02-151 
MOTION TO STAY PIR.OCEEBINGS 
PENDING DZSPOSITI$bN IN THE 
DAHO SUPRErn CO'LTRT OF 
H O F F W  v. STAT'. AND IN 
THE IJNITED STATES SUPREME 
COURT OF S C m R O  11. S m R L 1 7 V  
Petitioner, Gene Francis Stuart, moves to stay these proceedings pending the outcomes in 
cases now before the Idaho Supreme Court ( H o r n  v. State, Case Nos. 2935~J29355) and the 
United States Supreme Court (Schriro v. Summerlin, Case No. 03-526), in which the d i ~ s i t i ~ e  
issu& axe identical to issues raised before this Court. Specifidy, c o m o n  ta SummqrZia and 
Petitioner's cases is the question whether Ring v. Arizona, 122 S.Ct. 2428 (200:2), should be 
applied as a maser of federal law to cases in which direct appeal proceedings u-ere compIete 
before Ring was decided, while common to HofJinan and Petitioner's cases are (I) the m e  
Motion To Stay .I'roceedinga -1 
03/02/2004 17:4& FAX 208 883 1 4 Y "  FEDERAL DEFENDERS 
M 004 
question just noted regarding Summerlira and (2) whether Ring should be applied as a matter of 
state law to cases in which direct appeal proceedings were compXete before Ring was decided. 
Because resentencing proceedings would be expensive, lengthy, and wnnplex, sentencing relief 
in this case wodd likely lead the parties to consider resolving Petitioner's entire Case short of 
additional litigatioa. Thus, moving forward on these matters before dispositicms in Summerlin 
and Hornan m y  be wasteful. Additionally, stamg these proceedings vvoulc be consistent with 
Idaho Supreme Court and federal court ordm in the Ring context. 
bated this d day of March, 2003. 
L M, Fisher 
Attorney for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
Motion To Stay Proceedings -2 
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I hereby that on tbe day of March, 2003,I caused to bt: served a true and 
correct copy oftbe tbeoregoh docmat  by the method indicated bebw, postage prepaid where 
applimble, addressed to: 
L. LaMont Anderson 
D e p q  AIIomey General 
Chief, Capital Liegdon. Unit. 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise TD 83720-001 0 
(f) 208-334-2942 
John A. Swaylrle 
Clearwater County Prosecutor's Qfficcj 
P.O. Box 2627 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 
(0 208-476-971 0 
<US Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
&acsimJe 
- Federal Express 
,gE2 M d  
- Hand Delivery 
-simile 
- Federal Express 
: r  -2; C;eawtateT .. by w%f!Z. that me kregoing Is a fbn, he, and 
.cl copy 0% an instrument as the same now remains 
:r d GP~Lw~G r i l  iny C?%C@ 
,J t SS mi hand and offidal seal hereto afKxed 
-- - < \, 2- ". :.,. - -  -J &i 1s 
- <. , c - r:><d 
-'"- -*-, * 
dayof & -  A.D.,20CeJ 
. ,_ .:N CWfliSTEIdSEN, CLERK OFTME t41STRIGT 
CjLi iZr EX_ OFFIGlO VDITOR & RECOROER 
C '  
Motion To Stay Proceedings -3 
Gene @ran& 560- 
STATE OIr XDAH0, and 
TOM BEAUGL- Director, Idaho 
Department of Comeetian, and 
GREG ~~ Warden, Idaho 
Mtudmm Security Inetitation. 
1 
1 CAPITAL CASE SASE NO 
1 ?,-, 4b:9 a y ~4 3 
1 CASE NOS. $A &A" =.ye3 - OEPt1T'I' 
1 
1 @/2pn32. OCY?OY 73 
1 
) ORDER STAMYG PROlClEEDZNGS 
) PENDING DISWSXTION fN TEE 
) IDAHO SWREm CQlJRT OF 
) H O F W u . S T A m A W m  
) 'JXE XXWT!D STATES SUPRERfE 
) COURT OF SCHZWZO 1. S m R L L 7 V  
Respondent. ) 
Ha* duly consicked Petitiomx's application to stay ewb of these three proceedings 
and, on March 3,2004, ha\ing hard and wmidered oral argument addressing the application, it 
is hereby ordered that: 
I P r o c ~  in esch of these cases are hereby stayed peadis g 
&position in the Idaho Suplame Court of Hu$%n v. StW, 
Cwe Nus. 29354129355, and in the Uaited States Supreme 
Cmrt of Schrlrcl v. S m d h ,  Case No. 03-526. Ka the 
interim, either pu2-y m y  move to disso;fve the stay In eitha* 
case for good cause. 
Dated this /5 ' day of March. 2004. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff 
VS. 
Gene Francis Stuart 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Defendant. 
DOB: 
DL or SSN: 
See \nd Judicial District Court, State of Id-ho 
,n and For the County of Clearwater 
150 Michigan Ave 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 s c 8 5  LI , ,~ SL% CL Et\K-DISTRLC I COURT 
CLEARV~ATER COUBlTY 
1 OR3FiVe IDAiili 
1 
) ZOO5 CJEC 2 3 A 9: 38 
) 
1 C A S E  HO 
) Case No: CR-1981-0008495 
) 
/c.L * t  . : 
) NOTICE OF H ~ ~ N G  - - ' DEPLIT" 
1 
) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for. 
Telephonic Status Conference Friday, January 06, 2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling Pacific 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Friday, 
December 23, 2005. 
Defendant: Gene Francis Stuart 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Private Counsel: Mailed ,k. Hand Delivered 
J o a n M . ~ i ~ h ~ ~ / ' > i ' ~ ~  I 
Federal Defenders Of Eastern ~ a s h i k ~ t o n  & ldaho 
201 N. Main 
Moscow ID 83843 
Prosecutor: Lori Gilmore ILamont Anderson 
/ 
Mailed& Hand Delivered 
Dated: Friday, December 23, 2005 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
,'-' 
- %  
By: , \L, i- 
Deputy Clerk 
DOC22 7/96 
SECONP W I G I A L  DISTRICT COURT, STATE "F IDAHO 
py& LN . _IOD FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARW. ,ICR /??  
&a* j i j  150 IMICmGM AVE &dZ 
v&gp %i?& 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 F ,  - J m L m , , r d t ~  - 
'~LEWK-DISTR~C iCQUR J 
CLEARWATER COUNTY 
OROFIW. IDAEO 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff ) 
case No: lW*@&2f100&3q: 3 5 
1 
) NOTICEM WARING 
State Of Idaho, Defendant ) 0 ~ t .  
b 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Status Conference Friday, January 06,2006 1 0:00 AM Pacific 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on December 23rd, 2005. 
C9 j i y r- ,T% 
L : ' \ L % L r  ' i 
JOAN M. FISHER 
201 N. MArN 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
)C Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: December 23rd, 2005 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
By: 137 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
SECOND .F?)IcL~L DISTRICT COURT, STATE Om IDAHO 
J FOR THE COIJNTY OF CXEARM'A ,R 
150 m C m G A N  AVE 
OROFCNO, IDAHO 83544 :kuJ!:? bi , ,  , ~ . * v ~ ~ ~ ~  
C ~ E R ~ ' - O ~ S T R I C  ; OURT 
CLEARWATER COUNTY 
OR OF IT.?^;, ~ D A W O  
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 
VS 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
1 ) Case NO: c V - ~ W ~ W ~  A q: 35 




BY i OEPUT'f 
NOTICE IS HEREXU GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Status Conference Friday, January 06,2006 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
10:OO AM Pacific 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on December 23rd, 2005. 
L. LAMONT ANDERSON 
P.O. BOX 7129 
BOISE ID 83707-1 129 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: December 23rd, 2005 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
, C' 
Y?\k L. g-, 7% \\y,)h4r, \ \ By: - 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
SECOND VJDICLAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE "p IDAHO 
IN.  D FOR TJ3E COUNTY OF CLEARWt ER @*> 
150 MICHIGAN AVE v%v ,P+ *&Y 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 ; , ~ L . J I ~ ~  L l i t m m L  , ; - , $ > € ~  C L E R K - D ~ S T R I C T  COURT 
CLEARWATER COUNTY 
OROF"f~!D. 1DAfiO 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 
VS 
State OF Idaho, Defendant 
1 Case NO: C V - ~ & B & ~  A A: 35 




V BY- OEPUT'f 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Status Conference Friday, January 06,2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling Pacific 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on December 23rd, 2005. 
LORI GILMORE 
P.O. BOX 2627 
OROFINO ID 83544 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: December 23rd, 2005 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
2 $ ~ ~ : \ \ ~ y ~ , , ~ ~ 2 ~ + G ~  1 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
LAWMNCE G. WASI>EN 
Attorney General 
State of Idaho 
STEPHEN A. BYWATER 
Deputy Agorney General 
Chief, Criminal Law Division 
L. LaMONT ANDERSON, ISB # 3687 
Deputy Attorney General 
f,ti::iij Ck,rtd,,;,SEH 
CLEFXK-OISTRIL I COURT 
CLEARWATER COUHTY 
090FIL!0. 117At-10 
Criminal L,aw Division, Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 
Telephone: (208) 334-4539 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
OF THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 CASE NO. CV 2002-0000443 
Petitioner, 
VS. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
i 








STATE OF IDAHO, 
) 




) MOTION TO LIFT STAY 






MOTION TO LIFT STA Y - 1 
COMES NOW, L. LaMont Anderson, Deputy Attorney General, Chief, Capital 
Litigation Unit and Special Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater County, State of Idaho, 
and does hereby request t h s  court to lifi the stay imposed on March 17,2004. 
In the March 17, 2004, Order, this Court granted Petitioner's Motion to Stay 
Proceedings pending the dispositions in Ifoffrnan v. State, #29354/29355 and Schriro v. 
S m e r l i n ,  # 03-526. On September 14, 2005, pursuant to I.C. § 19-2719, the Idaho 
Supreme Court issued an opinion dismissing the appeal in Hoffman v. State, --- Idaho ---, 
121 P.3d 958 (2005). The Remittitur has been issued. On June 24, 2004, the United 
States Supreme Court issued an opinion in Schriro v. Sumerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004). 
Because the underlying bases for this court's order staying the instant case has 
now been concluded, the state respectively requests that the stay be lifted and a 
scheduling order be entered to complete the litigation in the instant case. 
DATED this 22nd day of December, 2005. 
Deputy ~ t t o r n e y  General 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
MOTION TO LIFT STA Y - 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERmCE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY That on or about the 22nd day of December, 2005, I caused 
to be serviced a true and correct copy of the foregoing docment by the method indicated 
below, postage prepaid where applicable, and addressed to the following: 
Joan M. Fisher X U.S. Mail 
Federal Defenders of Hand Delivery 
Eastern Washington & Idaho Overnight Mail 
3 17 W. 6& Street, Suite 204 Facsimile 
Moscow, ID 83843 
Honorable Ron Schilling X U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 1251 Hand Delivery 
Meridian, ID 83680-1251 Overnight Mail 
Facsimile 
Lori Gilmore X U.S. Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecutor Hand Delivery 
Box 2627 Overnight Mail 
Orofino, ID 83544 Facsimile 
S ~ W F  OF ~ O A H O  County af Cleamaf~ 
I h~1r.tty Certify that the foregoing is a fuii, true, and 
c ~ f  ~ c t  copy of an instrument as the same now 
re:?ra:ns on fire and of record in rnv office 
WITNESS Lq hand and o cid seal harc,qciNiW 
%is -* , - dayof%;ez  AD..-)<.^ 
ROBN CHRISTENSEN, CLERK OF ME 0i37 RiCT 
CXJURT ~ ~ F I C I O  AtfDITf?R & RECORQC R 
MOTION TO LIFT STAY - 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART 1 CASE NO. CV2002-00443, 
) CV2002-00473 
Plaintiff, ) 
) COURT MINUTES 
v s  . ) 
) 










GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 
1 
Defendant. 1 
District Judge Presiding: Ron Schilling 
Joan Fisher and Oliver Lowery: Attorneys Gene Stuart 
Lamont Anderson and Lori Gilmore: Attorneys for the State 
Deputy Clerk: Sue K. Summerton 
Date: 1/6/06 Tape: C3741 Time: 10: 10 a.m. 
Subject of Proceeding: Telephonic Status Conference 
---------------.--------------------------------------------------- --- --.---------- -- ---- --------- ------------- ------------------------ 
FOOTAGE: 
001 Court advises Ms. Fisher, Mr. Lowey, Mr. Anderson, and the court are present 
telephonically and Ms. Gilmore was present in person. Court advises that this 
matter will be recorded but not reported. Court advises now is the time to hear the 
motion to lift stay. 
25 Mr. Lowey has no objection to lift the stay and moves to submit a brief to the court. 
31 Court grants motion to lift the say and for supplemental briefs. 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
Mr. Lowey moves for I month to file brief. 
Mr. Anderson has no objection to I month for filing of brief. 
Court orders Mr. Lowey to file his brief by 2/3/06 and that any time there is a filing 
please send a courtesy copy to the court at his Meridian, Idaho address. 
Ms. Fisher moves for more time to file the brief. 
Court grants motion and continues deadline to 2110106. Court questions Ms. 
Gilmore. 
Ms, Gilrnore responds. 
Mr. Anderson moves for his brief be due 3110106. 
Court questions the attorneys regarding the 3 pending cases. 
Mr. Lowey clarifies the issues pending. 
Mr. Anderson responds. 
Colloquy between the Court, Mr. Anderson and Mr. Lowey regarding pending 
issues. 
Mr. Lowey moves to set a briefing schedule hearing. 
Court grants motion and orders the briefs dues a follows: PetitionerIDefendant's 
brief is due 211 0106 and the RespondentlPlaintiff s brief is due 311 0106. Court sets 
a telephonic scheduling conference for 3130106 at 10:OO a.m. pacific time, to set an 
oral argument hearing. 
Mr. Anderson remarks regarding an order appointing Mr. Lowey in the post 
conviction cases. 
Court orders Mr. Lowey to review the files for a specific order and if one is not 
located, he is to prepare one. 
Court in recess. 
COURT MINUTES - 2 Approved: 
SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUJXT, STATE IDAHO 
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWt-, ER 
150 MICHIGAN AVE 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff ) 
VS 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
) Case No: CV-2002-0000443 
1 26% ..?,I 1 2  ,?, 8: fi 8 - 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
1 OE ;,.I - 
f 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Scheduling Conference Thursday, March 30,2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on January 23rd, 2006. 
OLIVER LOEWY 
3 17 W. SIXTH STREET, SUITE 204 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
)( Mailed Hand Delivered 
NOTICE OF HEARDIG 
Dated: January 23rd, 2006 
Robin Christensen 
m r k  Of The District Court 
By: j$ ck  \/\ * \krrcvT&.p\, \-\yJ, 
Deputy Clerk 
1 
SECOND m I C I A L  DISTRICT COVRT, STATE rv IDAHO 
,y:,". IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF GLEARWA _ dR 
2 ,j& 
150 MICHIGAN AVE 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 I , I  , :r 
- ;:-C:5 i ,,,Id i LGU!?T 
> ,&; f3 ,;{p,j i :; q 5 1, y 
, r r ,  . , , * 
1 
I ,- 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 
) Case No: C ) / - $ O Q 2 f ~ y , ~ ,  5: 9 g 
) 
c!!!J 2 il vs 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
) NOTICE O P  HEARING 
) 
- gu-----."-- ----_ 
t rr- 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Scheduling Conference Thursday, March 30,2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on January 23rd, 2006. 
JOAN M. FISHER 
3 17 W. SIXTH STREET, SUITE 204 
MOSCOW ID 83843 
,f Mailed Hand Delivcrcd 
Dated: January 23rd, 2006 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
_i- 
By: b < t l J ~  {QY,, 
Deputy Clerk 
NOTICE OF HEARJNG 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 
SECOND S'TICLAL DISTRICT COURT, STATE OF XDMO 
IN At ,rs! FOR TEE C O m W  OF CLEARWA; R 
150 MICmGAN AVE 
OROFINO, X1)AHO 83544 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
) Case No: CV-2002-0000443 
) 703b j,?,]] 23 A 8: I48 
) NOTICE OF HEARING 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Scheduling Conference Thursday, March 30,2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on January 23rd, 2006. 
LORI CILMORE 
P.O. BOX 2627 
OROFINO ID 83544 
Mailcd & Hand Delivered 
Dated: January 23rd, 2006 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
.-----. ,- < " 
i e m 
BY: ';a\c - $, iJ;qn\%-J \ h.m, 
~ e p u t )  Clerk l 
NOTICE OF HEARING 
Gene Francis Stuart, Plaintiff 
SECOND J u U l e m  DISTRICT COURT, STATE rw m m o  
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEmWk, 1SR 
150 NLICHIGAN AVE 
OROFINO, IDAHO 83544 
VS 
State Of Idaho, Defendant 
' ,. ." , ,  . ,  .- N ..i:,;-C/ST:<:c ::jURT 
. t  5 r,q\:!,YJ"" c-i:".r" . . 
) 
\.i - -  . - ,  . I , , 
" ' , ,  , /jj::,:: 1 
) Case No: CV-2002-0000443 
) 
) NOTIGE OF 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Scheduling Conference Thursday, March 30,2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and on file in 
this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on January 23rd, 2006. 
L. LAMONT ANDERSON 
P.O. BOX 7129 
BOISE ID 83707-1129 
,X Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: January 23rd, 2006 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
r. 
By: %+ 3 \ITi \$ky\) fr< \,, b & ~  
Deputy Clerk 
NOTIGE OF HEARJNG 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Plaintiff 
VS. 
Gene Francis Stuart 
Orofino, ID 83544 
Defendant. 
DOE3: 
DL or SSN: 
Sec,t;-d Judicial District Court, State of Id- "0 
!; and For the County of Clearwater -p-e 
150 Michigan Ave p$9~/& z$/&*$ 
4 -  
Orofino, Idaho 83544 I *  
) 
1 A 3: 38 iCG\ :":i 33 t--3 
1 
) Case No: GEz$ 
1 ."Djl . 
) NOTICE OF H~AIJING n -  
1 
_ --I-- - 
1 
1 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that the above-entitled case is hereby set for: 
Telephonic Scheduling Conference Thursday, March 30, 2006 10:OO AM 
Judge: Ron Schilling 
I hereby certify that the foregoing is a true and correct copy of this Notice of Hearing entered by the Court and 
on file in this office. I further certify that copies of this Notice were served as follows on this date Monday, 
January 23,2006. 
Defendant: Gene Francis Stuart 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Private Counsel:  ailed ,': Hand Delivered 
Joan M. Fisher & Oliver Lowey 
Federal Defenders Of Eastern Washington & ldaho 
317 W. Sixth Street, Suite 204 
Moscow ID 83843 
Prosecutor: Lori Gilmore 
Lamont Anderson 
Mailed Hand Delivered 
Dated: Monday, Januarv 23, 2006 
Robin Christensen 
Clerk Of The District Court 
/< c. 
By: i t i ;  /-. (l*d\\t).d , , * t > , . .  
Deoutv Clerk 
JOAN M. FISHER 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
O ~ R W .  J X ) E ~ ~ Y  
Limited Admission 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defadcrs of Eastern Washington & Xdatxo 
3 17 West fjth Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, W 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-883-1472 
Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
rZV THE DISTRICT C O m T  OF THE SECOND SUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, JN AND F O ~  ~m COUNTY OF CflLEARWATER 












Case Nos. CV2002-00443 
CR 816008495 
PETITIONER'S SUPPLEMENTAL 
BRIEFING IN OPPOSITION TO 
(I) MOTION FOR SUMMARY 
DISMISSAL OF PETX'I'XON FOR 
POSTCONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
WRIT OF HlABEAS CORPUS AND 
(2) IDAHO CRI .mAL RULE 35 
PETITION 
Full briefing had already occurred when a stay was granted in this case. Specifically, 
afCer Petitioner filled his Petition For Postconviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus, 
Respondent Gfiled its Motion For Summary Dismi.ssa1, Petitioner filed his Response In 
Opposition, and Respondent filed its Reply. On January 6,2006, thc Court gcanted Petitioner 
leave to file supplemental briefing regarding the State's motion for summary dismissal. 
PETITIOmR'S SUPPLEMENTAL ~ ~ E F M G  IN  POSITION TO 
(I) M.OnON FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OF PETITION FOR 
P Q S T C O N V [ ~ N  -LIEF AND WRIT OF ~ B E A ; ~  COKPIIS AND 
(2) XDAHO CR~M~NAL RULE 35 PETITION -1
U L I  L U I  LUUU I I .  I4 L U U U U 3 L L t ' L  
I. PETITIONER IS ENTITLED TO RmTG FtELIEF AS A MAT"iER OF STATE 
AND FEREF2AL RETROACTMW LAW. 
Petitioner anticipates that Respondents will argue that his $2719 petition should be 
dismissed (I) pursuant to allegedly controlling Idaho Supreme Court precedent holding that 
Schriro v Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 (2004), is not retroactive as a matter of Idaho retroactivity 
law, (2) b u s s  $27 19 prohibits postconviction application claims which depend on the 
retroactive application of new law, and (3) became, as a mstter of federal retroactivity law, Ring 
v. Arizona, 536 US. 584 (2002), must be applied uniformly without regard to context and even 
though the application wiU in some contexts lead to inaccurate fact findings and, therefore, 
en~oneous death sentences. 
k Xdaho Retroactivity Principles Require That Ring Be Retroactively Applied, 
And The Idaho Supreme Court Has Not Held Otherwise. 
Petitioner anticipates that Respondent will assert that the Idaho Supreme Court has 
concluded that Xing is not retroactive to cases on colXatera1 review and that, for support, it: will 
cite to and discuss as authority for this proposition three recent Supreme Court cases, Porter V. 
Sfate, 140 Idaho 780, 102 P.3d 1099 (20041, Srare v. havia, 141 Idaho 895, 120 P.3d 283 
(2005), and Hoflmn v. Srate, - P.3d -, 2005 W22220025 (2005). However, far from 
concluding in any of these cases that Ring is not retroactive as a matter of state law, the Idaho 
Supreme Court simply refused to address the question. Specifically, in Porter, the Idaho 
PETITIONER'S UPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING JN OPPOS~TION TO
('L) MOTJON FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OP P E ~ O N  FOR
Pos~co~vxcmo~ RELXKF AND WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 
(2) IDAHO RULE 35 PETITION -2 
Supreme Court sidestepped the question squately presented by aanouncing far the first time and 
without explanation or citation to authority that state xetroactivity law has no application where 
the rule whose retroactivity is at issue is based sofely on the fdd consti.tution. Noting that 
'"tlhe issue raised ...in this application for post-convicth relief is based solely upon the Federal 
Constitution," the Supreme Court held chat, "[tlherefore, the retroactivity of that decision [i.c.- 
Ring] i s  a matter of fkieral law, not stilte law." Por fe~  at 783,1102 (itaJics added). Similarly, in 
the Xater decision Leuvitt where the district court bad dismissed the Ring postconviction petition 
solely on the ground that the anti-retroactivity provision required dismissal, the Supreme Court 
affhxd on the alternative ground that "Ring v. Arizona does not apply retroactively under 
f e d d  law." Leavitt, a t ,  286. Finally, ;ia. Hofman the S u p m e  Court did not address 
whether Ring was retroactive as a matter o f  state law. 
Before Porter, the Idaho Supreme Court had never before held that as a matter of state 
retroactivity law the retroactivity of rights based solely in the federal constitution is a matter 
exclusively of federal law, Nor is there any such f d e d  law requirement. On the contrary, the 
Supremacy Clause of the federal constitution prohibit3 states from apptying new federal ruIes 
only to a narrower, a broader, range of cases than allowed by federal retroactivity doctrine. 
See Petitioner's Response In Opposition To Motion For Summary Dismissal Of Petition For 
Postcomiction Relief AnUQr Writ Of Habeas Corpus ("Petitioner's Response") at 26. 
This Court may choose not to apply Ring to Petitioner's case, b~ doing so would fly in 
the face of Idaho's clear state retroactivity law. See Petitioner's Response at 46-50, (Section QI: 
"Under this Court's Retroactivity Rules, the Rule at Issue Should Be Applied to All Cases"). 
~Tl"i'T0NER's SUPPI..EMENTAL BRJEMNG IN OPPOS~~ON T  
(1) MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OFRETIT~ON FOR 
POSFCONVICTION RELIEF AND WRW OF ~ ~ B F A S  CORPUS AND 
(2)  IDAVO CRIMINAL RULE 35 Pmroru -3 
F d e r ,  if this C o w  ~Xlooses not to appXy Ring either by not add=%* the issue or by citing the 
rule first m o m c d  in Porter, doing so will violate Pdtionerk state and federal coostitutional 
ri&ts to due process. 
B. $2?X9(5)(c)%  an^-RetroacMty Provision Dot35 Not Preclude This Court's 
Coaside~ng Peti~oner" Rhg Claim. 
To the extent that Respondents argue or the Court stca sponte considers that §2719(5)(c) 
=ti-retmacti~9 pavision, precludes Petitioner's $2719 petition, Petitioner relies on the 
a m e n &  in bis Perifioner 's Respame that (1) $27 19(5)(c) violates the Idaho Constitution 
separation of powers requirement; (2) Idaho law prohibits retroactively applying Idaho Code 
Section 19-27 19(5)(c) to Petitioner; (3) applying Idaho Code Section 19-27 19(5)(c) in the instant 
ease would violate the United States Constitution's Supremacy Clause (U.S. Const., art. VI, cl. 
2); (4) applying Idaho Code Section '1 9-271 9(5)(c) here would violate Petitioner's due process 
and equal protection rights as guaranteed by the United States Constitution and Idaho 
Constitution; (5) applfing Idaho Code Section 19-2719(5)(c) to Mr.Stuart's case would violate 
tht? United States Constitution's and Idaho Constitution's prob.ibitions against ex post facto laws; 
and (6) equity requires applying Riag to the: instant case. See Petitioner's Response at 20-38 
(Section I.B.). 
P E T ~ R ' s  SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING INOPPOSITION TO 
(1) MOTION FOR SUMMARY DrSMtSSAL OF P E ~ O N  FOR 
Pm~co~vrcno~ RELIEF AND WRIT OF RAREAS CORPUS ANID 
(2) IDAHO CRIMINAL RWE 35 PETSITON -4 
C. The Court Should Re~ect A Mechanistic Approach to United States Suprme 
Court Decisions: Str Should Be Applied Only to Cases Where the 
Legal Gons&aints on the Evidence Considered by the Sentencing Judge Did 
Not ImpXiate the Accuracy of the Judge's Faet Findhgs Necessary to 
Lmposing the Death Seatence. 
Petil;i.oner stticipates that Respondent will argue that in SmmerZin the United States 
Supreme Court announced a monolitkic holding to be applied uniformly across differences in 
sfate sentencing smctu.es. Them is no reason to think that the Supreme Court intends any of its 
holdings to be applied in this way. Indeed, masoned opinions are especially valuable because 
tbey allow the public and litigants particularly to understand the boundaries of the rules under 
consideration. The reason that the differences between M7ana's s d  Idaho's now superseded 
judge sentencing schemes matters is that they implicate the accuracy of tb.e sentencing judge's 
fact findings. Arizona did not allow its sentencing judges to consider hearsay, Xdaho did. The 
reason this matters, of course, is that if accuracy i s  sufficiently implicated and if switching to jury 
sentencing s ip i f iwt ly  increases accuracy, then Ring must be retroactively applied, Teague v. 
Lane, 489 U.S. 288 (1 989). Pointing out that courts are divided on whethex Crawford v. 
Wdshin~ron, 541 U.S. 36 (2004), has resulted in greater accuracy of convictions, Respondents 
conclude that Arima.a's approach does not result in increased accuracy. Yet Petitioner docs not 
contend that no h-y is permissible, only that Idaho having allowed the sentencing judge to 
consider any and all hearsay requires that Ring be applied retroactively. 
Respndent's anticipated position repeats this mistake, i.e.-assumes that the particulars 
under consideration extend to all cases, in its analysis of Sumrnerlin. It quotes the United States 
Supreme Court as concluding that, "'When so many presumably reasonable minds continue to 
P E ~ o ~ R ' S  SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING INOPPOSITION TO
(1) MOTION FOR SUMMARY DISMISSAL OP P E ~ O N  FOR 
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disagree over whetner juries are better factfinders at all, we cannot confidently say that judicial 
factfmdhg seriousiy diminishes mwacy." Surely, tbough, the Supreme Court was not blind 
to tbie gossibility that if only either juries or judges (but not the other) were allowed to consider 
an, entirely additional class of evidence, it might well affect facflmding accuracy and therefore, 
require the retroac~ve amlication of R i ~ g .  Contrary to Respondent's view, there i s  no reason to 
think that whether a rule should be applied retroactively i s  a question to be answered without 
considering the factfinding rule governing the factfinders. Very different sets of rules applied in 
Arizona and Idaho, and it cannot seriously be disputed that the difference implicated a ~ ~ y  
and, therefore, the retroactive application question, Br ie fh  Support at 7. 
P E ~ O W R ' S  SUPPLEMENTAL BRIEFING IN 0~~0srn .o~  TO 
(1) MOTION FOR S-x RXSMXSAX, OF PETITION FOR 
PCFSTCONVJC~~N RELIEF A m  WRCI OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 
(2) IDAHO C!RIMINAL RULE 35 J?ICTJTION -6 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons and for the reasons in all previous filings in. .the instant mager, 
Petitioner respectllly asks the Court to grant his pending Petition For Postconviction Relief 
Andlor Writ Of Habeas Corpus, vacate the judgment and sentence, and order new sentencing 
procwdings. 
3b 
Dated this fi day of February, 2006. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Joan M. Fisher 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defenders of Eastern. Washington & Idaho 
208-883-0180 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
~ ~ O N E R ~ S  SUPPLEMENTAL B R T E ~ G  IN OPPOSITION TO 
(1) MOTION FOR S-RY'DISM~SSAL O F  PET~TION FOR 
POSTCOM~~~CTION RhUEF ANX) WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 
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STK I 3 OF IDAHO, 
Piaiutiff, 
VS. 
GENI FRANCIS SIXART, 
Defendant. 
COMES NOW, L. LaMont Andexson, :[)ept ty  Attorney Ger ga l ,  Chief, Capital 
Litil; tion Unit and Special Pmsmting Attome-jr fa 4: ! m a t e x  Cot nty, State of Idaho, 
SUP]'. ~ M A L  B m F   SUPPORT OFRES:DOA l:! W S  M O l X  E W ) R  SUMMARY 
md : ~cl;s hereby sd~ai t ,  p m u t  to this 'S ( Me :, i MS supplemen a l br ef in support 
of tk t state" Modm for S Disnrissal. 
The relevant backgownd for the s w ' s  &l:otio I Ir Summary I. li3mi;sal has been 
deta : d in the state's brief. (State's brit f: n support, pi 82-3. I Petitioner 
("'SO i st") filed a asponse to the state's briel ant ! : xpplernez1ta.I ; .L tho] ity that has 
subs: 1uentIy been revefsed by the Idaho Suprerr~ 2 C<. tr- . See Porter 1. State, 140 Idaho 
, 
780, 02 P.3d 1099 (2004). f i e  state filed a  re^' y b~ .ef Over the sta e's o 3jecficm, this 
Cou - stayed Stuart's case pending the Unitc; i SI et  f 3 and Idaho S up^ ;me Courts' 
deci : ms regarding the retroactivity of  ria^ v. . & C, 536 U.S. 5: ;L (2 N2). Based 
upox. &e Supreme Cow's decision in S&o v: Sur I Lin. 542 U.5 . 3 4  (2004)' and 
the 1 aho Supreme Court's decisions in Hoffmal I v. 51: & 142 Idaho 2 7, 121 P.3d 958 
(200 r I, State v. h v i t t ,  141 Idaho 895, 120 P.3 d 21 3 2005), and g t x  t. S ~ t f i ,  f 40 
Idah: 780, 782, 102 P.3d 1099 (2004), this Court g a31 ed the state's niotil~n to lift the 
stay s ~d ordered snpplernmtal briefmg. 
*mG-! g 
In S m e d h ,  542 U.S. at 358, the Un, ted 31; ~ e s  Supreme S3m definitively 
cone l ,ded the dictates of are not retmacti-c. ::to c:: t es on collata ir  re^ iew when it 
detm t line&, "Ring announced a new prw- I d e  i tl.3 does not app .> re1 cOacXiv&y to 
case:: already find on direct review," Clearly, bece tiu; thc: Idaho SI qlrerre Court has 
prevc usly upheld Stuart's death sentence on dire:t appeal long )#:for: E&g was 
a~lo I I&, Summe-rlm establishes that a has 11 o ap ~ l i  ation to Stwr ' ; instant case. 
SUPI; I W E f l a  BRZF IN SUPPORT OF E S f '  3M T S  MOTIOn i70J S U ~ W Y  
DISM I :sRC - 2 
The Idho Supmme Cam h a  also coal :lud~ x3 i$ not re 132x3 ivve to cases on 
col:; zd review. In P Q R ~ , ,  140 Idaho at 782, r:j &g upon amecX& the Idaho 
SUE I m e  Corn revmed the district wwt's c ~ncl rsi  &at & si as .modye. In 
LRE~ itt, 120 P.3d at 285-86, and Born= 1;:l P. I c l  at 960, fhr: Xc aho Supreme Court -. -3 
disr r ssed appeals based upon the retmactivi?, of ?=L p, because tk e claim did not fall 
wid 1 o the exception of LC. $19-2719. 
S t x ~  mntends S m ~ 1 . h  is bppGcdt.1 ie in l i j  iho became! it was .illegdy based 
upot Arizona's capital stmtav sentencing sch~rrae. - owever, the 1, kb.0 Sup~rne Court 
has ~pressly rejected such arguments. In P_Qz?! g, 1 tCf Idaho at 782, the cr>urt e x p l ~ ~ ,  
"Su .r wrlin was based solely upon the Sut ~m : 30m's deter r inat ion that Ring 
a m :  meed a new d e  of procedure that would not b( : :i )plied retroacl i~eely udl,es h was a 
watl: shed rule of a i m i d  procedure ixnplicati. g &I : 1 mdmentd fr. unes 3 and accuracy 
of t t  : aimid pro-." Thr: court fwtk12r ax:( gnized, "Whekm or not hearsay 
evi6 t ace can be considered when dettmahhg tl e ex, i3f ace of an agg c ivat lag factor is an 
ism! that i s  separate and distinct from the issu s of er tether it is a j uige or a jury who 
mab t i that d e t e a t i o r t "  at 783. Porter vras I lo t recently rea f rmf d ia .Hoffman, 
121 1 .3d at 960. 
S m e d k  itself c o n f i i  the Idaho Sul rt: ae Court's r n aly:.is is conect 
SUE> ierlin &= absolutely no reference to A . h l  tii' i pdaz capital rc enttmcing scheme 
or tl( alleged "amacy" associated with that s: hen c ~ :  Rafbex:, Sum 3:rIixi focuses upon 
'%h: ha judicial factflmding so 'seriously d &u;t $sj' accurac r that there is an 
' i r ~ l  t missibly large Itislc' of punishing conduct the j E:? does not mu h ." / d, 542 U, S , at 
355-! 5 (emphasis in miginat) (quoting m. y.J all 5 489 U+S. 2: ill, 3 12-13 (1989)). 
SUPI 'i EMEW& BRIEF N SUPPORT OF RESt202c Ili 'NT'S MOTIC I\' FCiR S L M M Y  
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With )ut reference to any statutory srntmcing : &e;r or? capital or no 1-ca~ital, the Court 
respr ~ded,  'The evidence is simply too equivoc, d to $11 rport that con1 lusicn.'' Jci, at 356. 
rCec z w i n g  there are multiple arguments why jusi 2 i  us less acnrr, 6 ;  fa &-finders than 
judg 4 s, noting the Court had opined judicial seat enci ql may even be I nxe amistent, and 
ref&- ncing 'We mixed reception that tbe I@& to j~ ry trial has t een 5ven in other 
cou I ries," the Court concluded, 'When so ma11 y pr :si rnably reason t l  tle rain& continue 
to d i a m  over whetha juries are beam fact fin^ fers dl, we cannot c o d  dently say that 
judi ; a1 factfiidhg saribusly diminishes murat: y." [.. (emphasis in >I igir 4). 
The: state is aware of no jurisdiction thai has c c ~  tcluded ,Sum r h  is restricted to 
a st: tencing scheme similar to Arizona's prior c 211 tdi sentencin~, scficme. In fact, 
sew: 4 federal circuits have relied u p  the ratio o;i :: in. Summer &o_ to conclude the 
Supr :me Court's decisioa. io U n i a  States vA1;[ 543 US. 220 (2005)' i s  not 
~etn ~ctive to cases oa collateral review, ' See, t i  .g, 1 yd V. United 2 $= 407 E3d 608, 
614 3rd Cir. 2005) (''Every federal court of app als s lave considea x wk ether Booker's 
n u  ule mnstituted a 'watershed rule' that ~ 0 . 1 4  $ rti fy T a p e ' s  s %mnd exception has 
helc: %at it does not and, thus has held that Bo! tkr d: a not apply r :t toar:tively to cases 
on 1 ollateral review") (citing cases). In LJoJ~, the Third C.i:cui; rejected the 
gov: merit's contention that Teaye's ''water;(; hed r:.' 5" exception ; i~ .p l ie  s only to rules 
that mprove the accuracy of the guilt or jnnoc3ace I:: a defendant, uld expressly relied 
-- 
' In 3lakdp v. Wa$hshgton, 542 U.S. 296, 305 (!I:# 4), the Suprcaie Court held that 
War kgtoa State's &t&te sentencing scE. :me vi tlated the Six h As~mdment right 
to a. x y  Mal because judges were imposing se11 lent 2s hat were not I tlsed solely w ftcts 
refll: ted jn the verdict of the jury or ad.nitrtl by the defeulant, and used a 
p q )  lnderance of the evidence staodard to lind BI : fads aeces i t q  to impose the 
sent r we. Xxt Booker, 543 U.S. at 244, the Supn: me ( 1c1 rt exteaded B g kA!: to the Federal 
Sent ncjllg Guidelines. 
SUP W ' a  BMEF NSUPPORT OF R1S;i PO1 I t ;  W S  MOTI( h? FQR SGWMARY 
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L ~ K I  the S c: Court's recognition that (: ~ w t  could n( it sa; r that the rule 
;tom< m& in Ring so sip&ardy improved ;I= i c  that it shoulll apply reaoadvely 
to c ; jes dlready fkd on dim&  review," 407 E' 3d r t ! 14 (citing Sur ~aeriin, 542 US.  at 
348 : Even thou& the Federal Sentencing Guj. Mix t t ;  md fdexal st n tenc ing produrm 
are 1 ot sindlar to h-imna's prior capital stxi& i LC&$ :. heme, the C ~ I  o ts have recomzed 
the t rtionale in S m e r l i n  mm&te;s Booker sl~ouk ri  ,t be applied I zircm~ively to 
on 1 :, Uawd review. 
Likewise, 0th~ states with statutory s:nter cj; g schemes si glititmtly dEerwit 
thar i Arizona's priar capital sentencing schez~ re h 3%; : relied upon I he rationde from 
Sun1 5ab jn d e w  . . -. - g retroactivity issues, I mti :, : trly with resp % 2 ta BIakeIy, 
and i~pmndi v New Ymev, 630 U.S. 466 (2!000:, i le Supme [:OW'S precursor to 
See, e.g., Johsbn v. Florida, 904 So. 2d 4 0  1, 407-09 (Fl t 20 35); Pwde v. 
&g g, 22 Gal. Rptr. 3d 908, 913-17 (Cal. Allp. 0: 5); hcien v. Mile5 821 NN.E,2d 
1 14 3 1 153 @1. 2 ~ 5 ) .  Stuart bas f d d  to lint t t r any jurisdicti x 1 or case that has 
distj 1 guished Sumrnerlin based upon Arizona's : .tatu r sentencing s :I tern 2. 
The mdalying theme of Stuart's are1 1, is that confrr r &ti 3n add cross- 
exm E ~atiaa necessarily increase the accwacy oi ' the 1) 1 $-fhder. Hot rt:ver, kt addressing 
whe: a the Supreme Court's decision h Crawl brd 4, Wishindon, ! 2 1 't ,S, 36 (2004), 
wbic: dramatidy dlanged how the courts a s s  to in  qret the Cc o&or tation Cfause, 
&ox1 i be retroactively applied, the courts are t ivided on tl ,e sigmficance of 
cod r lntatioa and cross-exanlination. Recently Be ! :I:\ enth C h i t  c o ncl~ ded Crawford 
d m  2iI.l wifhin Teme's second exception. .id& E:!; ing the accwasy of convictions 
bast: j upon Gmwford, the court explained, ''it ii unc t:3 . that Cravfol a's adfication to 
M A { .  1 0 .  201 1 : 54PN 111 41 I N Y  6 tN C H I M U I V  NU. 24Y t'. I 
the : %say rules will y improve the act war ~f wnvictions. Crfm$ot.d is not a 
gua: ntee of accuracy, but an extension of the :id1 c cr: ;tituticmd pro ectioas of the Sixth 
Am: ~dment. W l e  the two concepts ovala]), tb:;~ are not synolmcus." ZZintz v, 
%I gd, 403 F.3d 859, 867 ('7& Cir. 2005) (inter 1s: quote and ci a t i o ~  omitted). As 
fua: r explaked in Murillo v. frank, 402 E? 3 786. 790 (7& Cir. 1005, it is a "close 
que s ion whether Cra&ord helps or  hinder^, aa LJ. te decisionm d 5 . q  ." The court 
testimony is prdbrable to &&I vits a: transcribed cd=ssims, 
because cross-examination can prob: ie reaktzcfsses, I c t  rmrded 
t~?~t.isnony may be better than silence, vt hen chi itb or ineapac ity 01 h t s  
or loyalty to one's confedmates keep wj us: r.:; off the stand. '%e poj12.t of 
Cravvford is riot that only live te&kw: ny I eliable, but t 1. ~t tj le sixth 
m m h e n t  gives the wcused a right tc: ins $1 m live Wtjm 3 ~ y ,  whethw 
that demand promotes or h t m t m  awl uaq .. LBke the self- n cJrir lination 
clause and other provigions in the Bill r tf IRi $3: S, the cdkox t i t imi  clause 
can be invoked to prevent the convictio r L of :I rons who ate 9 i i l ~  in fa%. 
What Crmrffurd holds is that defendaxis cr?t jo this r&t a en uken tfze 
hearsay is trustworthy. 
Id. ( mphasis in origd).  -
h Mmgo V. Duncan, 393 F.3d 327, 335 r:I " Cir. 2004), ,be Second Circuit 
curt tuded Crawford would not necessaily imjrovc: 11 e overall a m  ccacy of the &a1 
pro r ?ss because "Cruy60rd also precludes a&] lissi )r 1 of highly reli tl tie i estimunial out- 
of-*: t w t  stammts that would have been admi:$ siblr r l  der the old ru .€ s,'" 
Jn fact, the Supreme Court bia expreisiy q r  eoved the us 3 of xemay Erom a 
pres :ntence report in a capital case before a j u ~  y, ! $1 gg v. MA, 428 U.S, 153,203- 
204 (1976). Based upon the zmxl for indiv.i$ual :!r 1. sentencing i r i  capitid cases, see 
Pal y v- Lynaugb, 492 U.S. 302, 319 (1989:1, ax jr 'f:limce Stuar : d ; e s  based up6rl -. 
COIL mntation and ~mss-examination to &tini gis i  . .i merliq is  s~:rialsly overstated. 
SUI! 'LEMEflM BRIEF&'? SUPPORT OF RE'SPO 4II EAT'S MOll5 N $'OR S U W Y  
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See dscz 426 F.3d 13 1 8, 1 !:! !-23 (1 la Ch . 2M 5 )  {aotiag that 
eve : . federal &wit to consider the issue lpost-1 a v  ;I. .di, has reason ru i th* rt Anission of 
bea ay teshony at senknchg does not viol&: co-n f r c ~tation rights) 
Finally, my claim that the: Idaho Supra~~e 6 211 t should devii f 2: h r n  Swnmerl.b, 
bas: ! upon state law grounds, has aXxeady bexi exg rr: dy rejected ir j 3 o f . m  121 P.3d 
at 9r 3. As reco@xd by the caw, 'We have c; ed. on m y  t ccas~ons in the past 
ow anfidence in the ability of the district judt es tt t ,: uemy and f i:ly .vei& the facts 
rela: ~g to the imposition of the death penalty. . . . * S i  je do not belic ;\ e &e prior process 
was .dair or suspect." Id. 
Smart attanptd to avoid the pitfalls 1.f Lt 1. $ 19-2719(5) by also raising his 
suu 8 ssive c4aim.s under the me of a Rule 35 II rotic ri I.C.R. 35, ia 14 3ev mt p a  states, 
'Th : court m y  correct an illegal sateace at st ny t IK 1 and may coj rc st ; L senmce tbat 
has t xa imposed in an illegal manner within tf te ti ril: provided hext h fo t the reduction 
of SI: .tence." 
Hctvvevm, I.C. 0 19-2719(4) expressly st;:tes: 
Any remedy available by pcl;t-ccnr .&on procedure, babeas 
c o f p ~  at m y  other provkian of state l aw 3 rc . it be pursued it :cording to 
the procedures set forth jxt this section ;: nd T $it tin the time k nutat ions of 
subsection (3) of this section. 
@mi lasis added.) 
InStatev. Bean, 121 Idaho 862,864,82 3 P.: 11 :91(1992), th.: leftadant claimed 
b.is s nknce was if legdly imposed because t he c 5 r ; cict court fai r d t 3 weigh each 
aggr; rating ckcm&nce against all mitigatin: cir 71; &anus ia ac xord with State v. 
Ch! oneau, 11.6 Idaho 129, 774 P.2d 299 (19e.2). 7i.l h u t  addrwsi 1.5 w:xether B m ' s  --.-c 
SUPI; EMEmAL BRIEF N SUPPORT OF RESI'OA !I, ' W S  MOnG 4' FL'R S-Y 
clah \ even mmtimterl, an illegal satmw, rlls su [a. me court ex: aGaed tloc apparent 
conf ict b a r n  LC&, 35 and I.C. fj  19-2719, ;I ad c 111 :luded: 
Because of the unique: name ol' the cb3 ith pe;adlty, ac ilrolided in 
chapter 27, title 19, LC., as well as the ! &in; :(:I t constitutim 1 protections 
corded to a person sexttmd to deaB~, wc 1 i tld that LC. 5 19-5 719(3), 
whch, in turn, clceattx, defines, and reglii es a p r i q  right, is  a 
substantive rule. 
Therefore, we conclude that the ?o@ - t t *o (42) day ti o ; Iir nitation 
of LC. fi 19-2719(3) applies to claims of illeg a l  y of a sente-nc e of death 
Id. :. :I Idaho at 864. -
The mtiode h Beam has been r 6 1  led 11 dcKinnev, 13 3 Idaho at 705, and 
app I d to d h s  bvoIving u. Leaviq 120 P,3c 21 285. "Becau st: Rt de 35 does not 
app: to [Stuart's] W e a g e  to his death sentelice,' 11 s appeal mwi 3e d i s d s e d  from 
the I 1 aid of b.is motion b correct an illegal seal: :ace. ; t 
Bemuse this COW is obligated to follow, the 1ii v as d&ed I t j  &t United States 
and : istho Supreme Courts, which have detem:ineC 1 2  is not reb oactive to cases on 
collt;~ %a]. review, Stuart's Petition for Post-Cc ~nvic tic n Rehf  and o t Fi'rit of Habeas 
Carp is and Motion to Correct megal Sentence, to V, I(;: .e Sentence of Ileal h and for New 
S ~ I  t ~ c i ~ g  TriaI must be dismissed. 
The state re6p-y quests  this ~ ~ l t t  g~ i :the state's EIotia,r for S m a r y  
Dis r dssd and dismiss S m ' s  successive Petit i on $ t.r *ost-Con~d( r Re lit$ arldlor Writ 
of I -  heas Gotpus aid Motion to C o r n  l[lleg: t l  St 11t ace:, to Vacat 2 Sex:tmw, of Death 
and or New Sentencing Trial. 
DATED this 1 0 ~  day of March, 2006. 
VIA-I. 1 U.  llif 1 : ??i'hf I D  4IlNY F t N  C K I M U I V  NO. 249 . 1 1  
I Y IEYThat on or abou the I(  "day of ~ a t g 2 ~ ,  2,006, I caused to 
be i rviced a true and correct copy of the fm.gok 1; loaxmmt by i he method indicated 
bel : u. postage prepaid wbere applicable, and a 1 idre ::it 3 to the foIlov i ig: 
Joan M. Kshw - _.. - U.S. Mail 
F e d d  Defenders of - _.. - Ebnd Deli n zy 
em Was BZ Idaho - _._ - Overnight Mail 
3 17 W. 6& Streeh Suite 204 - >I -.. - rjacsimile 
Moscow, T]D 83843 
Fax: (208) 883-1472 
Honorable Ron ScbjJling - 2 __. -U.S. Mail 
P.O. Box 1251 - -_. - Hand Deb cry  
Metidia n> $3680-1251 - -.. - Overnight P 4ail 
- -.. - Racsimile 
Lori Gilmore - -. . - U.S. Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecutor -... - Hand Deli v xy 
Box 2627 - -. . - Overnight Ptlail 
Omho, XT, 83544 - -... :il - Facsimile 
Fax: (208) 476-97 10 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
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STATE OF IDAHO, and TOM ) 
BEAUCLAIR, Director, Idaho Department ) 
of Correction, and GREG FISHER, Warden,) 
Idaho Maximum Security Institution, 1 
) 
Respondents. ) 
CASE NO. CV02-00443 and 
CVO2-00473 
MEMORANDUM OPINION ON 
PETITION FOR POST 
CONVICTION RELIEF AND/OR 
WRIT OF HABEAS CORPUS AND 
MOTION TO CORRECT ILLEGAL 
SENTENCE, TO VACATE SENTENCE 
OF DEATH AND FOR NEW 
SENTENCING TRIAL 
This matter is before the Court on Petitions for Post Conviction Relief and/or Writ of 
Habeas Corpus filed by Petitioner Gene Francis Stuart in Clearwater County Cases CV02-00443 
and CV02-00473. The Court heard oral arguments on the Petitions May 22,2006. The Court 
extended an opportunity to the Parties to file supplemental authority by June 8, 2006. Petitioner 
Stuart was represented by attorney Joan M. Fisher and Oliver W. Loewy with the Federal 
Defenders Capital Habeas Unit. The State was represented by Deputy Attorney General L. 
Lamont Anderson. The Court, having considered the Petitions, briefs, affidavits and records in 
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the cases, having beard oral arguments of counsel, and being h l ly  advised in the matter, hereby 
renders its decision. 
PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 
Petitioner Stuart (hereinafter "Stuart") was found guilty by a jury of murder by torture in 
the first degree and was sentenced to death in December 1982 by District Judge Andrew 
Schwam. Stuart appealed his conviction asserting the following grounds: ( I )  there was 
insufficient evidence to warrant a jury instruction and verdict based on first degree murder by 
torture; (2) an instruction on second degree murder by torture should have been given; (3) the 
trial court erred in denying Stuart's Motion in Linzine wherein he sought to exclude evidence of 
Stuart's physical mistreatment of former wives and girlfriends; (4) the trial court erred in moving 
the venue of the trial to a site still within the circulation area of the source of prejudicial pretrial 
publicity; (5) he was denied speedy trial; (6) the sentence imposed was unconstitutional because 
of the vagueness of the aggravating circumstances relied upon or the failure to use a jury in the 
sentencing process; and (7) the sentence iinposed was disproportionate to the crime committed. 
On appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed Stuart's conviction and death sentence. State v. Stuart, 
110 Idaho 163, 715 P.2d 833 (1986) (Stuart I). 
Following the denial of his direct appeal, Stuart filed his first petition for post- 
conviction relief. The district court denied and dismissed the petition on the grounds the 
majority of issues had been decided on direct appeal and no petition for rehearing had been filed, 
making the issues res judicata. The district court found the three remaining issues failed to raise 
any legal issue or questions of fact that would entitle Stuart to a hearing or relief. Stuart 
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appealed and, on appeal, the Supreme Court affirmed the district court. ' Stuart v. State, 1 18 
Idaho 865,801 P.2d 1216 (1990) (Stuart II). 
Stuart filed a second Petition for Post-con\liction Relief but that Petition was dismissed 
by the district court. Stuart appealed, asserting the district court erred when it dismissed his 
second petition as untimely. On appeal, the Supreme Court found Stuart's second Petition was 
timely and that Stuart's allegation that his confidential conversations with his attorney had been 
monitored and recorded was based on newly discovered inforrnation not available to Stuart 
during his direct appeal or first petition for post-conviction relief. The Court reversed the district 
court's dismissal of the second petition and remanded the matter with instructions that an 
evidentiary hearing be held. Stuart v. State, 1 18 Idaho 932, 801 P.2d 1283 (1990) (Stuart III). 
In compliance with the Supreme Court's remand, the district court held an evidentiary 
hearing to address Stuart's claim that the Clearwater County jail monitored and taped his 
telephone calls and privileged attorney conversations. However, the district court bifurcated the 
hearing, directing the parties to first present evidence on the question of whether the taping and 
monitoring of thc phone calls and attorriey conversations had occurred. When the district court 
determined Stuart had failed to meet his burden of proof on the initial question, the court found it 
unnecessary to address the question of whether Stuart's constitutional rights had been violated. 
Stuart appealed the district court's ruling. Once again, the Supreme Court reversed and 
remanded the matter back to the district court after finding the court's conclusions clearly 
erroneous. Stuart v. State, 127 Idaho 806, 907 P.2d 783 (1 995) (Stzcart IV). 
The district court held a second evidentiary hearing on Stuart's claim that the Clearwater 
County Sheriff's Office had recorded confidential conversations between Stuart and his attorney 
I Stuart petitioned the Court for rehearing. The Court denied the petition for rehearing. However, the Court 
withdrew its original opinion and issued a substitute, but still affirming, opinion. 
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while Stuart was in jail. At the end of the second hearing, the trial court found Stuart's jailhouse 
conversations had been monitored but that his constitutional rights had not been violated. 
Applying the three exceptions to the exclusionary rule, the trial court held that under the 
independent origin, inevitable discovery, and attenuated bases exceptions, the monitoring of the 
conversations did not lead to the discovery of evidence or witnesses. Stuart appealed. However, 
the Supreme affirmed the trial court, finding the law of the case doctrine did not prevent the 
adoption and application of the exceptions to the exclusionary rule in Stuart's case. Sluart 11 
State, 136 Idaho 490, 36 P.3d 1278 (2001) (Stuart l4). 
While the appeal in Stuart IV was pending, Stuart filed an I.R.C.P. 60(b)(5) motion with 
the trial court, asserting the Supreme Court's opinion in State v. Tribe, 123 Idaho 72 1, 852 P.2d 
87 (1 993) had retroactive application and, therefore, entitled Stuart to relief. The trial court 
denied Stuart's motion and he appealed. The Supreme Court held the ruling in Tribe had no 
retroactive application affirming the district court's dismissal of Stuart's petition. Stuart v. State, 
128 Idaho 436, 914 P.2d 933 (1996) (Stuart V) .  
Stuart filed his fourth post-conviction petition in August 2002 after the United States 
Supreme Court entered its decision in Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 
L.Ed.2d 556 (2002) and his fifth post-conviction petition in December 2002. It is Stuart's fourth 
and fifth post-conviction petitions that are the subject of the opinion herein. 
POST-CONVICTION STANDARD 
In order to be eligible for post-conviction relief, a person who has been convicted of, or 
sentenced for, a crime must claim: 
(1) That the conviction or the sentence was in violation of the constitution of the United 
States or the constitution or laws of this state; 
Stuart v. State of Idaho 4 
Opinion on 4th Petition for Post-conviction Relief 
(2) That the court was without jurisdiction to impose sentence; 
( 3 )  That the sentence exceeds the maximum authorized by law; 
(4) That there exists evidence of material facts, not previously presented and heard, that 
requires vacation of the conviction or sentence in the interest of justice; 
(5) That his sentence has expired, his probation, or conditional release was unlawfully 
revoked by the court in which he was convicted, or that he is otherwise unlawfully held 
in custody or other restraint; 
(6) Subj ect to the provisions of section 19-4902(b) tluough (0, Idaho Code, that the 
petitioner is innocent of the offense; or 
(7) That the conviction or sentence is otherwise subject to collateral attack upon any 
ground or alleged error heretofore available under any common law, statutory or other 
writ, motion, petition, proceeding, or remedy. 
I.C. 6 19-4901 (Supp. 2002). 
An application for post-conviction relief must present "adn~issible evidence supporting its 
allegations, or the application will be subject to dismissal." Fensternzaker v. State, 128 Idaho 
285, 287,912 P.2d 653 (Ct. App. 1995). In a post-conviction proceeding involving a capital 
crime, the parties have the same burden of proof as a civil litigant. State v. Pratt, 125 Idaho 546, 
567, 873 P.2d 800, 821 (1 993) breponderance of the evidence standard applies); see also Nix v. 
Williams, 467 U.S. 431, 444, 104 S.Ct. 2501, 2509, 81 L.Ed.2d 377, 387 (1984) (state is required 
to establish exclusionary rule exceptions by a preponderance of the evidence). Post-conviction 
petitions in a capital crime case are subject to the provision of I.C. 5 19-271 9. 
DISCUSSION 
On August 2,2002, Petitioner Stuart filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief and/or 
Writ of Habeas Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of death and 
for New Sentencing Trial in Clearwater County Case No. ~ ~ 0 2 - 0 0 4 4 3 . ~  This petition seeks 
relief based on the opinion entered by the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. Arizona, 536 
2 Clearwater County Case No. CV02-00443 was previously designated Clearwater County Case No. SP02-00109. 
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U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). On August 30, 2002, the State filed a Motion 
for Summary Dismissal. 
On December 3, 2002, Petitioner Stuart filed a Petition for Post-conviction Relief and 
Petition for Writ of Habeas Corpus in Cleanvater County Case No. ~ ~ 0 2 - 0 0 4 7 3 . ~  Petitioner's 
allegation in this Petition can be divided into three categories: (1) misconduct on the part of the 
prosecutor; (2) the withholding of mitigating information; and, (3) ineffective assistance of 
counsel. 'The State moved for summary disposition on October 10, 2003. 
In March 2004 the Court stayed the proceedings in Clearwater County Cases No. CV02- 
473 and CV02-00443 pending rulings by the United States Supreme Court in Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 542 U.S. 348 and the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Hofman, 142 Idaho 27, as the 
cases had the potential of being dispositive on the question of whether the Ring holding had 
retroactive application. The Court lifted the stays on January 6, 2006, after opinions were 
entered in Schriro v. Summerlin and State v. Hofman. 
fA) PETITION IN CASE NO. CV02-00443 
Stuart's petition to vacate his death sentence, correct illegal sentence and for new 
sentencing was brought following the decision of the United States Supreme Court in Ring v. 
Arizona, 536 U.S. 584, 122 S.Ct. 2428, 153 L.Ed.2d 556 (2002). The Court in Ring held that the 
Sixth Amendment precludes a sentencing judge, sitting without a jury, to find the aggravating 
circumstances necessary for imposition of the death penalty. The Court reasoned that, because 
statutorily enumerated aggravating factors operate as the functional equivalent of an element of a 
greater offense, the Sixth Amendment requires the factors be found by a jury. Ring v. Arizona, 
536 U.S. at 606. However, the question of whether Ring had retroactive application was not 
3 Cleanvater County Case No. CV02-00473 was previously designated Clearwater County Case No. SP02-0015 1. 
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decided until two years later when the Court heard the case of Schriro v. Summerlin. 
1n Schriro r?. Sumnzerlin, 542 U.S. 348, 124 S,Ct. 25 19, 159 L.Ed.2d 442 (2004). the 
question of the applicability of the Ring decision was placed squarely before the Court. In 
deciding the question, the Court noted that when it enters a decision that results in a new rule that 
is substantive in nature, the new rule generally has retroactive application. Skhriro v. Summerlin, 
542 U.S. at 35 1. Elowever, when the new rule is procedural in nature, it generally does not apply 
retroactively. Schriro v. Sumzmerlirz, 542 U.S. 35 1. The Court then held that the new rule 
announced in Ring is "a new procedural rule that does not apply retroactively to cases already 
final on direct review." Schriro v. Szlmmerlin, 542 U.S. at 358. A year later, relying on the 
Court's decision in Schriro v. S'ummerlin, the Idaho Supreme Court held in State v. Hqffman. 142 
Idaho 27, 121 P.3d 958 (2005), that the ruling in King had no retroactive application. 
In the instant case, Stuart's direct appeal was final well in advance of the Ring decision. 
Therefore, based on the holding in Schriro v. Sumnz~rlin and the holding of the Idaho Supreme 
Court in State v. Hoffman, the ruling in Ring has no application to Stuart's sentence. 
Nevertheless, in one of his claims at page 10 of his Petition, Stuart states: 
By the twenty year judicial delay in the correct determinatiorl of the 
unconstitutionality of the death sentence imposed on Petitioner, Petitioner 
has been unconstitutionally subjected to cruel and unusual punishment in 
violation of the Eighth and Fourteenth amendments to the United States 
Constitution and Idaho Constitution, Article 1, Sections 1, 6, 13 and 18. 
This claim fails because the death sentence imposed on Petitioner was not 
unconstitutional. 
To the extent that Stuart argues that the delay itself in carrying out the sentence 
constitutes constitutional violations, this argument is unreasonable and not supported by 
authority. The delay in carrying out the sentence was necessitated in order for the Courts to 
examine the numerous issues raised by Stuart (as was his right). Stuart is now asking the courts 
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to revisit many of these issues and examine other issues that were not timely raised contrary to 
I.G. 19-2719. 
Stuart's petition in this case raises a number of issues that are best addressed by dividing 
the claims into three categories: (1) misconduct on the part of the prosecutor; (2) the withholding 
of mitigating information; and, (3) ineffective assistance of counsel. The State contends Stuart's 
current post-conviction relief petition must be dismissed as it is untimely under I.C. $ 19-271 9. 
The State further contends Stuart's current post-conviction petitions fail to meet the statutory 
exception to the time limits set out in the statute. Stuart argues I.C. $ 19-2719 is inapplicable to 
his case because his sentence is invalid pursuant to Ring v. Arizona and/or that application of I.C. 
5 19-2719 violates state and federal constitutional pro\.isions and violates other Idaho law. 
(1) APPLICABILITY OF I.C. 4 19-271 9 TO STUART'S CASE 
As discussed above, Ring v. Arizona has no retroactive application to Stuart's death 
sentence judgment as his direct appeal was final well before Ring was decided. Therefore, 
Stuart's death sentence is a valid and lawful sentence within the contemplation of I.C. 5 19-2719. 
The Court must, however, address Stuart's alternative argument that application of I.C. 5 19- 
271 9 to his case violates federal and state constitutional law as well as other Idaho law. 
In 1984, the Idaho legislature enacted I.C. 5 19-271 9. The purpose of the statute, as 
articulated by the legislature in the language of the statute, is to eliminate unnecessary delay in 
canying out death sentences. The standard for review applicable to the statute has been well 
established by Idaho's Supreme Court. 
In capital cases, I.C. 5 19-271 9 modifies and supersedes the UPCPA. McKinney, 
133 Idaho at 700, 992 P.2d at 149. The purpose of I.C. 5 19-271 9 is to eliminate 
"unnecessary delay in carrying out a valid death sentence." Rhoades v. State, 135 
Idaho 299, 30 1, 1 7 P.3d 243, 245 (2000) (quoting McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho at 
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705,992 IJ.2d at 154). The procedures and time limits of I.C. 5 19-2719 must be 
followed in capital cases. Mck'innej; 133 Idaho at 700, 992 P.2d at 149. 
Generally, in a capital case, a claimant for post-conviction relief will have only 
one opportunity to raise all challenges to the conviction and sentence. Id. All 
h o w  challenges must be raised in one post-conviction application within 42 
days of the filing of the judgment imposing the death penalty. Row v. Sfate, 135 
Idaho 573,576,21 P.3d 895,898 (2001). Any known challenges or claims not 
raised within 42 days are deemed waived. Id. Our Court strictly construes the 
waiver provision of I.C. 9 19-271 9. Id. at 701,992 P.2d at 150. 
Dunlap v. Sfafe, 141 Idaho 50, 57, 106 P.3d 376 (2004). 
@) Stuart's Ex Post Facto Argument 
In the instant case, Stuart's capital sentence judgment was entered prior to enactment of 
I.G. 5 19-271 9. Stuart contends that application of the subsequently enacted statute to his case 
violates the expost facto clauses of the federal and state constitutions. 
When the statute was enacted in 1984, the legislature included the following language in 
the session law: 
This act shall apply to all cases in which capital sentences were imposed on or 
prior to the effective date of this act but which have not been carried out, and to 
all capital cases arising after the efkctive date of this act. 
Idaho Session Laws 1984, ch. 159, 5 8, p. 390. 
Recognizing the legislative directive given with the enactment of the statute, Idaho's 
Supreme Court has stated: 
The operation of I.C. 5 19-2719 is not limited by the existence of previous 
proceedings using different procedural rules. The provisions of I.C. 9 19-271 9 
apply "to all cases in which capital sentences were imposed on or prior to the 
effective date [April 2, 19841." I.C. 5 19-2719a. I.C. 5 19-2719(4) requires that 
any habeas corpus or post-conviction remedies in capital cases must be pursued 
under the procedures set out in I.C. 5 19-271 9 and the 42-day time period of I.C. $ 
1 9-27 19(3). 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 703, 992 P.2d 144 (1999). 
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Stuart, however, contends application ofthe subsequently enacted statute to his case 
violates the expost.facto clause of the state and federal constitutions. The United States 
Supreme Court has consistently held that retroactive application of a procedural statute does not 
violate the exposl,facto clause of the constitution where the change does not alter the definition 
of crimes or increase the punishment for criminal acts. See G a r ~ e r  11. Jones, 529 U.S. 244, 120 
S.Ct. 1362, 146 L.Ed.2d 236 (2000); C'ollins v. Yoz~nghtood, 497 U.S. 37, 110 S.Ct. 2715, 11 1 
L.Ed.2d 30 (1990). Idaho's Supreme Court has echoed the higher Court's analysis regarding 
retroactive application of procedural statutes. 
The ex post facto doctrine prohibits a state from 'b-retroactively alterling] the 
definitions of crimes or increasling] the punishment for criminal acts." Collins v. 
Youngblood 497 U.S. 37,43, 110 S.Ct. 2715,2719, 111 L.Ed.2d 30, 39 (1990). 
Provisions of the federal and state constitutions prohibit changes in the law and 
changes in procedure that affect matters of substance. Dobbert v. Florida, 432 
U.S. 282, 97 S.Ct. 2290, 53 L.Ed.2d 344 (1977). A change in law will be deemed 
to affect matters of substance where it increases the punishment or changes the 
ingredients of the offense or the ultimate facts necessary to establish guilt. Hopt v. 
Utah, 1 10 U.S. 574, 580,4 S.Ct. 202, 205, 28 L.Ed. 262, 265 (1 884). Decisions of 
"substantive criminal law" are those that reach beyond issues of procedural 
function and address the meaning, scope, and application of substantive criminal 
statutes. Summerli~ v. S'tewrrrt, 341 F.3d 1082 (9th Cir.2003), cert. granted 72 
U.S.L.W. 3362-63 (Dec. 2, 2003), citing Bousley v. United States, 523 U.S. 614, 
620, 1 18 S.Ct. 1604, 1609, 140 L.Ed.2d 828, 838 (1 998). 
State v. Lovelace, 140 Idaho 73, 77, 90 P.3d 298 (2004). 
Idaho Code 5 19-271 9 establishes the time frame in which petitions for post-conviction 
relief may be brought in a capital case. In addition, the statute establishes the sole standard by 
which a post-conviction relief petition may be brought outside of the established time frame. By 
definition, I.C. 5 19-2719 is a procedural statute rather than a substantive statute. The difference 
between procedure and substance was addressed by the Court in State v. Beam. 
The distinction between procedure and substance was well stated in cur ring to^, 
108 Idaho at 54 1, 700 P.2d at 944: 
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Although a clear line of demarcation cannot always be delineated between 
what is substantive and what is procedural, the following general guidelines 
provide a useful framework for analysis. Substantive law prescribes nonns 
for societal conduct and punishments for violations thereof. It thus creates, 
de$nes, and regulates primary rights. In contrast, practice and procedure 
pertain to the essentially mechanical operations of the courts by which 
substantive law, rights, and remedies are effectuated. 
Quoting State v. Smith, 84 Wash.2d 498. 501, 5 27 P.2d 674, 676-77 (1 974) 
(emphasis added). 
State v. Beam, 121 Idaho 862,863,828 P.2d 891 (1992). 
[b) Stuart's Due Process and/or Equal Rights Asuments 
Stuart also contends that application of I.C. 5 19-2719 to his case violates his due process 
andlor equal rights as it provides less protection to capital case petitioners for post-conviction 
relief than are provided to non-capital case petitioners. Idaho's appellate courts have repeatedly 
and consistently rejected such arguments. This Court specifically rejected this argument in State 
v. Beam, 1 15 Idaho 208, 766P.2d 678 (1988), cert. denied, 489 U.S. 1073, 109 S.Ct. 1360, 103 
L.Ed.2d 827 (1989). Noting first that the rational basis test was the applicable standard through 
which the statute's constitutionality would be determined, the Court held: 
We hold that the legislature's determination that it was necessary to reduce 
the interminable delay in capital cases is a rational basis for the imposition of 
the 42-day time limit set for I.C. tj 19-271 9. The legislature has identified 
the problem and attempted to remedy it with a statutory scheme that is 
rationally related to the legitimate legislative purpose of expediting 
constitutionally imposed sentences. Accordingly, I.C. tj 19-27 19 does not 
violate the defendant's constitutional right to equal protection, and the trial 
court correctly denied [the defendant's] post conviction petition. 
Id. at 21 3, 766 P.2d at 683; see also State v. Hofman. 123 Idaho 638, 647, 851 
P.2d 934, 943 (1993) (applying Beam to reject constitutional challenge to I.C. tj 
19-2719), cert. denied, 51 1 U.S. 1012, 1 14 S.Ct. 1387, 128 L.Ed.2d 61 (1994); 
State v. Rhoades, 120 Idaho 795, 806-07, 820 P.2d 665, 676-74 (1991) (upholding 
constitutionality of I.C. fj 19-2719 under due process clause of U.S. Constitution), 
cert. denied, 504 U.S. 987, 1 12 S.Ct. 2970, 1 19 L.Ed.2d 590 (1992). 
Lanword v. State, 127 Idaho 100, 102, 897 P.2d 991 (1 995). 
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(c) Stuart's Vagueness Argument 
Stuart contends I.C. i j  19-2719 is void for vagueness, arguing the term "known" and/or 
phrase "reasonably should have been known", as used in subpart (5) of the statute, are subject to 
varying interpretations and impose a less stringent standard than would have been imposed had 
the legislature used the phrase "reasonably could have known". Stuart's argument, which cites 
to little or no law in support, is not persuasive. 
Vagueness may invalidate a criminal law either because the statute fails to 
provide the kind of notice that will enable ordinary people to understand what 
conduct it prohibits or because it may authorize and even encourage arbitrary and 
discriminatory enforcement. C'ity o f  Chicago v Morales, 527 U.S. 4 1,42, 1 19 
S.Ct. 1849, 1859, 144 L.Ed.2d 67 (1999), citing Kolender v Lawson, 461 U.S. 
352, 357, 103 S.Ct. 1855, 1859, 75 L.Ed.2d 903, 908, 909 (1983). The test for 
vagueness to be applied in Idaho, if the law does not regulate constitutionally 
protected conduct or a significant amount of that conduct, is to ask whether the 
statute gives notice to those who are subject to it and whether the statute provides 
sufficient guidelines for the exercise of discretion by those who must enforce the 
ordinance. See State v Bitt, 11 8 Idaho at 588, 798 P.2d at 47. It has long been 
held that a statute should not be held void for uncertainty if any practical 
interpretation can be given the statute. C'ity of Le~ t s ton  v. Mathewson, 78 Idaho 
347, 350, 303 P.2d 680 (1956). 
State v. Larsen, 135 Idaho 754, 756,24 P.3d 702 (2001). 
A statute is not constitutionally vague merely because the legislature does not statutorily 
define the words. State v. Richards, 127 Idaho 31, 38, 896 P.2d 357 (Ct.App.1995). "Where the 
legislature has not provided a definition, terms in a statute are given their commonly understood, 
everyday meanings." State v. Richards, 127 Idaho at 38. The words "known" and "reasonably 
should have known" are not vague words but are words commonly used and understood in the 
English language. Paraphrasing for brevity, Webster's ~ i c t i o n a r ~ ~  defines "known" as to 
perceive or understand and to be acquainted or familiar with a thing, place, person, etc. 
"Reasonable" or "reasonably" is defined as in accord with reason or logic. The distinction 
4 Webster's College Dictionary Second Random House Edition 1999. 
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between the use of the word "could" rather than "should, as argued by Stuart, is difficult to 
address as the words have such commonly understood meanings that Webster's Dictionary 
provides a history for the words but little or nothing in the way of definitions. 
A constitutional challenge of a statute places upon the asserting party a high burden. 
"The party challenging a statute on constitutional grounds bears the burden of establishing that 
the statute is unconstitutional and 'must overcome a strong presumption of validity'." State v. 
Bennett, 142 Idaho 166, 169, 125 P.3d 522 (2005); quoting O l s e ~  v. ./.A. Freeman Co., 177 
Idaho 706, 709, 791 P.2d 1285. 1288 (1990). In the instant case, Stuart provides the Court with 
no case law sufficient to meet his burden of overcoming the presumption of validity. 
Stuart's various constitutional challenges of I.C. 5 19-27 19 have been previously 
resolved by the Idaho Supreme Court. As the Supreme Court in Porter v. State, 139 Idaho 420, 
422, 80 P.3d 1021 (2003) stated in footnote, "Porter also challenges the constitutionality of I.C. $ 
19-2719 for the first time on appeal. This challenge is baseless, as we have repeatedly upheld 
the constitutionality of I.C. $ 19-2719. See, e.g., Creech v. State, 137 Idaho 573, 576-77, 51 P.3d 
387.390-91 (2002)." Just as Porter's and Creech's constitutional challenges of I.C. $ 19-2719 
were baseless, so are the challenges posed by Stuart. 
(d) Stuart's Separation of Powers Argument 
Stuart asserts 1.C. $ 19-2719 removes a district court's jurisdiction to reach the merits of 
post-conviction petitions filed outside the statute's time requirements in violation of Idaho's 
constitutional separation of powers doctrine. Stuart's argument lacks merit. 
In Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho 464, 4 P.3d I 1 1 5 (2000), the 
Court addressed the issue of legislative powers that affect the judiciary and the separation of 
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powers doctrine found in the Idaho Constitution. While the Kirkland Court was not addressing 
I.C. § 19-2719, the Court's analysis is nevertheless applicable. 
The separation of powers doctrine is embodied in two provisions of the Idaho 
Constitution. Article 11, 5 1 provides: 
The powers of the government of this state are divided into three distinct 
departments, the legislative, executive and judicial; and no person or 
collection of persons charged with the exercise of powers properly belonging 
to one of these departments shall exercise any powers properly belonging to 
either of the others, except as in this constitution expressly directed or 
permitted. 
IDAHO CONST. art. 11, $ 1. 
Article V, $ 13 of the Idaho Constitution provides: 
'The legislature shall have no power to deprive the judicial department of any 
power or jurisdiction which rightly pertains to it as a coordinate department 
of the government; but the legislature shall provide a proper system of 
appeals, and regulate by law, when necessary, the methods of proceeding in 
the exercise of their powers of all the courts below the Supreme Court, so far 
as the same may be done without conflict with the Constitution, provided, 
however, that the legislature can provide mandatory minimum sentences for 
any crimes, and any seiltence inlposed shall no1 be less than the mandatory 
minimurn sentence so provided. Any mandatory minimum sentence so 
imposed shall not be reduced. 
IDAHO CONST. art. V, Ij 13. 
Kirkland v. Blaine County Medical Center, 134 Idaho at 470. 
'The Court went on to state, "Because it is properly within the power of the legislature to 
establish statutes of limitations, statutes of repose, create new causes of action, and otherwise 
modify the common law without violating separation of powers pritlciples, it necessarily follows 
that the legislature also has the power to limit remedies available to plaintiffs without violating 
the separation of powers doctrine." Id. at 47 1. 
The legislature's enactment of I.C. $ 19-2719 did not remove a district court's 
jurisdiction to reach the merits of a post-conviction petition, as argued by Stuart. Rather, the 
statute merely sets a time limit for the filing of a post-conviction petition in a capital case 
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provides for the filing of a petition outside the time limit i f a  petitioner can show certain 
circumstances exist to merit a late filing. If the petition is not timely filed or the exception is not 
met, only then is the court prevented from determining the petition on the merits. The limits that 
exist in 1.G. $ 19-2719 are analogous to statutes of limitations, time limits for appeals, as well as 
other time limits established by statute or court rule. Therefore, I.C. $ 19-27 19 does not violate 
the separation of powers doctrine found in the Idaho Constitution. 
12) RETROACTIVE APPLICATION OF I.C. 6 19-27 19 AND IDAHO L,AW 
Stuart is correct when he asserts that, absent an express legislative statement to the 
contrary, a statute will not be applied retroactively. When enacting I.C. $ 19-2719, the 
legislature made such an express statement. As already stated by this Court in analyzing Stuart's 
ex posf.fircfo argument, when I.C. $ 19-27 19 was enacted in 1984. the legislature included the 
following language in the session law: 
This act shall apply to all cases in which capital sentences were imposed on or 
prior to the effective date of this act but which have not been carried out, and to 
all capital cases arising after the effective date of this act. 
Idaho Session Laws 1984, ch. 159, $ 8, p. 390. 
Recognizing the legislative directive given with the enactment of the statute, Idaho's 
Supreme Court has stated: 
The operation of I.C. $ 19-27 19 is not limited by the existence of previous 
proceedings using different procedural rules. The provisions of I.C. $ 19-27 19 
apply "to all cases in which capital sentences were imposed on or prior to the 
effective date [April 2, 19841." I.C. $ 19-27 19a. I.C. $ 19-27 19(4) requires that 
any habeas corpus or post-conviction remedies in capital cases must be pursued 
under the procedures set out in I.C. $ 19-2719 and the 42-day time period of I.C. $ 
19-2719(3). 
McKinney v. State, 133 Idaho 695, 703,992 P.2d 144 (1 999). 
Idaho's Supreme Court made clear I.C. $ 19-271 9 must be applied to all capital case 
post-conviction petitions whether the death sentence judgment was entered before or after 
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enactment of the statute. Therefore, the statute is applicable to Stuart's current petition. When 
I.C. 5 19-2719 is applied, the Court must find Stuart's petition untimely unless Stuart is able to 
sufficiently show some or all of his claims fall within the exception found in I.C. 19-2719(5) . 
(3) STUART'S CURRENT POST-CONVICTION CLAIMS 
The question the Court must address next, given Stuart's untimely filing of his current 
post-conviction petition, is whether all or some of his claims were known or reasonably should 
have been known by Stuart within the time period required by I.C. 5 19-2719. As noted earlier 
in the Opinion, Stuart's post-conviction claims are easily divided into three categories: ( I )  
misconduct on the part of the prosecutor; (2) the withholding of mitigating information; and, (3) 
ineffective assistance of counsel. 
(a) Prosecutorial Misconduct Claims 
Stuart asserts the following misconduct by the prosecutor: (I)  prosecutor advised at least 
one witness not to say Stuart had mental health issues; (2) prosecutor knew witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing ingested "small white tab pills which purportedly had a calming effect"; (3) 
prosecutor encouraged 'prior bad act' witnesses to exchange anticipated testimony by housing 
them in the same small hotel for the preliminary hearing and for trial and putting witnesses in the 
same room during the preliminary hearing without advising them not to exchange their 
anticipated testimony and/or failing to take steps to insure they did not exchange anticipated 
testimony; (4) the prosecutor encouraged witnesses to exaggerate Stuart's misdeeds by providing 
a heightened sense of danger by placing police officers at the motel where the witnesses were 
staying, telling at least one witness that the prosecutor received a threatening call regarding 
Stuart, requiring Stuart to wear leg irons during the preliminary hearing and requesting additional 
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security measures at trial that included having unifomed and armed police in the courtroom 
during the trial and requiring security checks of all persons entering the couaroom. 
Each of Stuart's claims of prosecutorial misco~lduct werc known or reasonably should 
have been known by Stuart at the time he filed his direct appeal and/or at the time he filed his 
first petition for post-conviction relief. As to Stuart's first assertion of misconduct, Stuart was in 
the best position to know if he had at any time been diagnosed with mental health problems and 
who, if any, of the State's witnesses were likely to be am-are of his diagnosis. Stuart had the 
opportunity at the preliminary hearing and again at trial to question witnesses about any 
knowledge they had regarding Stuart's mental health and, more importantly, Stuart had the 
opportunity to present his own evidence regarding Stuart's mental health. An admonition by the 
prosecutor to a lay witness to refrain from volunteering such a statement regarding Stuart's 
mental health would have been proper. Stuart knew or reasonably should have known when he 
filed his direct appeal and his prior post-conviction petitions what evidence, if any, was 
presented or not presented regarding his mental health status. 
As for Stuart's assertion that the prosecutor allowed witness to openly share "pills", 
housed witnesses in the same motel and/or had witnesses wait in the same room, thus 
encouraging them to share their testimony, such information was known or should have 
reasonably been known to Stuart at the time of his direct appeal and/or at the time of the filing of 
his earlier post-conviction petitions. Stuart had the opportunity to question witnesses at the 
preliminary hearing and at trial, and to contact and interview them between the two proceedings, 
regarding their accommodations. In addition, Stuart and his counsel could have requested the 
court admonish the prosecutor and the witnesses that no discussions regarding the case occur 
between the witnesses until after the conclusion of trial. Finally, Stuart offers nothing beyond 
mere speculation regarding the alleged "calming pills", pills which may have been antacids, 
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gurn, breath mints or any of a myritld of other benign legal 'pills'.' One must rememtzer that 
these vague assertions are being made more than twenty years after a jury returned a verdict of 
guilty. 
Stuart's final claim for prosecutoriai misconduct involves the courlroom enviroment 
during his preliminary hearing and trial. Stuart was present in the courtroom during both 
proceedings and therefore knew or reasonably should have known when he filed his direct appeal 
and his earlier post-contliction petitions that he was wearing leg irons during his preliminary 
hearirig as well as how many police officers were present during the hearing and trial. 
Stuart claims the prosecutor withheld certain mitigating information from the court rclatcd 
to Stuart's childhood. Stuart contends he and his sisters suffered constant physical and sexual 
abuse at the hands of his father and that such an environment may have predisposed Stuart to 
mental health problems, noting his own son required psychiatric care and medication during his 
adolescence. In support of his claim, Stuart directs the Court to affidavits filed in this matter by 
his sisters, his son, his former wife, a former girlfriend, an aunt, former friends and neighbors, 
and the principal of Stuart's high school in ~ o n t a n a . ~  1n varying degrees, the affiants describe 
Stuart's childhood as replete with serious physical abuse inflicted by Stuart's father upon Stuart, 
5 Statement of Theresa Jo Jacobson dated October 28, 2002, Appendix "A" 1 8, "Before testifying at the preliminary 
hearing, a police officer drove me to the courthouse. There, I was directed to a room. When I entered, Sharie, 
Vicki, Kathie (the deceased's mother, and other women who Mr. Stuart had allegedly known and abused were 
already in the room. I recall that there was a policewoman in the room as well. It was in that room that I first met 
Sharie, Vicki, and Kathie. When I first entered the room, some were smoking cigarettes and taking small tab pills. 
Someone offered me a pill, saying that it would calm me down. She offered the pills to me in a normal speaking 
voice. Nothing she said or did suggested to me that she was joking in any way. My impression was that a police 
oficer in the room had supplied the pills. I declined the pills, but the woman who told me about them and other 
potential witnesses at the table took some of the pills" 
6 In addition to previously filed affidavits, on May 22, 2006, Stuart filed affidavits or sworn statements from Susan 
Kathleen Stuart, Gene Lee Dally, Malvin Krafi, Daniel Heagy, Jane Bigley, Jim Bigley, Shari Lee Kuhl, Donna 
Marquette, Delores Mary Nichols, Claudia Petrie, Doug Wayne Seeger, Coby Smith, Thomas Thorn, Sheri Wald, 
Esther Ziemann, Virginia Lee Presler, Michael Lowe, Debra Johnson and Rose Connelly. 
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his siblings and his mother. The affidavits also describe a childhood in which Stuart was 
exposed to his father's incestuous sexual abuse of Stuart's sisters. It is this tumultuous childhood 
that Stuart contends the prosecutor "hid" from the court because of its potential mitigating affect. 
It is curious that the prosecutor is alleged to have hidden Stuart's own childhood fi-om him. 
Stuart has produced affidavits supporting a conclusion that his childhood was terrible, 
Nevertheless, to suggest this information was withheld from the trial court during the sentencing 
phase does not follow. The person with the best knowledge, insight and understanding of 
Stuart's childhood is Stuart and persons known to Stuart. If Stuart believed his childhood 
experiences were mitigating factors that should have been considered by the trial court, it was 
Stuart and his counsel who had the responsibility to present the information to the court. The 
prosecutor did not hide, nor could he hide, what was best known by Stuart and available to Stuart 
to present to the court. 
fc) Ineffective Assistallce of Counsel 
The standard that must be met on post-conviction claims for ineffective assistance of 
counsel is well established. 
To prevail on an ineffective assistance of counsel claim, the defendant must show 
that the attorney's performance was deficient, and that the defendant was 
prejudiced by the deficiency. Hassett v. State, 127 Idaho 3 13, 3 16, 900 P.2d 221, 
224 (Ct.App. 1995); Russell, 1 18 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656; Davis v. State. 1 16 
Idaho 40 1,406, 775 P.2d 1243, 1248 (Ct.App. 1989). To establish a deficiency, the 
applicant has the burden of showing that the attorney's representation fell below an 
objective standard of reasonableness. Aragon v. State, 114 Idaho 758, 760, 760 
P.2d 1 174, 1 176 (1 988); Russell, 1 18 Idaho at 67, 794 P.2d at 656. 'To establish 
prejudice, the applicant must show a reasonable probability that, but for the 
attorney's deficient performance, the outcome of the trial would have been 
different. Aragon, 1 14 Idaho at 76 1, 760 P.2d at 1 177; Russell, 1 18 Idaho at 67, 
794 P.2d at 656. This Court has long adhered to the proposition that tactical or 
strategic decisions of trial counsel will not be second-guessed on appeal unless 
those decisions are based on inadequate preparation, ignorance of relevant law or 
other shortcomings capable of objective evaluation. Howard v. State, 126 Idaho 
23 1,233, 880 P.2d 261, 263 (Ct.App.1994). 
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Baker v. Slate, 142 Idaho 41 1,416, 128 P.3d 948 (Ct.App.2005). 
It is not enough for a petitioner to simply allege his or her counsel's performance might 
have been better or might have contributed to conviction. Rather, the standard that must be met 
is to show actual unreasonable representation and actual prejudice. Estes v. State, 1 11 Idaho 
430,434,725 P.2d 135 (1986). "'A showing that defendant was denied the reasonably 
competent assistance of counsel is not sufficient by itself to sustain a reversal of the conviction. 
The defendant, in most cases. must make a showing that the conduct of counsel contributed to 
the conviction or the sentence imposed"." Id. at 434; quoting State v. Tucker, 97 Idaho 4, 12. 
539 P.2d 556 (1975). 
Stuart's current post-conviction petition asserts ineffective assistance of counsel at trial, 
on appeal andlor in his prior post-conviction petitions in regards to the following issues: (I)  
admission of prior bad act testimony; (2) admission of statements by Stuart in violation of 
constitutional rights; (3) confusing and erroneous jury instructions; (4) insufficient evidence of 
murder by torture; (5) failure to instruct jury on included offense of second degree murder by 
torture; (6) failure to challenge criminal statute as unconstitutionally vague; (7) speedy trial 
violation; (8) prosecutorial misconduct; (9) violation of right to an impartial jury; (10) failure to 
record critical pretrial and trial proceedings and conferences held in chambers; (1 1) 
constitutional violations because of heightened courtroom security measures; and, (1 2) plea offer 
constitutional violations. Many of Stuart's current post-conviction claims, as listed above, were 
raised and addressed on direct appeal. Stuart seeks to again raise these issues by alleging that his 
trial counsel failed to "adequately raise, brief and argue'' these issues. Even if timely raised, 
Stuart's ineffective assistance of counsel claims should be summarily dismissed. 
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Stuart's ineffective assistance of trial counsel claims and his ineffective assistance of 
appellate counsel claims have not been asserted within a reasonable time. Stuart was sentenced 
to death in December 1982. His first appeal was decided in 1986. He has been before the 
Supreme Court on four more occasions. Stuart has had two defense attorneys' offices represent 
him since the withdrawal of his trial attorney; attorney Scott Chapinan was appointed in 
November 1995 and his present attorneys were appointed on January 17,2002, almost one year 
prior to the filing of this successive post-conviction petition. By measurement from any point of 
reference, the trial and appellate ineffective assistance of counsel claims were not raised within a 
reasonable time after they were known or reasonably should have been known. Idaho Code 19- 
2719(5). See tv.g., Porter v. State, 136 Idaho 257, 260, 32 P.3d 151,154 (2001). 
CONCLIJSION 
'The State's Motions for Summary Dismissal are granted in each case. 
ORDER 
'The State shall submit an appropriate order to the Court within fourteen days of this 
Opinion. 
Dated this &day of March 2007. 
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District Judge Presiding: Ron Schilling 
Joan Fisher and Oliver Lowery: Attorneys Gene Stuart 
Lamont Anderson and Lori Gilmore: Attorneys for the State 
Deputy Clerk: Sue K. Summerton 
Date: 3130106 Tape: CD162 Time: 10:06 a.m. 
Subject of Proceeding: Scheduling Conference ................................................................. ................................................................. 
FOOTAGE: 
10:06 Court advises Ms. Fisher, Mr. Lowey, Mr. Anderson, and the court are presecf 
telephonically and Ms. Gilmore was present in person. Court advises that this is 
the time for a scheduling conference. Court has reviewed the briefs that were 
filed. 
10:08 Mr. Lowey advises that there will be a motion for discovery filed. 
10:08 Colloquy regarding scheduling a hearing. 
Deputy Clerk - Sue K. Summerton 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
Approved: * 
10: l l  Court sets May 22, 2006 for argument on the motions. Hearing to be held at the 
State Maximum penitentiary. 
10:13 Court sets this matter for 10:OO a.m. on 5122106 and the clerk will make the 
scheduling arrangements with the penitentiary. 
10: 1 5 Court in recess. 
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NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN, that Monday, the 22" day of May 2006, at the hour of 
10:OO a.m., is hereby set as the time to hear motions in the above-entitled actions before 
the Honorable Ron Schilling, in the Courtroom of the Maximum Security Prison in Boise, 
ID. 
DATED this 18'~ day of May. 2006. 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE 
OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART 1 CASE NO. CV2002-00443, 
) CV2002-00473 
Plaintiff, ) 
) COURT MINUTES 
Vs . ) 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ET. AL. 1 
) 
Defendant. ) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) CASE NO. CR1981-008495 
Plaintiff, 
VS. 





District Judge Presiding: Ron Schilling 
Oliver Lowery: Attorney for Gene Stuart 
Lamont Anderson and Lori Gilmore: Attorneys for the State 
Deputy Clerk: Sue K. Summerton 
Date: 5/22/06 Tape: Stuart Tapes: 1, 2, 3, and CD 4. Time: 10: 18 a.m. 
Subject of Proceeding: Motion hearing - ------ ------------- ----------- ...................... ------------- .................................... ....... 
FOOTAGE: 
001 Court advises Mr. Lowey, Mr. Anderson, Lori Gilmore and Gene Stuart are present 
in court. Court explains now is the time to hear the Motion for Summary Dismissal. 
11 8 Mr. Anderson argues. 
263 Court remarks regarding the briefs that have been filed. 
COURT MINUTES - 1 
278 Mr. Lowery argues. 
360 Court has sidebar. 
702 Mr. Anderson argues. 
791 Continued to Stuart Tape 2. 
264 Mr. Lowery argues. 
501 Continued to Stuart Tape 3. 
0011435 Mr. Lowey continues argument. 
10:45 a.m. Stuart CD 4 
Court explains the issues with the tapes of this hearing. Court further explains that 
the SP numbers that were initially assigned to Mr. Stuart's cases have been 
converted to CV numbers due to a computer update at the court office. 
Mr. Lowey reiterates his previous argument. Mr. Lowey moves for an evidentiary 
hearing to see if the female witnesses were available to the defense for interviews 
and an evidentiary hearing on the reasonable time to appeal issue. Mr. Lowey 
further moves for copies of trial files, police and sheriffs office files, in camera to 
be provided to the defense. 
11:20 Mr. Anderson objects to Mr. Lowey's motions. 
11:34 Mr. Lowey gives rebuttal argument. 
11:38 Court allows counsel to provide additional citations by 6/1/06. 
Mr. Lowey moves for another week to provide the citations to the court. 
Court grants continuance to 6/8/06 to provide citations. 
Mr. Lowey continues argument. 
11:45 Court reiterates deadline for attorneys to file citations. Court takes this matter 
under advisement and advises a written decision will be provided. 
Mr. Lowey continues argument. 
COURT MINUTES - 2 
Court advises not prepared to rule on Mr. Lowey's argument. Court orders all 
motions to be in writing. 
Defendant leaves the courtroom. 
Court advises issues to be raised outside of the prison guard 
Mr. Lowey argues motion to seal records, pleadings of 3/19/03, Affidavit in Support 
of Post conviction Relief. 
Court grants motion to seal. 
Mr. Anderson advises there are 4 affidavits to the pleading. 
Mr. Lowey argues filing of declarations or affidavits. 
Mr. Anderson argues in opposition to filing declarations or affidavits. 
Mr. Lowey continues argument. 
Court questions Mr. Lowey regarding the declarations or affidavits. 
Mr. Lowey responds. 
Mr. Anderson argues. 
Court grants motion to file declarations or affidavits. 
Mr. Anderson continues objection. 
Mr. Lowey advises the court of each declaration or affidavit to be filed and their 
claim. Mr. Lowey addresses court regarding a settlement conference. 
Court does not schedule a settlement conference however advises that the parties 
may meet to discuss settlement if they wish. 
12:10 Court in recess. 
Deputy Clerk - Sue K. Summerton 
COURT MINUTES - 3 
Approved: 
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1 
On Mmh 12, 2007, this Cow e n t d  a Memorandum Opinion on Petition for 
I 
Post-Conviction Relief andior Writ of ~ a &  Corpus and Motion to Correct Illegal 
Sentence, to Vacate Sentence o f  Death and for New Sentencing Trial, granting the state's 
i 
Motion for Summary Dismissal and dismissing this case with ;prejudice. Based upon the 
Court's Memaandm Opinion on Petition f& Post-Conviction Relief and/or Writ of 
Habeas Corpus and Motion to C o m t  Illegal Sentence, to Vacate Sentence of Death and 
for New Sentencing Trial, and the Court b;ing fully advised in the premises, IT IS 
J3EREBY' ORDERED AND N3JlJL3GED thati Petitioner's case i s  DISMISSED with 
I 
DATED this / 2 'by of April, 2007. : 
I 
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Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
3 17 West tjth Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
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Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRICT COlJRT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
1 Case Nos. CR81-0008495 
Petitioner-Appellant, 1 
) 
v. 1 MOTION THAT COSTS OF 
1 APPEAL BE AT COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 EXPENSE 
1 
Respondent. 1 
Mr. Gene F. Stuart ("'Petitioner"), pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17 and Idaho Code 
Section 19-4904, moves that the Court order that all costs of appeal, including the costs of the 
Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record, shall be at county expense. In support of this 
motion, Mr. Stuart states as follows: 
1. Since October, 198 1, Idaho courts have determined that Mr. Stuart is indigent and 
unable to pay litigation costs in the prosecution, appeals, and postconviction petitions relating to 
his prosecution in the Second Judicial District, County of Cleanvater, District Court Case No. 
CV02-00443. Mr. Stuart has been incarcerated since September, 198 1. 
2. To the best of undersigned counsel's knowledge Mr. Stuart remains and shall continue 
to remain throughout the appellate proceedings in the instant matter an indigent person with no 
means of support or ability to pay the costs of these proceedings. 
3. The federal and state constitutional rights to counsel, to due process, to equal 
protection, and against cruel and unusual punishment guarantee Mr. Stuart the right to appeal the 
denial of postconviction relief in his capital case. U.S. Const. amend. VI, VII, XIV; Idaho Const. 
art. I, jjjj2,6, 13 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order directing 
that all costs of appeal, including the costs of the Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record, 
shall be at county expense. 
Dated this ~ j k h a y  of April 2007. 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
208-883-01 80 
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Joan M. Fisher 
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Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
3 17 West 6" Street, Suite 204 
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Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
) Case Nos. GV02-00443 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) 
1 
v. 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
1 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Respondent. ) 
TO: PROSECUTXNG ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF 
CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 1 (a)(l), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(9),and 17, NOTICE IS 
HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Gene F. Stuart, the above named appellant, appeals against the above named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Opinion On Petition For Post 
Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus and Motion To Correct Illegal Sentence, To 
Notice of Appeal - 1 
Vacate Sentence Of Death And For New Sentencing Trial filed in the above entitled action on 
March 12,2007, Honorable Ron Schilling, Senior District Judge, presiding. 
2. Mr. Stuart is entitled to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order 
described in paragraph one is an appealable order pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 1 (a)(l), 
1 1 (a)(7), and 1 1 (c)(9). 
3. Mr. Stuart intends to raise various issues in his appeal, including but not limited 
to: 
a. Whether this Court's holding in Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 783, 102 P.3d 1099, 
1 102 (20041, followed by the court below, that Schriro v. Summerlin, 532 U.S. 348 (20041, 
precludes it from retroactively applying Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (20021, reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of its authority to give retroactive effect to a broader range of 
cases than permitted by federal retroactivity doctrine; and 
b. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho Code $19-2719 to this case violates the 
state and federal constitutions' prohibition against expost facto laws. 
4. Mr. Stuart requests that a Reporter's Transcript of all hearings in this matter be 
prepared. He requests that it not be prepared in compressed format as described in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 26. 
5. Mr. Stuart requests that in addition to those items automatically included pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, that the Clerk's Record include all papers filed by each party and all 
orders and minute entries. 
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6.  The undersigned certifies: 
a. That the Honorable Ronald D. Schilling is a Senior District Judge and, as such, does 
not have an assigned court reporter; that on this 23rd day of April, 2007, a copy of this Notice of 
Appeal has been served on each court reporter who recorded hearings in this matter and whose 
identity is now available to undersigned counsel; that undersigned counsel has made a good faith 
effort to learn the identity of the court reporter for the May 22,2006, hearing, but that Judge 
Schilling, the clerk's office of the Clearwater County District Court, and opposing counsel were 
unable to provide that court reporter's identity today; that service on the remaining court 
reporter(s) was accomplished by placing a copy in a properly addressed envelope, first class 
postage affixed, and mailing that envelope via the United States Postal Service; and that 
undersigned counsel will determine as quickly as possible the identity of the May 22, 2006, court 
reporter, immediately serve a copy of this Notice of Appeal on him or her, and also immediately 
advise this Court of same. Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
b. That on this 23rd day of April, 2007, a copy of this Notice of Appeal has been served 
on the court reporter for the Honorable Ron Schilling by placing the copy in a properly addressed 
envelope, first class postage affixed, and mailing that envelope via the United States Postal 
Service. Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
c. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated reporter's transcript fees because 
he was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
d. m a t  Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated clerk's record fees because he 
was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
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e. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because he was indigent 
before trial and has been ever since; and 
f. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 20, namely, the Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney and the Attorney 
General for the State of Idaho. 
Dated this p L d a y  of April 2007 
Oliver Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
208-883-0180 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
hereby certify that on the of April, 2007, I 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, first class postage prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
Lori Gilmore - A S .  Mail 
Cleanvater County Prosecuting Attorney - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 - Facsimile 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 - Overnight Mail 
L. LaMont Anderson M . ~ .  Mail 
Attorney General's Office - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 83720 - Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 - Overnight Mail 
Cindy Leonhardt -4.~. Mail 
Court Reporter - Wand Delivery 
M&M Court Reporting Service Inc. - Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2636 - Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 8370 1-2636 
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Joan M. Fisher 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Oliver W. Loewy i 
b' 
Limited Admission -> 
Capital 13abens Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho - [kt/ * h Z ~ f i -  
3 17 West 61h Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 -- 
208-883-01 80 
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Attomeys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTliICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
1 Case Nos. CRS1-0008495 
Petitioner-Appellant, 1 
1 
v. 1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
i 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
1 
Respondent. 1 
TO: PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF 
CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 1 (a)(l), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(9),and 17, NOTICE IS 
HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. Gene F. Stuart, the above named appellant, appeals against the above named 
respondent to the Idaho Supreme Court from the Memorandum Opinion On Petition For Post 
Conviction Relief And/or Writ Of Habeas Corpus and Motion To Correct Illegal Sentence, To 
Notice of Appeal - 1 
Vacate Sentence Of Death And For New Sentencing Trial ("OrderW)filed in the above entitled 
action on March 12, 2007, Honorable Ronald D. Schilling, Senior District Judge, presiding. 
2. Mr. Stuart notes that while the caption on the Order does not list Case Number 
CR81-0008495, the case number assigned to his Motion To Correct Illegal Sentence, the 
substance of the Order appears to address that motion. See Order at 5-8. 
3. Mr. Stuart is entitled to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the order 
described in paragraph one is an appealable order pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 1 1 (a)(l), 
1 1 (a)(7), and 1 1 (c)(9). 
4. Mr. Stuart intends to raise various issues in his appeal, including but not limited 
to: 
a. Whether this Court's holding in Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780,783, 102 
P.3d 1099, 1 102 (2004), followed by the court below, that Schriro v. 
Summerlin, 532 U.S. 348 (2004), precludes it from retroactively applying 
Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), reflects a fundamental 
misunderstanding of its authority to give retroactive effect to a broader 
range of cases than permitted by federal retroactivity doctrine; 
b. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho Code 9 19-27 19 to this case 
violates the state and federal constitutions' prohibition against expost 
facto laws; and 
c. Whether Idaho Code 9 19-2719 violates the Idaho constitution's separation 
of power's doctrine inasmuch as it removes from the district courts the 
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jurisdiction to reach the merits of postconviction petitioners filed outside 
that statute's time requirements. 
5.  Mr. Stuart requests that a Reporter's Transcript of all hearings in this matter be 
prepared. He requests that it not be prepared in compressed format as described in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 26. 
6. Mr. Stuart requests that in addition to those items automatically included pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, that the Clerk's Record include all papers filed by each party and all 
orders and minute entries. 
7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That the Honorable Ronald D. Schilling is a Senior District Judge and, as such, does 
not have an assigned court reporter; that on this 23rd day of April, 2007, a copy of this Notice of 
Appeal has been served on each court reporter who recorded hearings in this matter and whose 
identity is now available to undersigned counsel; that undersigncd counsel has made a good faith 
effort to learn the identity of the court reporter for the May 22,2006, hearing, but that Judge 
Schilling, the clerk's office of the Clearwater County District Court, and opposing counsel were 
unable to provide that court reporter's identity today; that service on the remaining court 
reporter(s) was accomplished by placing a copy in a properly addressed envelope, first class 
postage affixed, and mailing that envelope via the United States Postal Service; and that 
undersigned counsel will determine as quickly as possible the identity of the May 22,2006, court 
reporter, immediately serve a copy of this Notice of Appeal on him or her, and also immediately 
advise this Court of same. Idaho Appellate Rule 20. 
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b. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated reporter's transcript fees because 
he was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
c. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated clerk's record fees because he 
was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
d. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because he was indigent 
before trial and has been ever since; and 
e. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 20, namely, the Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney and the Attorney 
General for the State of Idaho. 
Dated this z/'Z day of April 2007. 
~ & n  M. Fisher 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
208-883-01 80 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 1 
v @ I 
, hereby certify that on the Z3 1 day of April, 2007,I 
caused to be served a true and co&ct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, first class postage prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
Lori Cilmore - U.S. Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 Facsimile 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 - Overnight Mail 
L. LaMont Anderson J U.S. Mail 
Attorney General's Office - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 83720 Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83 720-00 1 0 - Overnight Mail 
Cindy Leonhardt - U.S. Mail 
Court Reporter - Hand Delivery 
M&M Court Reporting Service Inc. - Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2636 - Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701-2636 
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XN THE DKSWCT COURT OF THE S ~ " 7 '  .OF m 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR TER 
NGIS STUmT, 1 
Pebircfoner, 
1 




STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Raportdemt. 1 
Havhg duly consiclmd Petitioner's Mofian Thaf Cosrs WAppeal Be At Ci?mty Expense, 
Afl costs of appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court in the instant matter, including the costs 
ofthe Rqorter" Tmmcript and the Glak" Record, shall be at county e x p s e .  
7 
Entered this J s L d a y  of April, 2007. 
District Judge I 
84/24! 2007 08: 46 208476F* 3 CLW CO 
X I-EWBY CEiXTIFY tha e and w.rrect copy of the fmegoing Order w a  
ly delivered or mailed thi of A@, 2007, by first-class mail with prepaid 
po-e to the following: 
Joan M. Fisher & U.S. Mail 
Oliver Loewy - Hmd Delivery 
Capital Habeas Unit - Facsimile 
F e d d  Defcnder Services of Idaho - Ovmigfrt Mail 
3 17 W m  6th. Street, Suite 204 
Mascow, Idaho 83843 
b r i  Gihure  - U.S. Mail 
C l e m b r  Comty Prosecuting Attorney a Hand Dtl.liven 
P.O. Box 2627 - Facsimile 
Orofmo, T&bo 83544 - C h e g h t  P4t1.d 
L. W o n t  Anderson. & V.S. Mail 
Attorney Genaral's Office - Hand Delivery 
P.0 .  Box 83720 P Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83720-00 1 0 - Overnight Mail 
Cindy XROmrdt - 10 U.3. Mail 
Court Reporter P Wand Delivery 
M&M Court Reporting S M m  he. - Facsimile 
P.0, Bax 2636 P Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701-2636 
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Joan M. Fisher 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Oliver W. Loetvy 
Limited Admission 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
3 17 West 6" Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
208-883-01 80 
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Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 
) Case Nos. CR81--0008495 
Petitioner- Appellant, ) 
) 
v. ) AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
TO: PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF 
CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FOR 'THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 1 (c)(l), 1 1 (c)(4), 1 1 (c)(6), 1 1 (c)(8), and 
1 1 (c)(9), 1 7, and 1 7(1) NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. On April 23, 2007, Gene F. Stuart, the above named appellant, filed his Notice of 
Appeal from the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on March 12, 2007, by the Honorable 
Amended Notice of Appeal - 1 
Ronald 11. Schilling, Senior District Judge. The next day, undersigned counsel received the 
Judgment Dismissing Case with Prejudice ("Judgment'" entered on April 18, 2007. Mr. Stuart 
files this instant Arnended Notice of Appeal from that Judgment. 
2. Mr. Stuart is entitled to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment is 
appealable pursuant to ldaho Appellate Rules I 1 (c)(l ), 1 1 (c)(4), 1 1 (c)(6), 1 I (c)(8), 1 1 (c)(9). 
3.  Mr. Stuart intends to raise various issues in his appeal, including but not limited to: 
a. Whether this Court's holding in Porter v Stale, 140 Idaho 780, 783, 102 P.3d 1099, 
1102 (20041, followed by the court below, that Schriro v. Sumnzerlin, 532 U.S. 348 (20041, 
precludes it from retroactively applying Ring v Ariz'zor~c~, 536 U.S. 584 (20021, reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of its authority to give retroactive effect to a broader range of 
cases than permitted by federal retroactivity doctrine; 
b. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho Code § 19-271 9 to this case violates the 
state and federal constitutions' prohibition against expost facto laws; and 
c. Whether Idaho Code § 19-27 19 violates the Idaho constitution's separation of power's 
doctrine inasmuch as it removes from the district courts the jurisdiction to reach the merits of 
postconviction petitioners filed outside that statute's time requirements. 
4. Mr. Stuart requests that a Reporter's Transcript of all hearings in this matter be 
prepared. I-Ie requests that it not be prepared in compressed format as described in Idaho 
Appellate Rule 26. 
5.  Mr. Stuart requests that in addition to those items automatically included pursuant to 
Idaho Appellate Rule 28, that the Clerk's Record include all papers filed by each party and all 
orders and minute entries. 
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6.  Please note that there are sealed documents filed in his case. Mr. Stuart respectfully 
requests that those docments remain sealed and be sent to the Supreme Court as sealed 
exhibits to this record on appeal in this matter. 
'7. Tbc undersigned certifies: 
a. That the Honorable Ronald D. Schilling is a Senior District Judge and. as such, does 
not have an assigned court reporter; that on this 7th day of May, 2007, a copy of this Notice of 
Appeal has been served on each court reporter who recorded hearings in this matter. 
b. That the District Court electronically recorded some hearings for which no court 
reporter was present, including those held on January 6, 2006, and May 22, 2006. 
c. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated reporter's transcript fees because 
he was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
d. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated clerk's record fees because he 
was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
e. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the appellate filing fce because he was indigent 
before trial and has been ever since; and 
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f. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 20, namely, the Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney and the Attorney 
General for the State of Idaho. 
CJC, 
Dated this 7 day of May, 2007 
kfoan M. Fisher 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
208-883-01 80 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
hereby certifji that on the day of May, 2007,I 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, first class postage prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
Lori Gilmore 1 U.S. Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 - Facsimile 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 - Overnight Mail 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-00 10 
U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
Facsimile 
- Overnight Mail 
Cindy Leonhardt U.S. Mail 
Court Reporter - Hand Delivery 
M&M Court Reporting Service Inc. - Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2636 - Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 8370 1-2636 
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Joan M. Fisher 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Limited Admission 
Capiral Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
3 17 West 6"' Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
208-883-01 80 
Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 
1 Case Nos. CV02-00443 
Petitioner- Appellant, ) 
) 
v. 1 AMENDED NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
TO: PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF 
CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 1 (a)(l ), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(9), 1 7, and 17(1) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. On April 23,2007, Gene F. Stuart, the above named appellant, filed his Notice of 
Appeal from the Memorandum Opinion and Order entered on March 12, 2007, by the Honorable 
Ron Schilling, Senior District Judge. The next day, undersigned counsel received the Judgment 
Amended Notice of Appeal - 1 
Dismissing Case with Prejudice ("Judgment") entered on April 18,2007. Mr. Stuart files this 
instant Amended Notice of Appeal from that Judgment. 
2. Mr. Stuart is entitled to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment is 
appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules I 1 (a)(l), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(9). 
3. Mr. Stuart intends to raise various issues in his appeal, including but not limited 
to: 
a. Whether this Court's holding in Porter v State, 140 Idaho 780, 783, 102 P.3d 1099. 
1102 (2004). followed by the court below, that Schriro v Surnrnerlin, 532 U.S. 348 (2004), 
precludes it from retroactively applying Ring v Arizclnu, 536 1J.S. 584 (2002), reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of its authority to give retroactive effect to a broader range of 
cases than permitted by kderal retroactivity doctrine; and 
b. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho Code 5 19-27 19 to this case violates the 
state and federal constitutions' prohibition against ex post facto laws. 
4. Mr. Stuart requests that a Reporter's Transcript of all hearings in this matter be 
prepared. He requests that it not be prepared in conlpressed format as described in Ida110 
Appellate Rule 26. 
5. Mr. Stuart requests that in addition to those items automatically included pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, that the Clerk's Record include all papers filed by each party and ull 
orders and minute entries. 
6. Please note that there are sealed documents filed in this case. Mr. Stuart 
respectfully requests that those documents remain sealed and be sent to the Supreme Court as 
sealed exhibits to the record on appeal in this matter. 
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7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That the Honorable Ronald D. Schilling is a Senior District Judge and, as such, does 
not have an assigned court reporter; that on this 7'h day of May, 2007, a copy of this Notice of 
Appeal has been served on each court reporter who recorded hearings in this matter. 
b. That the District Court electronically recorded some hearings for which no court 
reporter was present, including those held on January 6, 2006, and May 22, 2006. 
c. 'That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated reporter's transcript fees because 
he was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
d. 'I'hat Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated clerk's record fees because he 
was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
e. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because he was indigent 
before trial and has been ever since; and 
f. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 20, namely, the Cleanvater County Prosecuting Attorney and the Attorney 
General for the State of Idaho. 
& 
Dated this '7 day of May 2007. 
Yoan M. Fisher 
Oliver Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
208-883-01 80 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
ereby certilji that on the day of May, 2007, I 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, first class postage prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
Lori Gilmore )Z U S .  Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 - Facsimile 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 - Overnight Mail 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 
U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
- Overnight Mail 
Cindy Leonhardt U S .  Mail 
Court Reporter - Hand Delivery 
M&M Court Reporting Service Inc. - Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2636 - Overnight Mail 
Boise. ID 83701-2636 
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Joan M. Fisher 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Limited Admission 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
3 17 West 6" Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
208-883-01 80 
Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
) case NOS. &1-000~495 
Petitioner-Appellant, 1 
) 
v. ) SECOND AMENDED 
) NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, ) 
) 
Respondent. ) 
TO: PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF 
CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 1 (a)(l), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(9), 1 7, and 17(1) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. This Second Amended Notice of Appeal is filed in compliance with the Idaho 
Supreme Court's May 23, 2007, Order directing that Appellant, Gene F. Stuart, file within 
fourteen (14) days, an Amended Notice of Appeal "specifLing by date and title the hearing(s) 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal - 1 
required to be transcribed for purposes of this Appeal.'The particular dates and related matters 
are set out in paragraphs 4 and 7 below. 
2. Mr. Stuart is entitled to appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment is 
appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 1 (a)(l), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(9). 
3. Mr. Stuart intends to raise various issues in his appeal, including but not limited 
to: 
a. Whether this Court's l-rolding in Porter v. State, 140 Idaho 780, 783, 102 P.3d 1099, 
1102 (20041, followed by the court below, that Schriro v. Summerlin, 532 U.S. 348 (20041, 
precludes it from retroactively applying Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (20021, reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of its authority to give retroactive effect to a broader range of 
cases than permitted by federal retroactivity doctrine; and 
b. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho Code 5 19-27 19 to this case violates the 
state and federal constitutions' prohibition against expostfacto laws. 
4. Mr. Stuart requests that a Reporter's Transcript of all hearings be prepared in this 
matter, including the following hearings: 
a. The March 3, 2004, Scheduling Conference held in Boise, Idaho, during which 
Appellant's Motion to Stay Proceedings was considered and ruled on. This 
hearing was reported by Cindy L. Leonhardt, C.S.R., and a transcript of the 
hearing has previously been prepared. 
b. The January 6, 2006, telephonic Scheduling Conference. This hearing was not 
reported, but it was recorded electronically on tape #C374 1, Clearwater County 
District Court, Orofino, Idaho. 
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c. The March 30, 2006, telephonic Scheduling Conference. This hearing was not 
reported, but it was recorded electronically on tape JlCn 162, Clearwater County 
District Court, Orofino, Idaho. 
d. The May 22, 2006, Motion Hearing. This hearing was not reported, but it was 
recorded electronically by Court staff on tapes, tape numbers unknown, at the 
Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Boise, Idaho. 
5.  Mr. Stuart requests that the Reporter's I'ranscript nof be prepared in compressed 
format as described in Idaho Appellate Rule 26. 
6. Mr. Stuart requests that in addition to those items automatically included pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, that the Clerk's Record include all papers filed by each party and all 
orders and minute entries. 
6. Please note that there are sealed documents filed in this case. Mr. Stuart 
respectfully requests that those documents remain sealed and be sent to the Suprerne Court as 
sealed exhibits to the record on appeal in this matter. 
7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That the Honorable Ronald D. Schilling is a Senior District Judge and, as such, does 
not have an assigned court reporter; that on this 4'h day of June, 2007, a copy of this Second 
Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on each court reporter who recorded hearings in this 
matter. 
b. That the District Court electronically recorded some hearings for which no court 
reporter was present, including those held on January 6, 2006, March 30, 2006, and May 22, 
2006. 
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c. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated reporter's transcript fees because 
he was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
d. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated'clerk's record fees because he 
was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
e. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because he was indigent 
before trial and has been ever since; and 
f. That service has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 20, namely, the Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney and the Attorney 
General for the State of Idaho. 
G 
Dated this day of June, 2007. 
Oliver Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
208-883-01 80 
Second Amended Notice of AppeaI - 4 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE , 
1, a W & r e b y  certify that on the 5' day of June, 2007.1 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, first class postage prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
Lori Gilmore P 4.S. Mail 
Cleanvater County Prosecuting Attorney Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 - Facsimile 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 - Overnight Mail 
L. LaMont Anderson - 4 , s .  Mail 
Attorney General's Office - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 83720 - Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83720-00 10 - Overnight Mail 
Cindy Leonhardt P L . S .  Mail 
Court Reporter - Hand Delivery 
M&M Court Reporting Service Inc. - Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2636 - Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701 -2636 
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Joan M. Fisher 
Idaho State Bar No. 2854 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Limited Admission 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
3 17 West 6th Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
208-883-01 80 
Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRlCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) 
1 Case Nos. CV02-00443 
Petitioner-Appellant, 1 
) 
v. 1 SECOND AMENDED 
1 NOTICE OF APPEAL 
) 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Respondent. 1 
TO: PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR THE COUNTY OF 
CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO, THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE STATE OF 
IDAHO. 
Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules I 1 (a)(l ), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(9), 17, and 17(1) 
NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN THAT: 
1. This Second Amended Notice of Appeal is filed in compliance with the Idaho 
Supreme Court's May 23, 2007, Order directing that Appellant, Gene F. Stuart, file within 
fourteen (14) days, an Amended Notice of Appeal "specifying by date and title the hearing(s) 
Second Amended Notice of Appeal - 1 
required to be trmscribed for purposes of this Appeal." The particular dates and related matters 
are set out in paragraphs 4 and 7 below. 
2. Mr. Stuart is entitled to appeal to thc Idaho Supreme Court, and the Judgment is 
appealable pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules 1 1 (a)(l ), 1 1 (a)(7), 1 1 (c)(9). 
3. Mr. Stuart intends to raise various issues in his appeal, including but not limited 
to: 
a. Whether this Court's holding in Porter v. Sfate, 140 Idaho 780, 783, 102 P.3d 1099, 
1 1 02 (2004), followed by the court below, that Schriro v. Summerlin, 532 lJ.S. 348 (2004), 
precludes it from retroactively applying Ring v. Arizona, 536 U.S. 584 (2002), reflects a 
fundamental misunderstanding of its authority to give retroactive effect to a broader range of 
cases than permitted by federal retroactivity doctrine; and 
b. Whether the retroactive application of Idaho Code 5 19-271 9 to this case violates the 
state and federal constitutions' prohibition against ex post facto laws. 
4. Mr. Stuart requests that a Reporter's Transcript of all hearings be prepared in this 
matter, including the following hearings: 
a. The March 3, 2004, Scheduling Conference held in Boise, Idaho, during which 
Appellant's Motion to Stay Proceedings was considered and ruled on. This 
hearing was reported by Cindy L. Leonhardt, C.S.R., and a transcript of the 
hearing has previously been prepared. 
b. The January 6,2006, telephonic Scheduling Conference. This hearing was not 
reported, but it was recorded electronically on tape #C374 1, Clearwater County 
District Court, Orofino, Idaho. 
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c. The March 30,2006, telephonic Scheduling Conference. This hearing was not 
reported, but it was recorded electronically on tape #CD162, Cleamater CounQ 
District Court, Orofino, Idaho. 
d. The May 22,2006, Motion Hearing. This hearing was not reported, but it was 
recorded electronically by Court staff on tapes, tape numbers unknown, at the 
Idaho Maximum Security Institution, Boise, Idaho. 
5. Mr. Stuart requests that the Reporter's Transcript no1 be prepared in compressed 
format as described in Idaho Appellate Rule 26. 
6. Mr. Stuart requests that in addition to those items automatically included pursuant 
to Idaho Appellate Rule 28, that the Clerk's Record include all papers filed by each party and all 
orders and minute entries. 
6. Please note that there are sealed documents filed in this case. Mr. Stuart 
respectfully requests that those documents remain sealed and be sent to the Suprenze Court as 
sealed exhibits to the record on appeal in this matter. 
7. The undersigned certifies: 
a. That the Honorable Ronald D. Schilling is a Senior District Judge and, as such, does 
not have an assigned court reporter; that on this 4th day of June, 2007, a copy of this Second 
Amended Notice of Appeal has been served on each court reporter who recorded hearings in this 
matter. 
b. That the District Court electronically recorded some hearings for which no court 
reporter was present, including those held on January 6,2006, March 30,2006, and May 22, 
2006. 
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c. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated reporter's transcript fees because 
he was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
d. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the estimated clerk's record fees because he 
was indigent before trial and has been ever since; 
e. That Mr. Stuart is exempt from paying the appellate filing fee because he was indigent 
before trial and has been ever since; and 
f. That senrice has been made upon all parties required to be served pursuant to Idaho 
Appellate Rule 20, namely, the Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney and the Attorney 
General for the State of Idaho. 
G 
Dated this day of June, 2007. 
Oliver Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
208-883-01 80 
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
1, ereby certify that on the 9- day of June, 2007,I 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated 
below, first class postage prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
Lori Gilmore - J - U.S. Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 - Facsimile 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 - Overnight Mail 
L. LaMont Anderson - d S .  Mail 
Attorney General's Office - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 83720 - Facsimile 
Boise, Idaho 83720-0010 - Overnight Mail 
Cindy Leonhardt - 4 s .  Mail 
Court Reporter - Hand Delivery 
M&M Court Reporting Service Inc. - Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2636 - Overnight Mail 
Boise, ID 83701-2636 
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STATE OF IDAHO, 1 
1 
Respondent- ) 
Having duly considered Petitioner's Mutian Thar Costs OfAppeaZ Be Ar County fipense, 
lT IS J3EREBY ORDEWD THAT: 
All costs of appeal to the Idaho Supreme Court in the instant matter, including the costs 
of the Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record, shall be at county expense. 
Entered this 35-' day of April, 2007. 
R O ~  D. s c a n ~ y  
District Judge 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
X HEEBY CFiRTlFY and correct copy of the foregoing Order was 
personally delivered or m d e d  April, 2007, by first-class mail with prepaid 
postage to the foIIowing: 
Joan M. Fisher US. Mail 
Oliver hewy - Hand Delivery 
Capital Hatteas Unit - Facsimile 
Federal Deknder Services of Idaho - Overnight Mail 
3 1 7 West 6th Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, Idaho 83843 
Lori Gilmore - U.S. Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney 4 Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 - Facsimile 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 - Overnight Mail 
L. LaMont Anderson A.s. Mail 
Attorney General's OEce - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 83720 - 1Far;simile 
Boise, Idaho 83720-001 0 - Overnight Mdl 
Cindy LRonhardt 4 U.S. Mail 
Court Reporter - Hand Delivery 
M&M Court Reporting Service Inc. - Facsimile 
P.O. Box 2636 - Overnight Mii 
Boise, II) 83701-2636 
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Oliver W. Loewy 
Limited Admission 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of ldaho 
3 17 West 6th Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
208-883-01 80 
Attorneys for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAI, DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 
1 Case Nos. CV02-00443 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) 
1 
v. 1 MOTION THAT COSTS OF 
1 APPEAL BE AT COUNTY 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 EXPENSE 
1 
Respondent. ) 
Mr. Gene F. Stuart ("Petitioner"), pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 17 and Idaho Code 
Section 19-4904, moves that the Court order that all costs of appeal, including the costs of the 
Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record, shall be at county expense. In support of this 
motion, Mr. Stuart states as follows: 
1. Since October, 198 1, Idaho courts have determined that Mr. Stuart is indigent and 
unable to pay litigation costs in the prosecution, appeals, and postconviction petitions relating to 
his prosecution in the Second Judicial District, County of Clearwater, District Court Case No. 
CV02-00443. Mr. Stuart has been incarcerated since September, 198 1. 
2. To the best of undersigned counsel's knowledge Mr. Stuart remains and shall continue 
to remain thoughout the appellate proceedings in the instant matter an indigent person with no 
means of support or ability to pay the costs of these proceedings. 
3. The federal and state constitutional rights to counsel, to due process, to equal 
protection, and against cruel and unusual punishment guarantee Mr. Stuart the right to appeal the 
denial of postconviction relief in his capital case. U.S. Const. amend. VI, VII, XIV; Idaho Const. 
art. I, 55  2,6, 13 
WHEREFORE, Petitioner respectfully requests that the Court enter an Order directing 
that all costs of appeal, including the costs of the Reporter's Transcript and the Clerk's Record, 
shall be at county expense. 
Dated this & day of April 2007. 
Oliver Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho 
208-883-01 80 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I, l i ~ e  8f:i30~ hereby certify that on the 3qg day of April, 2007, I 
caused to be served a true and correct copy of the foregoing document bv the method indicated - - 
below, first class postage prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
Lori Gilrnore -6. Mail 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney - Hand Delivery 
P.O. Box 2627 - Facsimile 
Orofino, Idaho 83544 - Overnight Mail 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Idaho 83720-00 LO 
Cindy Leonhardt 
Court Reporter 
M&M Court Reporting Service Inc. 
P.O. Box 2636 
Boise, ID 83701 -2636 
(March 3, 2004) 
-4s .  Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
- Overnight Mail 
/ & U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
- Overnight Mail 
MOTION THAT COSTS OF 
APPEAL BE AT COUNTY EXPENSE - 3 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL D ISTRI~  
THE STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) CASE NO. CV2002-00443 
) CR1981-8495 
Petitioner-Appellant, ) DOCKET #34198, #34199 
v. 
STATE OF IDAHO, 
Respondent. 
) 
) NOTICE OF LODGING 
) REPORTERS TRANSCRIPT 




NOTICE IS HEREBY GIVEN that on July 25, 2007, the Clerk's Record and 
Reporters Transcripts were lodged in the above-referenced appeal. 
The parties shall have twenty-eight (28) days from the date of service of the appeal 
record to file any objections, together with a Notice of Hearing, with the District Court. If 
no objection is filed, the record will be deemed settled and will be filed with the Supreme 
Court. 
If there are multiple (Appellants) (Respondents), I will serve the record, and any 
transcript, upon the parties upon receipt of a stipulation of the parties, or court order 
stating which party shall be served. If no stipulation or order is filed in seven (7) days, I 
will serve the party whose name appears first in the case title. 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S 
TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
ROBIN CHRISTENSEN. Clerk 
Cc: Clerk of the Court 
Idaho Supreme Court 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-0101 
NOTICE OF LODGING OF SUPPLEMENTAL REPORTER'S 
TRANSCRIPT AND CLERK'S RECORD - 1 
JOAN MI. FISHER 
ID Bar No. 2854 
O L m R  W, ICOEW );x z? p q:q?J 
Limited ,%&ittee 
C;tp;'isrI F?-hbt?as Unit . - 1  A --  
Federal Iletkndcr Service3 of]td&o 
3 17 West tiQT Street Suite 204 
MOSGQW rZ) 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
'+--- - 
P r acsirniie: 208-883- f 472 
Attarneys for Gene F. Stuart 
IN I'HE IfiISmm COtNT OF THE SECOIW JUDfC1A.L DISmIm OF THE 
STATE OF 1[DA.HO, XN AND FOR a W R W A T E R  C O m  
GENE F W a 8  STUART, C ~ s e  Xa. CV..CiZ-BObTS 
FeGt-ianer, 1 
1 MOITON IFOR EmENSXOFir OF TlME ) 
1 IN \;VBo;CH TO FILE: O m m I O F S  
V. 1 TO CLEmSS PaCOm 
1 ARB RERV3RmR2S mIYSCRPTS 
STATE OF ICTPAHiO, ) Case No. CR-11)81-08495 
FlainM, 1 
V. MOTEON FOR -%EON OF TIME 
1 m WIGfiL 733 FEE 0mmoPc-S 
TO CtEm'S IIUECOm 
GENE FRANCIS SWmT, 1 AMD REPOmR'S mMSCRISIIS 
Defmdalat. 1 
Genc F. Stuart, Pdbonm in the hvc-captioned actians, hereby moves for a t e~s ion~  ia 
MOIZQN FOR E m S I O N  OF TIME IM WEDCHI 
TO FTLE O E E C ~ O N S  TO CLERKS MCOR1D 
AND E P O R E K S  T R 4 N S m S  1 
lime to S"p&mber 25, 2007, by which the mes may file, p trr f&&o ~ ~ ~ a t e  
2 9 0 ,  objections to the C l d ' s  R a a b s  and R e m a '  Trwripts. In makiag these motions, he 
reiies on the accompmfiag decldian as well as state and federal right to due pmccsss. 
Dated this of A w s t ,  2M7. 
Oliver W. fxre.rvy 
CapitaJ Ha- Uait 
Fedad D~fender SeNices ofld&u 
208-88 3-01 80 
MOTION FOR EXWSTON OF 'UW C-4 W C R  
TO FILE OBJE!CTIONS TO CLERK'S RECORD 
b.hm FEPORTER'S ThYSCmTS 2 
,TOAN &M. HSmR 
ID Bar No. 2854 
OLIVER VV. LC,EIEW3- 
Limited Admittee 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Feded mfe& w,3w of Idnhn 
3 27 "jte 6th Str~?.i, Strite %Ot? 
Mcrscou~ El 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Faslsimile: 208-883 -1 472 
IN THE C43URT OF THE SEGONP JuaICTAL DPSTRJW OF THE 
STATE OF -f3r~ABOP EV A - I  FOR CtEAfzWAmR C O m  
GERZ I?RMKXS STXiMZTF 1 Kt .4 A*/  Carsrs Rus. r n - G z - 0 ~ ~ ~  
Petitioner, 1 CV.llZcirOri;33 
f 
tr. 1 A,I?FIDpSWT IT4 SUIPPORT EIF 
'I MQTTBE FOR EmNSI(3E 0% TlBME 
> lR  %%ICE TO P E E  
STATE OF EMHO, ) U m O N S  'T"6 CLERK'S REGOR3 
Respcmdeat. 1 AN]f) REPORTER'S M S m  
1, Joan M. Fishes, state that the fbfiowing is h e  tn ffie -best of my icaovvlet: mci *miid, 
MFXDAW @I$ SLTmIIT @F MO'RON FOR Em4SEGF: 
OF TIkiE WHCH TO OBETrBKS TO CLEWS lXEGOXD 
AND EPORER 'S  TR93CaSCWm 
I ail the S u p d s i m  AEmey for the t3pit.d %b Upit md hive h n  ad$-d by 
Oliver M". hewy, M m v  counsel remnsiblbte for the &veeMmd cases, the foliaaovb?% state 
of the record i,n, &ese rrzi3tJ.w~: 
Ring v. Arkom, 536 U.S. 584 (2QO2f. 
Ui~i:~d P ~ i f  Scdce, &e Kqmrtm's Trwacxipt md 
in each of &e above mat.k.xs on Jdy 26,200'7. 
3. .A3 the Cow@ is atvm, Stmrt is the p~gonhs party in, e a h  of the x h v e  tkrm 
capwioned cases, and aU three cases arise out of his i88i fir& degree murder canvletiorr 
and dea& sentence. 
4. 'A7ift-l regard t~ NO. C4-02-On&>, the P,epcE.Ca5s Tmwe~@ a p y m  ta iin~!7Aef a 
M tran~ript af each o f  the cam% prowe*% in the abiove-captloned matter. wII, it 
appess to i~c1urirl oa tm.~mip% af my e a k r  cam ~a&ng 
filed in this m&r,  including (a) sealed W e n t §  which Petitioner filed in the other two 
abve eases (Case F P m h  f j f J a W 7 3  an4 CR-XShfI-M495), (5f a 
dc)cummt which puqmrtS to be a list ofjury trial exhibits, fc) a dacummt which puqmrts 
to be a I is  of p ~ I I r * h q  mbibib, md (dJ a l& of the State's alribits &@m 
6. The Clerk's Recard in Case Numbers C'd-02-00473 and CR- 198 1-08495 appem to 
A.WluAVlT m- SWPORT OF %OTION FOR j32XXHS1[ON 
OF TIME IN W C l f  TO FEE CIB6ECTIONS TO CLmKS mCORR 
AND ,ItEPORrnS w s c m  2 
ttrrft @fHab~zs Corps, m e  =me czf the appendices to &sf dacmmt were ssea I4  
none appear to be included in the Clerk's 
Petitioner's Match 3? 2003, A f l b i t s  In Sqqport qfPe t i fhn  I;aP Po~fc~nvicficm Relief 
discussed the staee of the Cl&s Remd mid agreed &at an. exknsicm jn kine to 
September 25,2007, would allow s WIy adequate e-a~un of the Clcrk's Rccords in 
fkrtba exminationt the parties may be a& to stipulate to & Clerk's Record. 
sworn me thtra!edaY of 
August, 2007. 
T hereb  mrtifj that on day of August, 2007,I caused to bc s d  a true and 
coxeat copy of the farf:go@ docma t  by the k&r,@d betour, p!&tge pr@d v k e  
apj5ica!le, ~ddrzssed to: 
L. LaMorrt Menon 
Deputy A&amey Genefal Y .- U.S. M&l 
Idnho AGomey Gmmd'f- OEc-I: Hmd Delivery 
Chief5 C;;Zli+;sX ti~g&r;n "JTI x Facsimile 
S ~ e h o w  bf.ai1, born  10 . ,  @ d & k  Mail 
PC) Box 83720 
Raise n) $3720-0010 
Lori FA. H a d  - Pji1rnore x 3.S. 3&d 
Cleamxb Corn@ Prosecudng Attmey Xmd Delivery 
P.6. Box 2627 x - cFacsirnile 
Orofina, TC) 83544 - OvemiW& Mail 
AFrmAVXT RiJ STtii)PORT 63 XOTlON FOR ExTFNSION 
OF TME T I  W f C H  TO FEE O B E R O N S  TO CLERM'S RECORR 
AND REPORTER'S m S C m S  4 


JOAXY Mi. FISHER 
ID Bar No. 2854 
OLIVER W. L O E W  
Limited Admittee 
Capital Hahas Unit 
Fedmd Defmder Services of Idaho 
3 1 7 West 6' Street, Suite 204 
Moscow ID 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-883-1472 
Attorneys for Petitioner/Appellant Gerte F. Stuart 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THJ3 SECOND JUDICW DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEARWATER COUNTY 
GENE M C X S  STUART, 1 Case No. CR 1981 -8495 & 
Petitioner, 1 CVU2-OQQ443 
1 Supreme Court Nos. 34198 & 341 99 
v. 1 
) Notice of Hearing Xn Re: Settlemefit 
1 of Clerk's Record 
STATE OF UDAICXO, 1 
Respondent. 1 
TO: THE PROSE-G ATTORNEX FOR THE COUNTY OF 
CLEARWATER, STATE OF .IDAHO, AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL 
FOR THE STATE OF IDAHO, AND THE CLEM OF THE DISTRICT 
COURT OF THE SEGONR ~FUDICIAL DISTRICT OF TEE STATE OF 
IDAHO. 
PLEASE TAKE IYOTICE that pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rules, Rule 29(a), Tuesday, 
October 9,2007 at 10:OO a.m. P.S.T. is sd as the day and time for a hearing on Petitioner's 
Objection To Clerk's Record. 
NOTICE OF H!uRrNG IN RE: 
SETTLEMENT OF CLERK'S RECORD -1 
Dated this $?AY o f  September, 2007. 
Respectfully submitted, 
kfoan M. Fisher 
Oliver W, toewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Fedcral Defender Services of Idaho 
208-883-01 SO 
Attorneys for PetitionerlAppellant Gene F. Stuart 
NOTICE OF HEA.WG IN RE: 
SE't'T'LEMENT OF CLERK'S RECORD -2 
9 
I hereby certify that on the&day af ~ ~ t e m h e r ,  2007.1 caused to be sewed a true and 
wrrect copy o f  the foregoing document by the method indicated beiow, postage prepaid where 
applicable, addressed to: 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General - 
Idaho Attorney General's OEce 
Chief, Capital Litigation Unit 
Statehouse Mail, Room 10 Overnight Mail 
PO Box 83720 
Boise ID 83720-0010 
Ms. Lori M. Hood- Gilmore 
Clearwater County Prosecuting Attorney 






JOAN M, FISHER 
ID Bar No. 2854 
O L M R  W. L O E W  
Limited Admiltee 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services of  Idaho 
3 17 West Sth Street, Suite 204 
Moscow UD 83843 
Telephone: 208-883-01 80 
Facsimile: 208-883- 1472 
Attorneys for Pctitioner/Appellant Gene F. Stuart 
IN THE DXSTRIm COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICXAL L)ISTlUCT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR CLEMWATER COUNTY 
GEMC I?R..AP;TCIS STUART, 1 Case Nos. CR-1981-08495 & 
1 CV-0240443 
Petitioner, ) 
1 Supreme Court Nos. 34198 & 34199 
v. 1 
NOTICE OP AND OB*TIECTION 
STATE OF IIlAH[O, ) TO CLEW'S RECORD 
Respondent, 1 
TO: THJ3 PROSECUTING ATTORNEY FOR TH[E CC'UNTU OF 
CLEARWATER, STATE OF IDAHO, AMD THE ATTORWY GEI'?ERAX, 
FOR THE STAm OF XIDAXXO, AND T'HE CLERK OF THE DISTRICT 
COWT OF TEIE SECONni JULXCIAL DICSTWCT OF THE: STATE OF 
ZDAHO. 
Undersigned cowsel received the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript on or about 
July 26,2007. Pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 29 and bis state and federal constitufional 
rights to due process, and by and through counsel, Gene Francis Stuart, objects tr, the Clerk's 
Record. 
NOTICE OF A N  OBJECTION TO CLERIC'S RECORD 
AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON APPEAL - 1 
A, The Clerk's Record Appears T o  Include-Docurnetits ReXated To But Not Properly 
Part Of The Xnstmt Matter. 
Capid pomonGction promed'mgs an: civil in name. Stuart v. l&ho, f. 36 Idaho 490, 
494 36 P.3d 1278, 1282 (2001). Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b)(l) enumerates the items which the 
Clerk's Record in a civil case must automatically include. Id That rule's next subdivision, Idaho 
Appellate Rule 28(b)(2), enmerates the items which the Clmk's Record in a criminal case must 
automatially include, with item N of subdivision (b)(2) being devoted to criminat appeals in 
whic,h the death penalty was imposed. In addition to the items which must: bc included 
automatically, Idaho Appellate Rule 28(c) provides that the Clerk's Record must include all other 
dmutnents of certain types which any party requests be included. 
On its face, Rule 2Sfb)(l) is written to apply to original civi'L actions which do not attack 
earlier c r k k d l  convictions and sentences. The provisions describing documents to be included 
jn the Clerk's Records do not contemplate the inclusion of an entire earlier case file. So, for 
example, item J of subdivision (b)(l) provides that among the documents to be included is, "A 
list of all exhibits offered, whether or not admiaed.." I.A.R. 28(b)(l) J. The plain meaning of 
the singular 'list' rather than plural "lists' is that the exhibits from the postconviction proceeding. 
not any earlier criminal proceeding, is to be included automatidly in the record. 
While Mr. Stuart requested, pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28,"tbat the Clerk's Record 
include all papers filed by each party and all orders and minute entries,"hhe did not intend that all 
exhibits from the underlying criminal proceedings and each earlier postconvjc.tion action be 
included. Notice clfnppeal(6/6/2007). Rather, in the instant matter he has relied on the Clerk's 
Record and Reporter's Transcript from those earlier proceedings, and he is confident that having 
NOTICE OF AND OBJECTION TO CLEW'S RECORD 
AND FGiPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT ON AIPPEAL -2 
done so incovrates those papers into this promding. Undmigned counsel Oliver Imewy has 
conferred with opsit lg  counsel L. LaMont Anderson, and Mr. hderson agrees that to the 
extent the carlier proceedings need to be relied on in this appeal, the Court may look to those 
earlier C l ays  Records and Reporter' s Tmschpb. 
Only those pleadings and documents which dire~tly relate to the pmceedings in the court 
bdow are properly past of the Clerk's Record on appeal. This is especially clcar here where 
rather than rwbing the merits of Mr. Stuart's claims, the Court dismissed the case on procedural 
grounds unrelated to many of the exhibits. However, counsel has received from the Clerk of the 
Court not only a bound Clerk's Record for this case, but a variety of documents From earlier 
proceedings in which Petitioner sought postconviction relief. Petitioner assumes that the 
unbound documents are intended to be part of the Clerk's Record. 
In particular, undersigned counsel received a large box on or about July 26,2007. It 
contained four bound volumes, two for Distrjct Court Nos. CV2002-443 & CRl98 1-8495 and 
the other two for Docket No. Court No. GV2002-473. h c h  of these sets purports to be the 
Clerk's Record for its corresponding case. 
The box received from the Clerk of Court in July 2007 also included these five other sets 
of documents: (1) a set of binder-cljpped documents wit11 a cover sheet stating "Jury Trial 
Exhibits"; (2) a rubber-banded set of documents with a cover shed stating ""Gene Francis Stuart 
v. State of Idaho, CR 1981 -8495 EVIDENTNRY HEARING 4/6/92'' which sheet purports to 
list the defendant's exhibits from that hearing; (3) a rubber-banded set of documents with a cover 
sheet stating "Gene Fmcis Stuart v. State of Idaho, CR 1981-8495 EVIDENTIARY HEARING 
-4/6/92" whiclt. purports to list the plaintiffs exhibits from that hearing; and (4) & (5) two 
NOTICE OF AND OBEClTON TO CLERK'S RECORD 
AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRTPT ON APPEAL -3 
rubber-banded sets of documents without any notation regarding their identity, though each 
appears to contain copies of exhibits from a June, 1999, postconviction. evidentiary hearing. 
Mr. Stuart objects that the Clerk's Record includes what purports to be exhibits, 
pleadings, and other documents relating to proceedings commenced and concluded prior to those 
now under consideration. None of these exhibits, pleadings, and other documents were relied on 
by the parties or t11e court in the case at bar. To the extent that these documen& are intcnded to 
be part of the Clerk's Record in this case, Mr. Stuart requests that they be deleted from it. In 
particular, Mr. Stuart objects to and hereby requests that all documents not properly part of this 
case pursuant to Idaho Appellate Rule 28(b)(l) be deleted &om the Clerk's Record, including but 
not limited to: 
1. The documents appended behind a sheet labeled "Jury Trial Exhibits." Neither 
party relied on my of thcsc exhibits, nor did the Court in any apparent way. In 
any event, these items were nut exhibits at. Mr. Stuart's trial but, instead, at his 
Preliminary Hearing. 
2. Exhibits from a postconviction evidentiary hearing conducted in April, 1992, as 
part of the proceedings held in relation to an carlier postconvjction petition. 
3. Exhibits from a postcoxlvidion avidentittry hearing wnducted in Junc 1999, as 
part of the proceedings held in reIation to an earlier postcouviction petition. 
Should the Court deny this objcetion and request, Mr. Stuart reserves the right to make; specific 
objections and requests regarding each particular document within each of the three categories 
described above. Were those objections and requests small in number, Mr. Stuart wodd make 
them now. Howcver, because of their number, enumerating than now. before the Court has had 
NOTICE OF AND OBJECTION TO CLEM'S RECORD 
AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRXPT ON APPEAL -4 
LHt'l I HL tIHDtH3 U I Y  I I 
an omomnity to consider whether to strike the general categories of documents f2om the 
Clerk's Record would bc unduly burdensom on the Court and the parties. 
Also, to the extent that the Court denies Petitioner's request to delete these documents 
%om the Clerk's Record, hc: asks th;lt the Clerk's Rccord be modified in two ways so that it is 
accurate. First, a number of the copies of exhibits .from the postconviction evidentiary hixirings 
appear to be only partial copies. Specifically, it appears that a number of the same exhibits were 
admitted into evidence at both the 1992 and 11999 hearings. In the Clerk's Rccord, however, the 
front page of each of those exhibits appears as the exhibit in the set of exbj,bits corresponding to 
onc of the evidentiary hearings, whereas it seems the remaining pages o f  each of those exhibits 
appear as the exhibit in the sd of exhibits corresponding to thc other evidentiary hearing. 
However, while this is undersigned counsel's best guess as to why ~opies of multiple exhibits 
from the postconvietion evidentiary hearings are incomplete, it is only a guess. Whether that 
guess is  accurate cannot be determined with certainty from the documents tl~emselves. The 
Court Clerk has provided no statement clarifying the matter. Second, a number of paper exhibits, 
noted oa the postconviction evidentiary hearixxgs' exhibit lists, are wholly absent from the sets of 
documents relating to the hearings. 
B. Documents Missing From The Clerk's Record. 
Petitioner objects that the fallowing documents are missing from the Clerk's Record, and 
he asks that they be added to it: 
a Stipulation (re: sealing certain documents) (6/28/07). 
b. Order (re: sealing certain documents) (6/29/07). 
NOTJCE OF AND OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD 
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Dated this o f  September, 2007. 
RespectMly submitted, 
(voan M. Fisher 
Oliver W. Loewy 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services o f  Idaho 
208-883-01 80 
NOTICE OF AND OBJECTION TO CLERK'S RECORD 
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X hereby ccrtifji that on the o f  September, 2007, I caused to be served a tluc and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the United States Postal Service, first class postage 
&xed, addressed to: , 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Chic$ Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise 1Cf 83720-00 10 
J 
Facsimile 
Overnight Mail - 
/ 
Ms. tori M, Hood-Gihore 
Prosecuting Attorney for Clearwater Coui~ty 
P.O. Box 2627 Facsimile 
Orofino, ID 83544 Overnight Mail 
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i'D B@r No 2854 
O L M R  W. LOEVVY 
Limited Admlttee 
Capital Habeas Unit 
Federal Defender Services o f  Idaho 
3 17 West 6' Street, Suite 204 
Moscow ID 83843 
Telephone. 208-883-0180 
Facsimile: 208-883-1472 
Arcomy for Petitioner Gene F. Stuart 
IN Tm, DISTRICT COURT OF TI-IE SECOlW JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF XDMO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FMNCIS STUART, ) Case No. CV-2002-0000443 
Petitioner, 1 Case No' CR-81-0008495 
) 
1 Supreme Court Nos, 34198 & 34199 
Y e  
1 STIPVLATION m G A m I N G  
1 GORmCTION OF CLERK'S 
STATE OF IDAHO, ltlKmR.?) 
Respondent. ) 
Petitioner and Respondent stipulate as follows: 
1. The exhibit lists as well as any of the exhibits listed therein, C.R.387-93, should be 
deleted from the Clerk's Record as none were relied on by either party or by the Cowrt in 
any apparent way during the proceedings relating to either Mr. Stuart's August 2,2002: 
Petif ion for Post-Convicfion Reliefand/or Writ oflilaheas Corpus or his 
contemporaneously filed Motion To Correci Sentence. As well, none of those items 
should be forwarded to the Supreme Court as part of the record in these cases, and the 
Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, C.R 386, should be modified to reflect this change. 
S~YPULATIUN REGARDING C O R R E ~ O R  F 
CLERK% RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRII'T -1 
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2. None of the sealed statements noted in the Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, C.R. 386, 
should be forwarded to the Supreme Court as part of the record in these cases, and the 
Clerk's Certificate should be modified to reflect this change. Those sworn statements 
werc offered and admitted only in Case No. CV-2002-473, not in either of the cases at 
bar. 
3. The following documents should be added to the Clerk's ~ecord ' :  
a. Sealed Stipulation (re: sealing certain documents) (6/28!07); 
b. Order (re; sealing certain documents) (6/29/07). 
Dated this La day of December, 2007. 
Respectfully submitted, 
v 
Joan M. Fislter 
Attorney for Petitioner 
'These additions may seem inconsistent with paragraph nmber 2, and thcy would be 
except that the parties filed the stipulation not only in Case No, CV-2002-473 but in the instant 
cases as well. The parties note that Petittoner filed in the instant cases none of the statemetlts 
referenced in the scaled stipulation. 
ST~PULAWON REGARDFNG CORRECTION OF 
CLERK'S RECORD AND REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT -2 
CERTIFXCATE OF SERVXCE 
I certify that on the day of December, 2007, I caused to bc served a truc and 
correct: copy of the foegoing document by the method indicated below, first class postage 
prep&d where applicable, addressed to- 
Lawrence G. Wasdcn 
Tdabo Anorney General 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Iddm 83720-001 0 
z;a;$F 
- Overnight Mail 
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IN THE DISTRZCT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, 1 Case No. CV-2002-0000443 
Petitioner, 1 Case No. CR-81-0008495 
1 
1 Supreme Court Nos. 34198 & 34199 
v. 1 
1 ORDER REGARDING 
1 CORRECTION OF CLERK'S 
STATE OF IDAHO, 1 RECORD 
Respondent. ) 
1 
The Court, having conducted a hearing on Petitioner's Objections to the Clerk's Record 
and Reporter 's Transcript on Appeal and having reviewed the Stipulation Regarding Correction 
of Clerk's Record submitted by the parties in this matter, hereby orders that: 
1 .  The exhibit lists as well as any of the exhibits listed therein, C.R.387-93, 
shall be deleted from the Clerk's Record. As well, none of those items 
shall be fonvarded to the Supreme Court as part of the record in these 
cases, and the Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, C.R. 386, shall be modified 
to reflect this change. 
2. None of the sealed statements noted in the Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, 
ORDER REGARDING CORRECTION 
OF CLERK'S RECORD 1 
C.R.386, shall be forwarded to the Supreme Court as part of the record in 
these cases, and the Clerk's Certificate shall be modified to reflect this 
change. 
3. The Clerk's Certificate of Exhibits, see C.R. 386, shall be modified to 
reflect that none of the sealed sworn statements noted therein are being 
forwarded to the Supreme Court as part of the record in these cases and the 
sworn statements themselves shall be entirely removed from the Clerk's 
Record. 
4. The following documents shall be added to the Clerk's Record: 
a. Sealed Stipulation (re: sealing certain documents) (6/28/07); 
b. Order (re: sealing certain documents) (6/29/07). 
Dated this ~b " day of December, 2007. 
ORDER REGARDING CORRECTION 
OF CLERK'S RECORD 2 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
-ct 3 I certify that on the :3' - day of , I caused to be served a true and 
correct copy of the foregoing document by the method indicated below, first class postage 
prepaid where applicable, addressed to: 
Lawrence C. Wasden 
Idaho Attorney General 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Deputy Attorney General 
Capital Litigation Unit 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, Iddho 83720-00 10 
U.S. Mail 
- Hand Delivery 
- Facsimile 
- Overnight Mail 
Joan M. Fisher U.S. Mail 
Oliver W. Loewy - Hand Delivery 
Capital Habeas Unit - Facsimile 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho - Overnight Mail 
3 17 West 6' Street, Suite 204 
Moscow D 83843 
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IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) CASE NO. CRl981-8495, CV2002-443 
) DOCKET #34198, #34199 
PetitionerIAppellant, ) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
Vs. ) OF EXHIBITS 
) 





I, ROBIN CHRISTENSEN, Clerk of the District County of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify: 
That the following is a list of lodged document which are being forwarded to the 
Supreme Court as Exhibits in this cause: 
EXHIBITS: none 
LODGED DOCUMENTS: 
Transcript of telephonic status conference 1/6/06. 
Transcript of scheduling conference 3130106. 
Transcript of motion hearing 5/22/06. 
Transcript of scheduling conference 3/3/04. 
SEALED: 
Stipulation filed 6/28/07 
Order filed 7/2/07 
cys\ IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and official seal this 
& day of January, 2008. 
CARRIE BIRD 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
OF EXHIBITS 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FRANCIS STUART, ) CASE NO. CV1981-8495, CV2002-443 
) DOCKET#34198,#34199 
PetitionerIAppellant, ) 
) CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
vs. 1 
) 




I, Sue K. Summerton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that 
the above and foregoing record in the above entitled cause was compiled and bound 
under my direction as, and is a true, full and correct record of the pleading and 
documents under Rule 28 of the Idaho Appeiiste Rules. 
I further certify that all documents lodged, including briefs, in the above entitled 
cause will be duly lodged as Exhibits with the Clerk of the Supreme Court, along with 
the Court Reporter's Transcript, if requested, and Clerk's Record. 
IN WITNESS WHEREOF, I have hereunto set my hand and affixed the seal of 
said Court at Orofino, ldaho thisx*%ay of January, 2008. 
CARRIE BIRD 
Clerk of the District Court 
CLERK'S CERTIFICATE 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT OF THE 
STATE OF IDAHO, IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF CLEARWATER 
GENE FWNClS STUART, ) CASE NO. CR1981-8495, CV2002-443 
) DOCKET #34198, 341 99 
PetitionerIAppellant, 1 
) CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
vs. ) 
) 




I, Sue K. Summerton, Deputy Clerk of the District Court of the Second Judicial 
District of the State of Idaho, in and for the County of Clearwater, do hereby certify that 
I have personally served or mailed, by United States mail, postage prepaid, on copy of 
the Clerk's Record and Reporter's Transcript if, a transcript was requested, to each of 
the parties or their Attorney of Record as follows: 
Joan M. Fisher Lori Gilmore 
Olivery Loewy Clearwater County Prosecutor's Office 
Capital Habeas Unit P.O. Box 2627 
Federal Defender Services of Idaho Orofino, ID 83544 
317 West 6th Street, Suite 204 
Moscow, ID 83843 
L. LaMont Anderson 
Attorney General's Office 
P.O. Box 83720 
Boise, ID 83720-001 0 
IN WITNESS WHEREF F I have hereunto set my hand and affixed my official qh seal of the said Court this Ah- day of January, 2008. 
CARRIE BIRD, 
Clerk of the District Court 
By: 
Deputy Clerk 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
